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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The term “historicism” appears a natural foil to that of the avant-garde.  Indeed it 
appears with surprising regularity in avant-garde theoretical writings, generally 
accompanied by a fair share of contempt.  Despite the obvious connection – or tension 
– between the two terms, historicism has never achieved anything near the 
suggestiveness or authority enjoyed by the avant-garde as a category through which to 
reflect on contemporary culture.  One of the reasons it has remained largely maligned 
or ignored as a critical category is the common presumption that the term is basically 
unambiguous.  Whereas “avant-garde” is a term loaded with contradictions and 
implications that remain urgent and thought-provoking today (even though the era of 
the avant-garde is no longer our era), there is a strong tendency to assume that we 
know unproblematically what is involved or at stake with the term “historicism,” and 
that it has little to reveal to the present except insofar as it served as an object of 
critique for the avant-garde.  This situation is primarily due to the decisiveness of the 
avant-garde’s victory in the narrative of twentieth-century culture and the firmness 
with which the avant-garde was able to establish its contentious position towards 
historicism as the whole truth of the matter. With a presumptiveness akin to Gertrude 
Stein’s, the avant-garde undertook to write the autobiography of historicism, and we 
have too often read this account without critical reflection on the biases it 
incorporates. 
In that account, historicism typically appears as a fearful resistance to 
contemporary trends, as a futile attempt to ignore the passage of time, or as a senile 
incapacity to create new forms of expression.  Avant-garde theoreticians rarely felt the 
need to define the historicism they attacked in terms more precise than this.  
Historicism generally remained on the level of a codeword or negative slogan, the 
implications of which were clear to all and required no explication.  It is important to 
bear in mind that the avant-garde discourse on historicism rarely associated the term 
specifically with the Rankean Historical School and its successors (although they 
would obviously also have been encompassed by the term).  Rather, historicism 
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designated for the avant-garde a general mindset typical for the liberal bourgeois 
culture of Europe up until at least the end of World War I.  Historicism was thus 
perceived as one of the crucial cultural pillars of the ruling society against which the 
avant-garde revolted with such vehemence. 
Yet precisely the vagueness and ubiquity of this avant-garde critique of 
historicism ought to provide grounds for pause.1  The intensity of the avant-garde 
hostility to historicism (whatever that was understood to designate) could be a 
symptom that more was at stake than just cultural-political competitiveness.  Closer 
examination of the assumptions and implications of the avant-garde critique of 
historicism indeed reveals that the apparently inevitable conflict of positions between 
courageously forward-looking vision and hesitant backward glance disguises a more 
complex situation.  If historicism was the alter-ego of the avant-garde, it was one that 
could not be easily avoided: rather than the remnant of an obsolete understanding of 
culture, historicism was more the inescapable shadow cast by the sharp light of the 
future. 
For avant-garde thinkers, historicism typically represented a sort of corrupt or 
degraded consciousness of history, which paralyzed the production of cultural forms 
appropriate to the present age.  The response was to seek to recover effective forms of 
expression by vilifying the past as such.  But precisely this moment – this translation 
of a critique of historicism into a rejection of history – is what requires closer 
examination.  This translation was an essential feature of the avant-garde’s self-
                                                 
1  Historicism is in any event a difficult term to pin down, having meant many different things to 
different people at different times.  See the discussions in Georg G. Iggers, The German Conception of 
History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present, rev. ed. (S.l.: 
Wesleyan Univ. Press, 1983): 295-98; Charles R. Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of 
Historicism (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1995): 4-5; Herbert Schnädelbach, Philosophie in 
Deutschland 1831-1933 (Frankfurt a/M.: Suhrkamp, 1983): chapter 2; and Karl Heussi, Die Krisis des 
Historismus (Tübingen: Mohr: 1932).  For useful general accounts of historicism, see, in addition to the 
above, Paul Hamilton, Historicism (London: Routledge, 1996); Friedrich Jaeger and Jörn Rüsen, 
Geschichte des Historismus (München: Beck, 1992); Leonard Krieger, Ranke: The Meaning of History 
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1977); Peter Reill, The German Enlightenment and the Rise of 
Historicism (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1975); Maurice Mandelbaum, History, Man, and 
Reason: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Thought (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1973); 
Friedrich Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus (München and Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 1936); and 
Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme (Tübingen: Mohr, 1922).  The point I am making 
here, however, is not that the term is difficult to define with any precision but rather that the avant-
garde generally did not even find the attempt necessary. 
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understanding and also remains explicit or implicit in most present-day discussion on 
the topic of the avant-garde.  Yet such a translation conceals the central paradox in the 
role that historicism assumed for the avant-garde: historicism represented not a surfeit 
but rather an absence of history.  The avant-garde rejected the historicism of bourgeois 
liberal culture not because of the strength and vitality of the historicist understanding 
of tradition, but rather because of a perceived superficiality in that understanding, with 
its characteristic gestures of imitation and eclecticism.  Historicism represented a 
culture grounded in the dusty encyclopaedia rather than in real life, a costume 
melodrama rather than true-to-life tragedy. Ultimately historicism appeared as an 
interruption rather than extension of historical continuity – a fact that considerably 
complicates the avant-garde ideology of radical historical instauration.    The 
consequence of this paradox is that the avant-garde was able to attack historicism in 
terms that clearly reveal a certain historical nostalgia. 
  
The following chapters will explore these issues by tracing the background of this 
critique of historicism in the nineteenth-century and then examining the sorts of 
complications to which it led for theoreticians of the avant-garde between the two 
World Wars.  Chapter One provides a first look at those complications as they 
surfaced in the so-called Realism Debate that took place between avant-gardists and 
proponents of Realism (Socialist or otherwise) over the most appropriate artistic 
vehicle for representing the complexities of the modern era.  While this debate has 
commonly been interpreted through various pairs of opposed terms such as form 
versus content, neurosis versus reason, or fragment versus rounded whole, this chapter 
emphasizes rather the similarities between the two sides of the debate.  Those 
similarities lie primarily in the threat perceived on both sides: the threat of an artistic 
technique or strategy that misrecognizes the essential features of the present, a threat 
that this chapter argues can best be understood as a type of historicism or loss of vital 
contact with the present.   
 The second chapter goes back to the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century roots 
of the discourse on historicism.  Beginning with an examination of Herder, the thinker 
generally regarded as the founding father of modern historicism, and continuing with a 
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consideration of Nietzsche’s extremely influential critique of historicism almost a 
century later, this chapter again seeks parallels between positions that are usually 
perceived to be radically at odds.  Herder and Nietzsche, surprisingly, have much in 
common in their attacks on a “formalizing” reason and their attempts to counter this 
through a vitalist discourse.  While Herder associated such vitalism with the historical 
consciousness, Nietzsche’s vitalism was primarily figured as a release from, or 
forgetting of, the past.  The chapter argues that this change in the status of the 
historical consciousness represents the crucial moment in the formation of the critique 
of historicism pervasive for the avant-garde.   
 Chapter Three examines Marx’s theory of consciousness in order to suggest 
that the aporiai encountered there are of particular relevance to the historical 
consciousness.  Marx provides one of the clearest demonstrations of a basic difficulty 
with articulating historical consciousness: the moment one articulates one’s own 
historical position, one has been thrust out of the narrative of history, becoming an 
object of examination rather than a subject of historical experience.  This adds a 
further layer of paradox to Nietzsche’s difficulty that the only way that historical 
consciousness could be creatively vital was if it forgot the past. 
 Chapter Four returns to the twentieth-century and to the avant-garde proper by 
examining theoretical texts by Karel Teige, the leading theoretician of the Czech 
avant-garde.  The paradoxes discussed in the chapters on Nietzsche and Marx returned 
for Teige in his attempt to formulate Constructivism as the “style of the present.”  For 
Teige, the prerequisite for Constructivism’s claim to represent the essential identity of 
the modern age was its strict functionalism and freedom from all ornamentation.  Yet 
the radicality of Constructivism’s emergence as a scientific method of artistic 
production method truly expressive of the present, after the long interregnum of 
imitative historicism, led Teige to posit a programmatic counterpart to Constructivism: 
Poetism, the joyful celebration of the beauty revealed by the Constructivist vision.  
Yet the dual program that resulted – straddling the rhetorical and logical poles of strict 
rationalism and lyrical irrationalism, purposefulness and undirected eudaemonism – 
reproduced precisely the configuration that Teige posited as definitive of historicism: 
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the dualism of an ornamental system standing in uncertain relation to the functionalist 
structure to which it has been applied. 
 The final chapter examines Walter Benjamin’s theory of historical experience.  
Benjamin is a thinker who is in many ways difficult to categorize: although clearly 
sympathizing with the avant-garde and making use of many central avant-garde 
categories such as montage and shock, he is simultaneously obsessed with the question 
of the deterioration of historical experience in modernity.  Benjamin’s thought thus 
incorporates elements that are both parallel to and critical of the avant-garde temporal 
paradigm.  This chapter argues that these tensions in Benjamin’s thought are in fact 
fruitful in that they help to reveal some of the paradoxes and reversals that were 
constitutive for the emergence of the critique of historicism beginning with Nietzsche 
and attaining its most radical formulations with the interwar avant-garde. 
 
 
 
 6 
Chapter One  
 
THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE PRESENT  
Lukács, Teige, and the Realism Debate 
 
 
The fascination of portraits comes partly from the way they entrap the 
past.  They catch in the mirror of art the reflections of a vanished past.  
[…T]hese reproductions show the face of the sixteenth century […].1 
 
[…] to imitate or perpetuate this return [to classical antiquity] in the 
present day is to compel a young and robust body to live among 
corpses – to inflict on it a premature death.  We admire tombs, but we 
do not live in them.2 
 
 
Few aesthetic conflicts of the past century appear as stubbornly irresolvable as the 
“Realism Debate” that raged among Marxist critics and philosophers in the nineteen-
thirties.3  The vast differences in the aesthetic assumptions and artistic products 
defended on each side of the debate seemed to admit no theoretical reconciliation. 
Worse yet, it is not always clear whether the attempts to hash out these differences 
                                                 
1  John Walker, National Gallery of Art Washington, revised ed. (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 
1995): 159. 
 
2  Eugène-Emmanuel Viollet-le-Duc, Lectures on Architecture, [1872] trans. Benjamin 
Bucknall (New York: Dover, 1987): 315. 
 
3  This Realism Debate can be identified with various degrees of particularity.  On the most 
specific level, it refers to a series of articles by a range of authors appearing in the German-language 
exile journal Das Wort in 1937-38.  (These materials are collected in Hans-Jürgen Schmitt, ed., Die 
Expressionismusdebatte. Materialien zu einer marxistischen Realismuskonzeption [Frankfurt a/M.: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973], and a selection of these documents in English appears in New Left Review, 
ed., Aesthetics and Politics [London: Verso, 1977].)  On a broader level, the exchanges in Das Wort are 
simply a conveniently compact formulation of issues confronting Marxist proponents of the avant-garde 
or realism almost everywhere in the mid- to late thirties.  For example, the maneuvering of Breton’s 
Surrealists vis-à-vis the cultural authorities in Moscow invoked similar issues and exchanges, as did the 
never-ending tensions between the Czech Poetists and Surrealists on the one hand and their 
interlocutors defending Proletkult and Socialist Realism on the other (see, e.g., Helena Lewis, The 
Politics of Surrealism [New York: Paragon House, 1988]; and Květoslav Chvatík, Bedřich Václavek a 
vývoj české marxistické estetiky [Praha: Československý spisovatel, 1961]).  In what follows, I shall 
refer to the particular debate that unfolded in and around Das Wort as the “Expressionism Debate,” 
while the term “Realism Debate” shall refer to this more general context. 
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were even enlightening.  At times the debate appeared as a grand drama touching on 
the most crucial issues of modern aesthetics; at other times it appeared mired in an 
abstraction of argument just as scholastic as that earlier Realism debate of the 
thirteenth-century.4  The ambiguity about what precisely was at stake has often lent 
the Debate the appearance of a literary-theoretical feud between modernist Montagues 
and card-carrying Capulets. 
This impression is heightened by the sense of urgency saturating these 
exchanges: a sense that it was not only possible but even crucial to resolve these issues 
and demonstrate the error of the opposing camp.  More was at stake than aesthetic 
method.  The antagonists of the debate did not accuse each other merely of producing 
“bad art” (bad art rarely causes people to feel so threatened) but of producing 
fundamentally false images.  Fredric Jameson has described Lukács’ concept of 
decadence as:  
 
the equivalent in the aesthetic realm of that of “false consciousness” in 
the domain of traditional ideological analysis.  Both suffer from the 
same defect: the common presupposition that in the world of culture 
and society such a thing as pure error is possible.  They imply, in other 
words, that works of art or systems of philosophy are conceivable 
which have no content, and are therefore to be denounced for failing to 
grapple with the “serious” issues of the day […].5   
 
Although the point is made less often, the spokespeople for the avant-garde were 
rarely less presumptuous of the error and emptiness of literary and artistic Realism.  
Thus ostensibly aesthetic issues merged seamlessly with broader campaigns against 
false consciousness.  The arguments left no room for peaceful co-habitation, for 
                                                 
4  Thus Fredric Jameson has described the Realism Debate as an aesthetic event “whose 
navigation and renegotiation is still unavoidable for us today” (“Reflections on the Brecht-Lukács 
Debate,” in The Ideologies of Theory: Essays 1971-1986 [Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 
1988]: 133), while Peter Bürger argues in effect that the version of this debate between Lukács and 
Adorno only arose out of a failure to realize that the categories used in that debate had already been 
made obsolete and irrelevant by the phenomenon of the historical avant-garde (Theory of the Avant-
Garde, trans. Michael Shaw [Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1984]: 86-87). 
 
5  “Reflections on the Brecht-Lukács Debate,” 138. 
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differences of taste or temperament.   One position was right and the other, 
consequently, could not simply be ignored but had to have its error demonstrated. 
 This absolutism is clearly connected with the term “realism” itself.  Again, in 
Jameson’s words:  
 
the originality of the concept of realism […] lies in its claim to 
cognitive as well as aesthetic status. […T]he ideal of realism 
presupposes a form of aesthetic experience that yet lays claim to a 
binding relationship to the real itself, that is to say, to those realms of 
knowledge and praxis that had traditionally been differentiated from the 
realm of the aesthetic, with its disinterested judgments and its 
constitution as sheer appearance.6 
 
Such an expansion of aesthetic into cognitive concerns clearly foreclosed on tolerance 
of alternatives.   
In the case of Realism, and especially of twentieth-century Realism as a 
consciously theoreticized method, such cognitive claims appear to hearken back to a 
Hegelian subordination of the aesthetic to the conceptual.  Indeed one of the standard 
accounts of modern Realism perceives it as the belated offspring of Hegelian 
aesthetics.  By such accounts, this ancestry can be recognized in particular in the 
emphases on totality (expressing art’s necessary function as a vehicle for truth content 
rather than as an autonomous phenomenon), on artistic over natural beauty (expressing 
beauty’s grounding in the conceptual), and on reflection (expressing the subordination 
of the aesthetic to the conceptual).7  Further, however, such accounts generally 
recognize that the Hegelian roots of the Realist tradition are countered by a parallel 
tradition stemming from Kantian aesthetics, usually seen as leading to Modernism 
proper and taking its most extreme form in the twentieth-century avant-garde.  The 
                                                 
6  Ibid., 135. 
 
7  A recent such account is Petr V. Zima, Literarische Ästhetik. Methoden und Modelle der 
Literaturwissenschaft (Tübingen: Francke Verlag, 1991).  The notion of Hegelian/Realist aesthetics 
involving a necessary subordination of art to truth clearly lays the ground for the recurring emphasis on 
didactic art in the Realist tradition.  For many authors writing under the onus of Zhdanovite Socialist 
Realism, the step from didacticism to political prescription and censorship appeared swift and 
inevitable.  See, e.g., Robert Kalivoda, Moderní duchovní skutečnost a marxismus, 2nd ed. (Praha: 
Československý spisovatel, 1970): 19-20 and 39-40. 
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main characteristics of this competing tradition are the emphases on art’s 
independence from conceptual truth claims (associated also with the notion of the 
autonomy of art), on the priority of nature and the material over spirit (associated with 
critiques of “idealisms” of various kinds), and on beauty’s immanence to form (and 
thus its independence from particular content).  From such a perspective, the Realism 
Debate in twentieth-century Marxist aesthetics would appear to have its roots in a 
fundamental division located more or less at the origin of modern aesthetics: a 
Manichean conflict between Hegelian “conceptual” aesthetics and Kantian “formalist” 
aesthetics.8 
 As tidy as this scheme is, and as much as it seems to explain the hegemony of 
terms such as “formalism” and “reflection” in the Realism Debate, it is misleading 
even on the broad level on which it is obviously meant to apply.  The line separating 
these aesthetic traditions was crossed as often as it was upheld,9 and Marxist aesthetics 
in particular demonstrates how either a Hegelian or a Kantian interpretation could 
convincingly be postulated as the most appropriate context for a particular aesthetic 
tradition.10  In the case of the Realism Debate, however, the characterization as 
Hegelian v. Kantian, or content-based v. form-based, is particularly onerous because it 
disguises much of what the two camps shared: the common vocabulary that allowed 
them to enter into debate in the first place.11 The insistence on presenting the Realism 
                                                 
8  Zima goes so far as to describe modern aesthetics as a “pendulum” swinging between the 
poles of expressive (Kantian) and content (Hegelian) aesthetics (Literarische Ästhetik, 30).  
 
9  For instance, the anti-conceptual strain in Dada could perhaps be fit into this scheme as 
“Kantian” (assuming one did not hesitate at the posthumous laughter of the Dadaists at such a label), 
but the Dadaist attack on aesthetic autonomy would have to be classified as “anti-Kantian.” 
 
10  Debate on this issue has often commenced by trying to determine Marx’s own aesthetic 
taste, about which he left few unambiguous clues.  The argument that Marx’s aesthetic preferences lay 
with the realist works of his age is generally based on interpretation of the Sickingen debate between 
Marx and Lasalle (see Walter Hinderer, ed., Sickingen-Debatte. Ein Beitrag zur materialistischen 
Literaturtheorie [Darmstadt: Luchterhand, 1974]).  For an argument that Marx in fact sympathized with 
the proto-modernist art of his time, see Margaret A. Rose, Marx’s Lost Aesthetic: Karl Marx and the 
Visual Arts (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984). 
 
11  That some kind of common vocabulary must have existed for the debate even to commence 
becomes apparent enough if one tries to imagine what “debate” could possibly have arisen, for example, 
between Realist and Fascist aesthetics, despite the many similarities between Fascist and Socialist 
Realist aesthetic norms (noted already by Ernst Bloch during the Expressionism Debate and by Karel 
Teige a year or two earlier). 
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Debate through opposed terms ultimately hypostacizes it in terms that boil down to 
“realism v. anti-realism.” 
What was really at issue, however, were fundamentally opposed 
understandings of what constituted “realistic” artistic representation.  Those arguing 
avant-garde positions lay no less emphasis on the ultimate “realism” of their art than 
did the defenders of Realism.  They argued in essence that artistic representations 
corresponding to the complexities of modern reality were only to be achieved through 
intricate processes and ended up taking startling, counter-intuitive forms.  Precisely 
this belief is expressed in a statement such as: “Surrealism is realism in the dialectical 
sense.”12  If the degree to which many avant-gardists insisted on the realism of their 
artistic methods is surprising, equally surprising is the insistence of the Lukácsian 
Realists that the failure of avant-garde art consisted in the adherence to the mere 
appearance of things, the copying of outer forms without the work of mediation that 
would reveal the true, organic appearance underneath.  Thus, paradoxically, precisely 
the distance that separated avant-garde formal vocabularies from standard notions of 
realistic representation became, in Lukács’ account, not so much the sign of excessive 
technical reworking, as one might have expected, but rather the symptom of 
unmediated imitation. 
Here, rather than with any rigid dichotomies such as form versus content or 
realism versus anti-realism, is where the debate ultimately proved a dead-end.  The 
feud appeared interminable precisely because each side raised such similar claims.  
Each claimed to portray the deeper, essential reality, arrived at through a laborious 
process of mediation.  Correspondingly, each claimed that the other remained 
entangled in and misled by a superficial, merely apparent reality.  This rhetoric of 
surface and essence pervaded both sides of the debate and, in the absence of agreed 
criteria for determining when the essential mother lode of truth had been uncovered, 
remained patently irresolvable.  Ironically, the debate hit a blank wall not because of 
the strict differences and dichotomies that ceaselessly arose – form v. content, reason 
                                                 
12  Karel Teige, “Deset let surrealismu,” in Surrealismus v diskusi, eds. K. Teige and Ladislav 
Štoll (Praha: Knihovna levé fronty, 1934): 55.  Emphasis in original. 
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v. irrationality, fragment v. rounded whole, etc. – but rather because of the similar use 
of the distinction between unmediated surface appearance and deeper, essential reality. 
Both sides of the Realism Debate thus justified their artistic technique as 
uniquely equipped to reveal the true “physiognomy” of the modern era.  The shared 
assumption was that the nature and identity of the present was not immediately 
apparent: the physiognomy of the modern was hidden behind masks.  In contrast to 
previous periods, where the unique features of a unifying style were recognizable 
across an entire range of cultural products, the modern era presented an enigma: an 
eclectic mix of disputed traditions, of contradictions and crises, and of lost certainties.  
The immediate and secure cultural identity that past epochs seemed to have enjoyed 
was no longer possible.  The complexity of the modern era prevented it from openly 
revealing its true face; its features could therefore only be recovered by technical 
effort.   
 These common concerns of the two sides of the Debate are easily obscured by 
the radically different physiognomies each identified as true.  But the parallels become 
more visible when one examines the flip side of the arguments: how the “false” forms 
of modern culture were portrayed.  The masks or false identities assumed by the 
present might display various features, but for both Realist and avant-gardist such 
masks constituted a form of historicism.  Historicism here did not necessarily indicate 
obsession with historical forms and techniques.  Nor did it necessarily denote any 
direct association with the particular historiographical tradition of which Ranke was 
the most illustrious member.  Rather it connoted an artistic style having no legitimate 
grounding in the historical period it claimed to represent, one that therefore “was to be 
denounced for having failed to grapple with the ‘serious’ issues of the day.”13  
Historicism constituted a false consciousness because it represented a fundamental 
misrecognition of the present: the failure to perceive the present as it really was.   
 
 
 
                                                 
13  Jameson, loc. cit. 
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I. The Historicist Novel  
 
The general features of Lukács’ critique of modernist art, centered on the concepts of 
decadence and formalism, are all too familiar.  That Lukács also associated these 
concepts with a notion of historicism, however, is rarely commented upon.  This is due 
in part to his persistent emphasis on the need to cultivate a deeper historical sense: 
precisely the loss of such a historical sense and the consequent pettiness of a present 
conceived as unconditioned and self-postulating were central aspects of the decadence 
Lukács perceived in modernist literature.  His own elevation of the status of the 
historical novel genre, and the broad claims he made for it as a cognitive instrument, 
appear to reinforce the interpretation of Lukács as a defender of the specifically 
historical dimension of culture against the attempts of the avant-garde to create a 
tabula rasa.  Lukács’ avant-gardist interlocutors clearly perceived his aesthetic 
position in these terms.  Lukács’ claim that the avant-garde had reduced the cultural 
heritage to a rummage heap, and his occasionally stentorian appeals “zu der 
glorreichen literarischen Vergangenheit des deutschen Volkes”14 were easily 
caricatured as the “pious reverence towards the cultural heritage expected by the 
executors of a will.”15  On a deeper, structural level, Lukács’ efforts to impose upon 
twentieth-century art the ideals and standards of a genre having its origin in the late 
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century were also easily understood as a form of 
historicist conservatism, as a call for literature to go “back” to Tolstoy or Balzac.  
Precisely such an understanding lay behind Brecht’s turning the term “formalism” 
around and applying it to Lukács’ prescriptions for Realism.16  From this perspective, 
Lukács’ call for contemporary art to take the form of Realism appeared as a parallel to 
                                                 
14  “Es geht um den Realismus,” in Die Expressionismusdebatte, 225. 
 
15  This statement is from Brecht’s reply to the foregoing passage by Lukács (Brecht’s 
comments quoted in Aesthetics and Politics, 56).   
 
16  See “Die Essays von Georg Lukács,” in Die Expressionismusdebatte, 307-8.  See also 
Eugene Lunn’s discussion of this aspect of the Lukács-Brecht exchange in Marxism and Modernism: 
An Historical Study of Lukács, Brecht, Benjamin and Adorno (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 
1982): 87. 
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the historicizing demand, say, that modern architecture assume the forms of classical 
antiquity. 
 These two factors – the first an objective understanding of the significance of 
the historical sense for Lukács’ aesthetics, the second a contentious claim that Lukács 
was himself locked in a form of historicism – have obscured the significance of 
Lukács’ own critique of historicism within his theory of Realism.  Nevertheless, 
historicism does play a major role as a term of censure for Lukács, in particular in The 
Historical Novel, where he contrasts historicism as a decadent form with the true 
historical sense exercised by novelists in the tradition of Scott.  Surprising as it first 
seems, Lukács’ aesthetics managed to associate historicism with precisely the cultural 
practices that claimed to make the most radical break with the past and tradition: 
historicism appeared for Lukács as the fundamental characteristic of avant-garde art 
and literature.   
 Appreciating how this could be so requires examining Lukács’ account not 
only of the contemporary state of modernist art, but also of its origins.  Lukács viewed 
modernism as an extension of tendencies first appearing in the Naturalism of the later 
nineteenth-century.17  That Lukács could identify the roots of modernist art, with its 
intentional disregard for conventional techniques of realistic representation, in 
Naturalism, for which the high burnish of such techniques was essential, makes clear 
that the status of mimetic representation was not the central issue for Lukácsian 
Realism.  Put another way, there was a level on which the mimetic principle could 
become so bloated that the result was no longer realism in the positive sense.  For 
Lukács, the hyper-mimetic, “photographic” realism practiced by the Naturalists was 
thus the disguised forerunner of the anti-mimetic montage techniques of the twentieth-
century avant-garde: 
 
                                                 
17  “I would maintain […] that in modern writing there is a continuity from Naturalism to the 
Modernism of our day – a continuity restricted, admittedly, to underlying ideological principles.  What 
at first was no more than dim anticipation of approaching catastrophes developed, after 1914, into an 
all-pervading obsession” (from The Meaning of Contemporary Realism, quoted in Marxism and Art: 
Essays Classic and Contemporary, ed. Maynard Solomon [Detroit: Wayne State Univ. Press, 1973]: 
397). 
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Entstanden aus der jeder Kunst gegenüber nihilistischen Theorie und 
Praxis verschiedener dadaistischer Richtungen, “konsolidierte” sich 
diese Theorie in der Auffassung der Periode einer “relativen 
Stabilisierung” zu  einem prinzipiellen Kunstsurrogat: das unorganische 
Zusammenklebung von gestalterisch unverbundenen Tatsachen sollte 
auf Grund dessen als Kunst betrachtet werden, daß sich in ihrer 
Gruppierung, in ihrem Arrangement angeblich eine besondere 
schöpferische Originalität äußert.  Die so zustande gekommene 
Montage als Kunst ist einerseits der Gipfelpunkt der falschen 
Tendenzen des Naturalismus, weil die Montage sogar auf jene 
oberflächliche, sprachlich-stimmungshafte Bearbeitung der Empirie 
verzichtet, die der ältere Naturalismus noch als Aufgabe betrachtet hat; 
andererseits ist die Montage zugleich Gipfelpunkt des Formalismus, da 
die Verknüpfung der Einzelheiten mit der objektiven inneren Dialektik 
des Menschen und ihrer Schicksale schon gar nichts mehr zu tun hat 
[…].18 
 
 
The rather surprising association of Naturalism and Dada was thus effected through 
the central Lukácsian category of totality – or, more precisely, through the perception 
of its absence.  The link between Naturalist description and Dadaist montage was their 
shared fascination with “disconnected facts” and their development of techniques 
(reportage, montage) that exaggerated the disconnection between the details presented.  
The luxuriant descriptive detail of Naturalism failed to hold together as a structured 
whole, and so, intentionally or not, produced the same effect as the purposefully anti-
totalizing montage techniques of Dada.  Therefore, Lukács included Naturalism within 
the scope of his indictment of modernism as decadent formalism, the hallmark of such 
decadence being the collapse of a totalizing aesthetic presentation of “objective 
reality” into a fragmented structure referring to its own internal construction. 
 Nevertheless, however much Lukács may have insisted on the similarities 
between Naturalism and modernism, they obviously were not identical.  Since 
Naturalism functions in Lukács’ account as a transition phase between the classic 
realist and historical novels of the early nineteenth-century and the full-blown 
modernism of the twentieth, it allows some insight into what Lukács felt went wrong 
                                                 
18  Lukács, Der historische Roman (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1955): 271.  (Hereinafter cited as 
“HR”.) 
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in cultural practices once the bourgeoisie was no longer simply ascendant but had 
become dominant.  The crucial historical moment for the emergence of the line of 
development that would stretch from Naturalism to modernist decadence is pointed 
out clearly by Lukács: the revolutions of 1848.  In the aftermath of these upheavals, 
the bourgeoisie in Lukács’ account lost its role as the most progressive class; 
furthering its own interests no longer meant furthering the interests of society as a 
whole.  Faced with “historical competition” from the class it was now forced to 
oppress in its own interests, bourgeois ideology hardened into less truthful, less pliant, 
but more easily defended forms.  Lukács perceived this ideological hardening 
primarily in the shift in the dominant understanding of historical change after 1848.  
Whereas the emergence of the modern historical consciousness – which Lukács 
characterized as the dialectical understanding of historical change as contradiction – 
had been one of the great and progressive effects of the triumphant revolutions of the 
ascendant bourgeoisie (Hegel and Thierry being Lukács’ prime examples), the 1848 
revolutions marked the emergence of an implicitly reactionary phenomenon: a 
phenomenon that could be called the modern historicist consciousness.  This new, 
historicist consciousness, in an effort to counter the specter of further historical 
change, now denied the contradictory nature of historical development once embraced 
and formulated a notion of linear, evolutionary progress that effectively reduced 
history to an unthreatening system of sociological laws or to a compilation of curious 
facts.  This retreat from the appreciation of history as a dialectical process of radical 
contradiction and violent change was exemplified for Lukács by the rise to dominance 
of Rankean historicism:  
 
Ranke und die Rankeschule den Gedanken eines sich widerspruchsvoll 
durchsetztenden Fortschrittsprozesses der Menschheit leugnen.  Nach 
ihrer Fassung hat die Geschichte keine Entwicklungsrichtung, keine 
Höhepunkte und Niederungen: “Alle Epochen der Geschichte sind 
gleich unmittelbar zu Gott.”  Es gibt also zwar eine ewige Bewegung, 
sie hat aber keine Richtung: die Geschichte ist eine Sammlung und 
Wiedergabe von interessanten Tatsachen der Vergangenheit.19   
 
                                                 
19 HR, 186. 
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In short, by reducing history to laws and isolated details, the historicist consciousness 
put the past at a safe remove from the present and constructed a firewall to protect 
against any historical claims the former might raise against the latter. 
This shift in historical consciousness provided the framework within which 
Lukács analyzed the incubation and emergence of modernist cultural decadence.  The 
transition from the Realist and historical novel that had flourished in the first half of 
the century to the Naturalist novel that would dominate the second half reflected 
precisely this shift in historical consciousness.  Addressing the question of just what 
art could draw from this new conception of the past, Lukács stated: 
 
Diese Vergangenheit erscheint, noch viel mehr als die Gegenwart, als 
ein riesiges farbenschillerndes Chaos.  Nichts ist mit dem objektiven 
Wesen der Gegenwart wirklich objektiv und organisch verbunden, aber 
eben darum kann die frei umherschwebende Subjektivität dort, wo sie 
will, und so, wie sie will, anknüpfen.  Und da der Geschichte ihre 
wirkliche innere Größe, die Dialektik ihrer widerspruchsvollen 
Entwicklung, in Gedanken weggenommen wurde, ist die Größe, die für 
die Künstler dieser Periode in Betracht kommt, eine malerische, eine 
dekorative. Die Geschichte wird zu einer Sammlung exotischer 
Anekdoten.20 
 
 
The past, denied any urgent connection with the present, became for the Naturalists a 
mere repository of themes and details that might add color to a narrative but contained 
no cognitive power.  This development meant for Lukács a major corruption of the 
classical historical novel not only because it reduced historical material to the level of 
trite decoration,21 but also because it initiated a spiraling process whereby historical 
detail had to be amassed in ever greater quantities in order to compensate for its lack 
of objective meaning.    Lukács described “das Prinzip der photographischen Echtheit” 
that underlay Naturalism in the following terms: “Wenn in den Romanen mit 
                                                 
20 HR, 192. 
 
21 Lukács stated that “die Abgerissenheit der Gegenwart von der Geschichte schafft dann einen 
historischen Roman, in welchem die leere antiquarische oder abenteuerliche, spannende oder mythische 
Exotik einer wahllosen und beziehungslosen Thematik zu einer bloßen Unterhaltungslektüre 
herabsinkt” (HR, 193). 
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zeitgemäßer Thematik die Spezialwörterbücher immer energischer geplündert werden 
[…] so muß diese Tendenz im historischen Roman zum Archäologismus führen.”22  
Thus Lukács saw the details worked into Naturalist narratives as increasing in quantity 
precisely in proportion to their decreasing significance, thereby becoming caught in a 
self-perpetuating cycle of exaggeration that took its toll on the formal integrity of the 
Naturalist artwork.  Further, Lukács’ often shrill-sounding condemnations of the 
“perversity” of Naturalism – which continued as a major theme in his criticism of 
modernist works – were clearly referring to this same process.  Because the material 
was fundamentally barren of meaning, “die Schriftsteller, um nicht einer Monotonie 
zu verfallen, immer ausgesuchtere, unnormalere, perversere usw. Fälle zum 
Gegenstand der Darstellung machen müssen.”23  Thus a logical progression led 
Lukács’ critique along the following path: from the pseudo-scientism of the post-1848 
historicist consciousness, via the reduction of historical detail to empty decoration, to 
the exaggerations and “perverse” fascinations of Naturalism.  The critique of 
modernism as formalist and decadent was simply the final extension, the apparently 
inevitable outcome, of this logic. 
 Lukács argued the link between historicism and modernism in another way as 
well.  A historicizing Naturalist novel such as Flaubert’s Salammbô may appear on the 
surface as the product of an attempt to escape the present through a lush, detailed 
evocation of the past.  While Lukács certainly did not spare this novel from the 
criticism that it was escapist,24 he nevertheless went a step further and claimed that, 
despite the desperate effort to flee from the boredom of bourgeois society into an 
exoticized past, the heaping of archaic detail in fact served only to lock the novel 
precisely in Flaubert’s banal present.  This is a dialectical twist that is central to 
Lukács’ theory of the historical novel: a historical moment could only be represented 
in a cognitively valuable way if it were represented in some relation to the present, as 
                                                 
22 HR, 210. 
 
23 HR, 206. 
 
24  “Aus dieser Einstellung Flauberts folgt, daß er mit programmatischer Konsequenz eine 
verschwundene Welt auferwecken wollte, die uns nicht angeht.  Gerade diese Beziehungslosigkeit war 
für Flaubert der Anziehungspunkt” (HR, 196). 
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the prehistory of the present.25  Flaubert’s archaeological detail, however, carefully 
manipulated so that its accuracy had no implications as a prehistory of the present, lost 
all meaning as a history of the past as well.  Despite the careful reconstruction, 
Salammbô according to Lukács had little or nothing to do with ancient Carthage.  
Because the details served merely for decorative effect rather than as an expression of 
the objective situation of a historical moment, they constituted nothing more than 
costumes draped over nineteenth-century bourgeois characters: “Bei Flaubert gibt es 
keinen solchen Zusammenhang zwischen der Außenwelt und der Psychologie der 
Hauptgestalten.  Und durch diese Zusammenhangslosigkeit wird die archäologische 
Genauigkeit der Schilderung der äußeren Welt degradiert: sie wird zu einer Welt der 
historisch-exakten Kostüme und Dekorationen; sie ist nur ein malerischer Rahmen, 
innerhalb dessen sich ein rein moderner Vorgang abspielt.”26 
This phenomenon – which Lukács describes as the “Modernisierung der 
Gefühle, Vorstellungen und Gedanken der Menschen […], verbunden mit einer 
archäologischen Treue gegenüber Gegenständen und Gebräuchen, die uns nicht 
angehen, die also nur exotisch wirken können”27 – provided him with his second 
major connection point between the degraded historicist consciousness and the rise of 
modernist art.  Decorative archaism and psychological or linguistic modernization 
were not contradictory phenomena but rather parallel consequences of the same 
development: “In den Debatten über den historischen Roman taucht nun die 
Modernisierung der Sprache oft als antinomischer Gegensatz des Archaismus auf.  In 
Wahrheit sind sie zusammenhängende, einander wechselseitig bedingende und 
ergänzende Tendenzen.”28  The paradox of equating archaism with modernization is 
merely apparent.  Since the historicizing details from the start had nothing to do with 
                                                 
25  “Und die Neuformung der Ereignisse, der Sitten usw. der Vergangenheit besteht in diesem 
Fall nur darin, daß der Dichter jene Tendenzen, die in der Vergangenheit bereits lebendig und wirksam 
gewesen sind, die real historisch zur Gegenwart geführt haben, die aber die Zeitgenossen dieser 
Ereignisse naturgemäß nicht in ihrer später sichtbar gewordenen Bedeutung erkannt haben, mit jenem 
Gewicht hervortreten läßt, das sie für das Produkt dieser Vergangenheit, für die Gegenwart, objektiv 
historisch besitzen” (HR, 58). 
 
26  HR, 200.  Emphasis in original. 
 
27  HR, 207. 
 
28  HR, 211.  Emphases in original. 
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the past moment they ostensibly recreated, the artistic structure they served to 
embellish was essentially a disguised modern novel about modern society.  This is 
then a further level on which Naturalism served to break down the organic totality of 
the Realist historical novel: not only through the uncontrolled proliferation of detail 
but also through the necessary tension between a decorative, “outer” level of historical 
detail and a hidden, “inner” referent to contemporary society, through the creation of a 
“Mischung von äußerlicher Exotik und innerer Modernität.”29   
Just as the theme of fragmentation and exaggeration carried over from Lukács’ 
account of Naturalism to his critique of modernism, the theme of this structural split 
between archaism and modernization continued even beyond the overtly archaicizing 
novels of Naturalist historicism.  In his polemic with Bloch during the Expressionism 
Debate, Lukács brought to bear a similar terminology of “outer” layer serving to 
disguise “inner” essence.  Bloch had argued that the Expressionists’ use of techniques 
such as montage and stream of consciousness were required to represent the 
discontinuous or fragmented character of contemporary society; representing this 
society through the accepted techniques of Realism would in Bloch’s view have 
constituted a vain attempt to play “Ärzte am Krankenbett des Kapitalismus” or “den 
Oberflächenzusammenhang wieder[zuflicken].”30  Lukács accepted Bloch’s claim that 
contemporary reality appears discontinuous and agreed that this is the result of the 
intensification of capitalist society.  But he then stated that this appearance was merely 
that – an outer appearance that did not go to the core of the matter: “Wenn die 
Literatur tatsächlich eine besondere Form der Wiederspiegelung der objektiven 
Wirklichkeit ist, so kommt es für sie sehr darauf an, diese Wirklichkeit so zu erfassen, 
wie sie tatsächlich beschaffen ist, und sich nicht darauf zu beschränken, das 
wiederzugeben, was und wie es unmittelbar erscheint.”31  To accept such surface 
appearance as reality was the sign that one had been hoodwinked by the ideological 
distortions of capitalism. Precisely the failing of “die einander rasch ablösenden 
                                                 
29  HR, 203. 
 
30   “Diskussionen über Expressionismus,” in Die Expressionismusdebatte, 187. 
 
31  “Es geht um den Realismus,” in Die Expressionismusdebatte, 198. Emphases in original. 
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modernen literarischen Richtungen der imperialistischen Periode vom Naturalismus 
bis zum Surrealismus” was that “sie bleiben alle, gedanklich wie gefühlsmäßig, bei 
dieser ihrer Unmittelbarkeit stehen, graben nicht nach dem Wesen, das heißt nach dem 
wirklichen Zusammenhang ihrer Erlebnisse mit dem wirklichen Leben der 
Gesellschaft, nach den verborgenen Ursachen […].”32  When one penetrated below 
this surface distortion, Lukács continued, what one found was in fact a totalizing 
image of the present.  The image might not be a pleasant one, as it would reveal all of 
the contradictions and injustice of the present, but it would nevertheless be a 
continuous and cognitively valuable image of the present as a totality.   
 The terminology of appearance and essence in Lukács’ critique of 
Expressionism thus echoed his analysis of the outer archaism and inner modernity of 
Naturalism.  The historical decorativism of a Naturalist novel such as Salammbô lent it 
the appearance of being an historical novel, but to accept such appearance was to miss 
its true nature as a novel of advanced bourgeois society and thus to lose whatever 
insight could be taken from the novel.  In both cases, remaining at the surface level 
brought the consequence that one remained unaware of, and thus captive to, the deep 
structural split between surface and essence marring the artwork as a whole.  If, 
however, one worked through to the deeper meaning – this penetration of surface 
appearance being simply a metaphor for what Lukács termed “mediation” – then that 
structural split itself became part of the cognitive content of the artwork.   
Lukács’ theory of Naturalism thus reveals how, in his account, formal 
structures linked with the emergence of the post-1848 historicist consciousness 
continued within modernism even once the overtly historicizing gestures had 
disappeared.  The empty, decorative historicist details of Salammbô were echoed in 
the profusion of (for Lukács) unconnected detail in modernist stream of 
consciousness; the split between outer archaism and inner modernity was deepened in 
Expressionism’s failure to distinguish discontinuous appearance from deeper totality.  
In other words, the primary structures Lukács identified when criticizing the 
historicism of the Naturalist novel became separated from the nature of the artwork’s 
                                                 
32  Ibid., 202.  Emphasis in original. 
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content: those same structures could exist in artworks that displayed no historical 
content.  This separation of “historicist” structural flaws from the appearance of overt 
historical content allowed Lukács to call into question one of the fundamental pillars 
of the self-understanding of the avant-garde: the understanding of the avant-garde as 
engaging in a ruthless battle against historicism.  While what Lukács might have 
called the “ideology of the avant-garde” perceived itself as fighting a battle through 
which the obsolete formal languages inherited from the past would be replaced by a 
new language expressive of the present, Lukács insisted that these new languages were 
simply a further step along precisely the development they claimed to combat.  In 
Lukács’ scheme, it was irrelevant that the Dadaists engaged in iconoclastic gesturing 
or that the Futurists called for the burning of museums.  These movements remained 
“historicist” by virtue of their inner structure.   
  
II. The Idealism of Immanence 
 
Lukács’ critique of the avant-garde and the modernists in general was for the most part 
articulated in response to Expressionism.  In the debate in Das Wort this is explicit, 
since the debate began as a consideration of whether Expressionism belonged within 
the Marxist artistic heritage.  Lukács’ increasing emphasis on the association of 
modernism with irrationality, culminating in what is probably his most disputed work, 
Die Zerstörung der Vernunft, demonstrates the enormous influence that his 
interpretation of Expressionism exerted on his account of modernist art as a whole.  
For this reason it is appropriate to interrogate Lukács’ position from the point of view 
of a figure from outside this debate.  The polemics of the Expressionism Debate were 
merely one version of an aesthetic and ideological conflict being played out in various 
forms and in different places in the nineteen-thirties.  Separating out the particular 
terms of the Expressionism Debate helps reveal the deeper assumptions of this wider 
Realism Debate. 
 Karel Teige’s writings are especially useful here for a number of reasons.  
First, he was never involved in a direct exchange with Lukács, although he engaged in 
an ongoing effort in the Czechoslovak press to defend avant-garde culture from 
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detractors of all kinds, including the proponents of Socialist Realism.  Second, despite 
his reputation as the radical theoretical voice of the Czechoslovak avant-garde, he was 
just as suspicious of Expressionism as was Lukács.  He generally portrayed it in 
similar terms as an unproductive act of desperation demonstrating the dead-end into 
which bourgeois culture had driven itself.  Even in the late twenties, when Teige was 
already well established as the leading theoretician of the Czech avant-garde and 
indeed enjoyed a European reputation in particular for his work as a propagator of 
Constructivism, his suspicion of the legacy of Expressionism was so strong that it still 
negatively colored his interpretation of Surrealism – which within a few years he 
would adopt as his own position.  Thus in 1928, six years before joining the 
Czechoslovak Surrealist Group, Teige could defend the Artificialist movement of the 
avant-garde painters Jindřich Štyrský and Toyen in the following terms: “the term 
‘Artificialism’ also reveals the difference from Surrealist painting, which is so deeply 
indebted to Böcklin and Expressionism that it is incapable of utilizing the unlimited 
possibilities represented by the heritage of Cubism, instead degenerating into a literary 
and formalized historicism.”33  The unrepentant irrationalism of Expressionism was 
thus suspect not only for Lukács but for Teige as well, whose aesthetic position 
constantly revolved around attempts to formulate principles for an art of a-rational 
lyricism that would harmonize with the strict rationalism he demanded of modern 
architecture.   
 Teige’s writings, therefore, problematize the standard terms of the 
Expressionism Debate simply because his account is in several respects so similar to 
Lukács’.  Like Lukács, Teige also condemned the empty and excessive irrationalism 
of certain movements of the avant-garde,34 and he also identified a latent historicism 
                                                 
33 “Ultrafialové obrazy čili artificialismus” [“Ultraviolet Images, or Artificialism”], in Výbor z 
díla, eds. Jiří Brabec, Vratislav Effenberger, Květoslav Chvatík, and Robert Kalivoda, vol. I (Praha: 
Československý spisovatel, 1966): 321  (hereinafter referred to as “VzD”).  All translations herein are 
my own. 
 
34  In a 1927 review article entitled “Ilya Ehrenburg’s Prague Lecture, or Constructivism and 
Romanticism” Teige accused not only Ehrenburg but also LeCorbusier, Picasso, and Meyerchold of 
engaging in the “infantile disorder” of a “romanticized maschinism or mechanomania.”  He insisted that 
“Constructivism signifies a principled rejection of the romanticized concept of art in the name of 
objective, rational, socially conscious scientific work […]” (in VzD/I: 557, emphasis in original). 
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in the work of some avant-garde artists who were clearly very far from resembling the 
standard historicism of the academies.35   
 But perhaps most striking is the similarity of Teige’s use of the term “realism” 
itself.  Even in his articles from the early twenties, when Teige’s theoretical position 
was becoming rapidly radicalized as he identified himself with the Constructivist 
avant-garde, Teige lay particular emphasis on the claim of the realism of avant-garde 
art.  As had Lukács, Teige contrasted the proper form of realism with its degraded 
Naturalist form.  He extolled the “direct realism […] (in contrast to the indirect, 
illusive, descriptive form of realism, i.e., Naturalism), which, after more than four 
hundred years of empirical and sensual painting, is returning art to its true foundation: 
cognition of the real [poznání skutečna].” 36  That this direct realism had little to do 
with producing mimetic images was made clear by the further claim that this was “a 
higher realism of strict formal purity, of an independent and self-governing form, the 
true opposite of the imitative, visual, optically illusive naturalism of the descriptive 
and so-called ‘photographic’ kind.”37  In other words, this realism reached “higher” or 
beyond the immediate appearance of objects in order to achieve some sort of purer and 
thus truer expression of their essential reality.  That purity was to be judged by formal 
purity.  Teige pointed to Cubism as an example of an art inspired by this 
understanding of realism and producing forms marked by purity rather than 
“ornamentality.”38 
 Thus a latent Platonism led Teige to oppose the illusionism of standard realist 
(i.e., “Naturalist”) art to the formal purity of a higher realism.39  This Platonism, 
                                                 
35  Most famously in his polemic with Le Corbusier, which will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 4. 
 
36  “Umění přítomnosti,” [“Art of the Present”] in Život II: Nové umění, konstrukce, soudobá 
intelektuelní aktivita [Life II: The New Art, Construction, Contemporary Intellectual Activity], ed. 
Jaromír Krejcar (Praha: umělecká beseda, 1922): 133. 
 
37  Ibid., 133-34. 
 
38  Ibid., 133. 
 
39  For a discussion of Mondrian’s identification of a Platonic purity in the harmony of radical 
abstraction, see Daniel Herwitz, Making Theory /Constructing Art: On the Authority of the Avant-Garde  
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1993): 108-112.  See also Reyner Banham, Theory and Design in the 
First Machine Age, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960): 151. 
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however, did not refer to a transcendent realm, despite Teige’s claim that such realism 
touched upon a “higher” truth.  Rather this realism expressed a Platonism of pure 
immanence: the purity achieved through the lack of all outside reference.  Art would 
only be realistic in this sense if it abdicated all claim to represent anything outside of 
itself.  Realistic art for Teige achieved its formal purity by abandoning the project of 
description: the work of art “represents only itself.  It is not a depiction.”40  Thus this 
higher realism consisted simply in the presentation of the artwork’s own corporeality, 
which appeared as a form of honesty in comparison to the illusionism involved in 
descriptive realism.  The honest identity of a painting was that it was an assemblage of 
forms and colors; since the invention of photography had freed painting from the 
burden of “documentary” tasks, painting had “awoken to new life in pure, unapplied, 
specific form.”41   
 This idealism of immanence would appear to imply that Teige’s realism was 
coldly autonomous, wrapped up in the purity of its introspection.  Teige, however, 
perceived the exact opposite.  The immanence of this realism did not cut it off from 
the outside world but rather presented material reality to its spectator as if magnified 
through a lens.  Immanence brought the spectators’ thoughts back down to earth in 
order to focus them on the true features – and innate beauty – of their surrounding 
environment.  In this manner, Teige understood realism as a sort of reconciliation with 
material reality, although such reconciliation did not signify resignation but rather an 
exhilarating aesthetic engagement. This realism was the aesthetic principle that 
allowed Teige to claim that Constructivism’s principle of functional perfection would 
inherently reveal beauty.42  The more functionally perfected an object was, the truer it 
was to its immanent characteristics, the more honestly it would reveal its inner nature 
                                                                                                                                            
 
40  “Doba a umění,” [“Art and the Age”] in Stavba a báseň: Umění dnes a zítra [Building and 
Poem: Art Today and Tomorrow] (Praha: Vaněk & Votava, 1927): 46. 
 
41  “Ultrafialové obrazy,” in VzD/I: 319. 
 
42  “[…] whenever a concrete task or problem receives the most perfected, most economic, 
most precise and most complete fulfillment and resolution, then without any additional aesthetic 
intentions it rises to the purest modern beauty” (“Konstruktivismus a likvidace ‘umění’” 
[“Constructivism and the Liquidation of ‘Art’”], in VzD/I: 140, emphasis in original). 
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and thus the more beautiful it would be.  This realism, therefore, did not draw art into 
itself and away from the world; rather it revealed the beauty even of material that was 
not graced with the transcendent aureole that traditional aesthetics required of art.  
Teige’s realism led him to identify beauty in all phenomena that were characterized by 
honesty and openness as to their nature.  Referring to the organizers of the avant-garde 
Liberated Theater (Osvobozené divadlo) in Prague, Teige wrote that:  
 
when they seek guidance for their work they no longer seek it in the 
past and the tradition of the old masters, but rather in the drama of 
contemporary, vital life; in its faith and its struggles, its games and 
mass spectacles, in sport and in the music-halls, in the cinema, dance 
halls, circus, or folk festivals they find the elements of modern beauty 
[…]. Constructivism, which forms the backbone of their program, has 
led them to eliminate from their work all decorative elements and 
ornamentation, so that they can build their project from elementary 
values.43 
 
This passage reveals how the notion of a realism of immanence had for Teige a 
temporal dimension: that which was most honestly “itself” was that which was most 
characteristically modern.  The traditions of the old masters or any references to 
formal vocabularies from another time constituted a form of transcendence just as did 
the functions of representation and depiction.  Art that “was not depiction,” that 
“represented only itself,” thus necessarily revealed openly and without ornament not 
only its material features but its time and present as well.  Realism consisted in the 
discarding of deceptive garments such as depiction and tradition and the revelation of 
the present as it really was. 
 The Realism Debate of the thirties thus was not about realistic versus anti-
realistic aesthetics.  Rather it invoked the question how one was to break through the 
outer forms or disguises in which present reality revealed itself so as “diese 
Wirklichkeit so zu erfassen, wie sie tatsächlich beschaffen ist.”44  Both the avant-
garde and Realist positions faced the question: what artistic style or method should we 
                                                 
43  “Osvobozené divadlo” [“The Liberated Theater”], in VzD/I: 161. 
 
44  Lukács, loc. cit. 
 
  
26  
 
 
 
regard as the true identity, the real face, of the present?  The necessity of even raising 
such a question appeared to set the present off from past epochs.  Earlier epochs, or at 
least so it could seem, had shown their face openly; the artistic style permeating the 
various manifestations of earlier periods gave those periods a coherent identity.  Only 
the present no longer had its identity spontaneously “given” to it, for all traditions 
claiming to provide such an identity had become suspect.  Thus the appropriate 
aesthetic style needed to be discovered – it needed to be constructed through 
theoretical labor.  This is what gave the Realism Debate its stridency.  The stakes 
involved were not simply that one might make bad art but that one might prescribe the 
wrong style, that one might fundamentally misrecognize or ascribe to the present a 
false or dishonest identity.  This was the threat understood by Lukács as well as by 
Teige as the threat of historicism: the threat of imposing an artificial or superficial 
image onto the present and creating thereby a false style that masked the true 
physiognomy of the present.  Both Realist and avant-gardist held historicism to be the 
process of creating such masks and passing them off as truth.  Each claimed to have 
identified the deeper reality under the mask. 
 
 27 
Chapter Two 
 
THE EXPULSION FROM THE GARDEN 
Herder, Nietzsche, and the Critique of Historicism 
 
Wer bloß an meiner Pflanze riecht, der kennt sie nicht, und wer sie 
pflückt, bloß, um daran zu lernen, kennt sie auch nicht.1 
 
 
Der Ursprung aller Architektur aus Eisen und Glas im Sinne der 
Gegenwart ist das Gewächshaus.2 
 
 
 
“Gewiss, wir brauchen die Historie, aber wir brauchen sie anders, als sie der 
verwöhnte Müßiggänger im Garten des Wissens braucht […].”3  Nietzsche’s garden of 
knowledge was no Eden but was rather the site of two sins.  The first was the sin of 
decadence.  The spoiled idler, intoxicated by the heavy atmosphere of lush and 
overgrown vegetation, was content merely to stroll, sniff and examine blossoms in the 
garden, and perhaps pluck some samples for his collection.  Nietzsche elsewhere 
described this idler as one of the “neugierige Reisende oder peinliche Mikrologen 
[…]” crawling over the pyramids of past historical accomplishment.  The true student 
of history, who had sought out places “wo er die Anreizungen zum Nachahmen und 
Bessermachen findet, wünscht […] nicht dem Müßiggänger zu begegnen, der, begierig 
nach Zerstreuung oder Sensation, wie unter den gehäuften Bilderschätzen einer 
Galerie herumstreicht.”4  Garden and gallery were here reduced to forums for self-
                                                 
1  Friedrich Hölderlin, Hyperion, in Werke und Briefe, eds. Friedrich Beißner and Jochen 
Schmidt, vol. I (Frankfurt a/M: Insel, 1969): 295. 
 
2  A.G. Meyer, Eisenbauten, quoted in Walter Benjamin, Das Passagen-Werk, in Gesammelte 
Schriften, vol. 5 (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 1982): 221. 
 
3  Friedrich Nietzsche, Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen II: “Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der 
Historie für das Leben,” in Kritische Studienausgabe, eds. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, vol. I 
(München and Berlin: DTV and De Gruyter, 1988): 244. 
 
4  Ibid., 258. 
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indulgence; the idler did not take inspiration for new action from the amassed 
treasures but satisfied a petty desire to possess.  Thus decadence: “Von dem 
gedankenlosen Verpflanzen der Gewächse rührt manches Unheil her: der Kritiker 
ohne Noth, der Antiquar ohne Pietät, der Kenner des Grossen ohne das Können des 
Grossen sind solche zum Unkraut aufgeschossene, ihrem natürlichen Mutterboden 
entfremdete und deshalb entartete Gewächse.”5 
 The second sin was that of the scientist.  The scientist’s diligence, however, 
appears in Nietzsche’s account to be merely a variant of the decadent’s idleness: the 
“neugierige Reisende oder peinliche Mikrologen” were equivalent sources of 
annoyance to those seeking instruction in history.  The scientist and the decadent were 
linked through their intemperate desire to amass material and their incapacity to put 
such material to use.  The botanist’s samples, as painstakingly organized and carefully 
stored as the decadent’s picture gallery, combined to form nothing more than a 
curiosity cabinet.  Worse yet, the modern scientist’s drive to dissect, separate, and 
categorize had transformed history from a live source of energy into a dead object of 
observation:  
 
Und nun schnell einen Blick auf unsere Zeit!  Wir erschrecken, wir 
fliehen zurück: wohin ist alle Klarheit, alle Natürlichkeit und Reinheit 
jener Beziehung von Leben und Historie […]!  Liegt die Schuld an uns, 
den Betrachtenden?  Oder hat sich wirklich die Constellation von 
Leben und Historie verändert, dadurch, dass ein mächtig feindseliges 
Gestirn zwischen sie getreten ist? […] Es ist allerdings ein solches 
Gestirn, ein leuchtendes und herrliches Gestirn dazwischen getreten, 
die Constellation ist wirklich verändert – durch die Wissenschaft, durch 
die Forderung, dass die Historie Wissenschaft sein soll.6 
 
Thus the garden of knowledge expressed the two forces acting on the modern 
historical sense: on the one hand the self-indulgent torpidity of the decadent, and on 
the other the stultifying pedantry of the scientist.  These two forces, both driven by the 
greedy desire to accumulate at all costs, had distorted the historical sense into a 
                                                                                                                                            
 
5  Ibid., 264-65. 
 
6  Ibid., 271.  Emphasis in original. 
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mockery of what it ought to have been.  From a source of instruction and inspiration to 
action, the modern historical sense had devolved into a pass-time, or even worse, into 
a dissolving agent that reduced the accomplishments and drama of history into lifeless 
specimens suitable only for the private collection or technical catalog.   
 This garden had not always been this way.  Where Nietzsche found rank weeds 
and poisonous blossoms, others had found the image of order and meaning.  The 
metaphor of history as a garden full of unique and fragile blossoms had been one of 
the standard tropes of the Historical School, against which Nietzsche’s polemic was 
largely pointed.7  Yet the origins of the metaphor extend back further.  It was Herder 
who had originally claimed “daß […] man die Erde als einen Garten ansehen könnte, 
wo hier diese, dort jene menschliche Nationalpflanze in ihrer eignen Bildung und 
Natur blühet […].”8  Herder, however, had adopted the metaphor of a garden of 
history precisely to illustrate his distance from the strict rationalism of Enlightenment 
science.  In contrast to what he deemed the “mechanical” historiography of writers 
such as Hume, Voltaire, and Robertson, Herder wished to emphasize how history 
constituted a field of knowledge resistant to the categorical precision and nomothetic 
universalism of scientific thought.  The garden metaphor expressed not only this 
contrast to mechanical rationality, but also the urgency and relevance Herder 
attributed to history as a source of knowledge of the present.  Herder felt that the 
accounts of the Enlightenment historians were too heavy with the dust of libraries and 
                                                 
7  Although Nietzsche never actually used the term “historicism” in “Vom Nutzen und 
Nachteil,” Karl Heusi has described it as the book “in dem man ihn [i.e., the term “historicism”] vor 
allem vermuten möchte” (Die Krisis des Historismus [Tübingen: Mohr, 1932]: 2).  An example of how 
the vegetative metaphor for history was used in the rhetoric of the Historical School is provided by 
Georg Gervinus’ 1852 Preface to his Einleitung in die Geschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts: “Das 
wenige, was sich von Betrachtung anschließt, erwächst ungezwungen aus den geschichtlichen 
Hergängen selbst und ist frei von jedem Kunstwort eines Systems und frei von jedem Kunststück der 
Sophistik.  Die Pflanze des tatsächlichen, die hier in typisch-einfacher Gesetzlichkeit erscheint, wird 
hoffentlich gesund und unverstümmelt gefunden, und an der Blüte des Urteils, die hier und da in 
Knospen ansetzt, keine Spur einer Treibkunst entdeckt werden” (Berlin: Dom-Verlag, 1921): 9.  On 
Wilhelm von Humboldt’s use of the plant analogy to express the organic coherence he felt characteristic 
of historical knowledge, see Georg G. Iggers, The German Conception of History: The National 
Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present (S.l.: Wesleyan University Press, 1983): 57. 
 
8  Johann Gottfried Herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (hereinafter 
“Ideen”), in Herders Sämmtliche Werke, Bernhard Suphan, ed., vol. XIV (Berlin: Weidmannsche 
Buchhandlung, 1887): 84.  (This edition shall be cited hereinafter as “SW” followed by a volume 
number.) 
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studies; thus he wished to send the historian out into the fresh air in order to move 
freely, perceive, and engage with the surrounding world. 
Somewhere in the century between Herder’s and Nietzsche’s visits, therefore, 
this garden had become dreadfully overgrown.  The fresh air had turned into a 
greenhouse atmosphere.   Where Herder had perceived the image of an ordered whole 
constituted from a myriad of unique and fascinating blossoms, Nietzsche perceived a 
sprawling collection of weeds.   
The deterioration of this garden represents more than just the fate of a 
particular metaphor.  It is indicative of a wider shift in the aspirations and hesitations 
associated with the category of history.  This shift stands out with particular clarity in 
the light of what Herder and Nietzsche have in common: as two of the most significant 
figures of the German Counter-Enlightenment, each was concerned to point out the 
limits and hazards of an absolute faith in reason.  They pointed to such limits, 
however, not by criticizing reason from an anti-rationalist standpoint, but rather by 
turning the critical principles of Enlightenment rationalism against the Enlightenment 
itself.9  Thus both Herder and Nietzsche criticized what they perceived as an 
arrogantly self-confident and undialectical notion of reason.  Herder and Nietzsche 
described this undialectical rationalism, which engulfed the world but was unable to 
turn back on itself, and which created a universe in its image by imagining itself to be 
universal, in remarkably similar terms.  The essence of this deficient form of reason 
for both of them came down to its formalism.  Formalism filtered the world through 
abstract categories, which took priority over individual examples; the compulsively 
repetitive application of such categories replaced the exercise of vital and productive 
cognitive energy.  Where more supple forms of reason were able to combine 
                                                 
9  In regard to Herder this point is made in Robert E. Norton, Herder’s Aesthetics and the 
European Enlightenment (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1991), introduction and chapter one.  Herbert 
Schnädelbach has argued that historicism in general “praktiziert Aufklärung über die Aufklärung und ist 
als Aufklärungskritik eben nicht einfach Gegenaufklärung” (Philosophie in Deutschland 1831-1933 
[Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 1983]: 54, emphases in original).  In regard to Nietzsche, see, e.g., Robert 
B. Pippin’s claim that Nietzsche often appears to try to “out-trump” Kant and the post-Kantians through 
Kantian terminology (Modernism as a Philosophical Problem: On the Dissatisfactions of European 
High Culture [Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1991]: 82). 
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perceptions into holistic patterns, formalism ruthlessly divided the world so as to fit 
within its predetermined categories.    
While Herder’s and Nietzsche’s descriptions of this formalism are very similar 
– in fact at times almost identical – the transformation of the garden indicates where 
their accounts are deeply at odds.  Herder had found the fundamental antidote to 
formalist rationality in the historical understanding.  Since the garden of history 
represented a field of knowledge consisting entirely of unique and individual events, it 
was particularly resistant to the application of abstract categories.  Thus Herder’s 
assault on formalist reason led him to cast his glance back towards the past: the 
lessons in logic to be gleaned from the study of history were not an end in themselves 
but were to help dissolve the habits of rigidly formalist thought that Herder felt 
obstructed future cognitive development.  By the time Nietzsche entered this garden, 
however, his associations were quite the opposite.  The historical appeared as the very 
soil from which this tangled formalism grew, and the garden of history represented 
mere raw material for the classificatory systems of the botanist.  Nietzsche sought the 
vital energy necessary to overcome the stifling formalism of modern science not by 
appealing to history – which had become too deeply enmeshed in scientific 
classification – but rather by appealing to “life,” to the ceaseless re-creation of 
identity.  Nietzsche did, to be sure, admit in “Vom Nutzen und Nachteil” the 
possibility that history could serve as a source of life for those true seekers able to 
liberate themselves from the pseudo-scientism of the modern historical consciousness.  
Nevertheless, the overall rhetorical structure of Nietzsche’s argument functioned to 
ally “life” with presence.  Even those moments when Nietzsche identified history as a 
source for life were made possible because Nietzsche implicitly perceived the 
historical to have been actualized or made present for a fleeting moment.  The 
deterioration of the garden thus represents this shift: with Nietzsche, resistance against 
formalist reason no longer cast the glance backward to history, as it had for Herder, 
but rather forward to the next incorporation of life and to a present that was always 
just emerging out of the future. 
This shift constitutes the foundation of a critique of historicism that was to 
become one of the ideological pillars of the twentieth-century avant-garde – a crucial 
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element, so to speak, of the avant-garde’s subconscious.  The avant-garde artist 
perceived the dependence of liberal bourgeois culture upon revivals of past forms or 
systematizations of historical aesthetic traditions as the mark of that culture’s 
impotence.  The historicism of that culture appeared to consist in this stifling 
overabundance of historical knowledge; thus the need for a radical rejection of the past 
and a new beginning.  But in fact what was really at issue was not so much the 
abundance as the degeneration of the historical in nineteenth-century culture.  The 
critique of historicism for which Nietzsche’s “Vom Nutzen und Nachteil” served as 
the unofficial manifesto identified the impotence of historicism in the conjunction of 
history and formalism.  This conjunction had dissolved history as an active force and 
given rise to the shallowness of the modern historical consciousness.  With Nietzsche 
the distinction between history and historicism was still perceptible, as he admitted the 
possibility of a positive and life-producing understanding of history, even though his 
logic for the most part denied this possibility.  For the avant-garde artist of the early 
twentieth-century, however, the elision between history and historicism had become 
complete.  The debilitating formalism that Herder had tried to resist through the 
suppleness of historical reason appeared as the defining characteristic of the historical 
itself.   
 
I. The Cultivation of Reason 
 
Herder’s intellectual legacy is often difficult for a modern reader to evaluate.  While 
he is generally regarded along with Hamann as one of the founding figures of the 
German Counter-Enlightenment, many passages in his writings attest to his deep 
commitment to Enlightenment ideals.  The political implications of Herder’s thought 
are equally hard to assess, as at times he appears as an apologist for a self-satisfied 
nationalism, and at times as the defender of a liberal, cosmopolitan tolerance.10  
                                                 
10  These ambiguities have produced drastically differing interpretations of Herder’s legacy.  
Usually associated on the one hand with Goethe and Schiller as one of the founders of Weimar 
humanism, Herder has on the other hand often been contentiously interpreted by conservative German 
nationalists as the great defender of a superior German “national genius” (see Bernhard Becker, 
“Phasen der Herder-Rezeption von 1871-1945,” in Johann Gottfried Herder, 1744-1803, ed. Gerhard 
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Herder often appears to have had one foot planted in the nineteenth-century and one 
foot still in an earlier age.  He raised many of the issues that became critically urgent 
in nineteenth-century culture: issues of national identity, of aesthetic autonomy, of 
idealism versus vitalism, of tradition versus revolution.  Yet he combined and resolved 
these issues in ways that shortly thereafter became unsustainable.  Precisely this 
combination of proto-modernist questions with pre-modernist answers makes Herder 
so difficult to classify with twentieth-century terminology.   
Such difficulties, of course, would be of limited interest if they did not point to 
something deeper.  Underneath the apparent contradictions in Herder’s position lay a 
concept that he implicitly assumed but never explicitly named: formalist rationality.  
Teasing out the ways Herder described what now appear to be incompatible positions 
as forming part of a consistent intellectual project reveals the outline of his critique of 
formalist rationality.  Inversely, examining that critique of formalism helps clarify at 
least some of the paradoxes in Herder’s overall position. 
Herder at times appears as an orthodox Enlightenment thinker.  This stands 
forth clearly in passages where he described his vision of a unified human race, of a 
common human nature linking all societies despite the appearance of radical 
difference.  The very first sentence of Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur 
Bildung der Menschheit announced this vision: “Je weiter es sich in Untersuchung der 
ältsten Weltgeschichte, ihrer Völkerwanderungen, Sprachen, Sitten, Erfindungen und 
Traditionen aufklärt: desto wahrscheinlicher wird mit jeder neuen Entdeckung auch 
der Ursprung des ganzen Geschlechts von Einem.”11  Herder was optimistic that 
increased understanding of the unity-in-variety of humanity would produce a better, 
                                                                                                                                            
Sauder [Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987]: 423-36).  Simultaneously, however, Herder served as a 
catalyst in the development of 19th-century Slavic and Pan-Slavic nationalisms (see Peter Drews, 
Herder und die Slaven. Materiellen zur Wirkungsgeschichte bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts 
[München: Sagner, 1990]).  Further, Marxist commentators have portrayed Herder as the harbinger of 
leftist egalitarianism in 19th-century Germany (see, e.g., Wolfgang Förster, “Geschichtsphilosophie und 
Humanitätsbegriff Herders,” in Johann Gottfried Herder und die progressive bürgerliche Geschichts- 
und Gesellschaftstheorien zwischen 1720-1850 [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1979]: 43).  With the 
exceptions perhaps of Hegel and Nietzsche, few modern German thinkers have appeared so differently 
to so many different interpreters. 
 
11  SW/V: 477.  This quote is from Herder’s earlier work on the philosophy of history, Auch 
eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit (1774) (hereinafter “Auch eine 
Philosophie”).  Here and in all following citations, emphases are Herder’s. 
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more peaceful society.  An understanding of the variety of forms produced by 
different climates, geography, cultures and traditions, rather than underscoring the 
divisions between societies, would serve to reveal the common and unchanging 
characteristics of the human species: “In so verschiedenen Formen das 
Menschengeschlecht auf der Erde erscheint: so ists doch überall Ein’ und diesselbe 
Menschengattung.”12  Herder believed that this awareness must lead to a sense of 
solidarity and tolerance, and to a reduction of the violence caused by peoples’ sense of 
difference from each other.13 
  Herder was also convinced of the power of reason to clear away superstition.  
Stories of men with tails or their feet attached backwards, theories that orangutans 
might be capable of speech, revealed their absurdity once the true variety and unity of 
humanity was known: 
 
Wie viele Fabeln der Alten von menschlichen Ungeheurn und 
Mißgestalten haben sich durch das Licht der Geschichte bereits 
verlohren!  und wo irgend die Sage noch Reste davon wiederholet, bin 
ich gewiß, daß auch diese bei hellerm Licht der Untersuchung sich zur 
schönern Wahrheit aufklären werden.14 
 
This commitment to the increase of knowledge and tolerance and to the battle against 
prejudice and superstition shows Herder’s affinities with the mainstream of 
Enlightenment thought.  Nevertheless, the above passage also begins to reveal where 
he departed from that mainstream. While “light” and “enlightenment” were still the 
                                                 
12  SW/XIII: 252.  Herder’s theory of climate illustrates this point well.  While Herder has 
sometimes been interpreted as having emphasized the differentiating effects climate and geography 
have on societies and customs, he in fact lay more emphasis on what remained constant throughout such 
variation: “niemand z.B. wird verlangen, daß in einem fremden Klima die Rosa eine Lilie, der Hund ein 
Wolf werden soll” (ibid., 284).  On how this emphasis set Herder apart from the major French theorists 
of climatic influence (Montesque), see Gonthier-Louis Fink, “Von Winckelmann bis Herder.  Die 
deutsche Klimatheorie in europäischer Perspektive,” in Johann Gottfried Herder, 1744-1803, 173. 
 
13  Thus Herder contrasted the differences resulting from climatic or cultural variation with the 
common features that distinguish all human beings from our closest relatives, the apes: “Du aber 
Mensch, ehre dich selbst. Weder der Pongo noch der longimanus ist dein Bruder; aber wohl der 
Amerikaner, der Neger.  Ihn also sollst du nicht unterdrücken, nicht morden, nicht stehlen: denn er ist 
ein Mensch, wie du bist; mit den Affen darfst du keine Brüderschaft eingehn” (SW/XIII: 257). 
 
14  Ibid., 255. 
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victors over fable and superstition, the mechanism of enlightenment had changed: 
where one would expect to find the “light of reason,” one finds the “light of history” 
instead. 
 That Herder identified history rather than reason as the ultimate source of 
enlightenment reveals that a major part of Herder's project in fact consisted in a 
critique of Enlightenment reason.  His primary complaint with the model of rationality 
he found in major Enlightenment thinkers such as Hume or Voltaire was that it was 
“mechanical.”  He wrote that: “Der Geist der neueren Philosophie – daß er auf mehr 
als eine Art Mechanik seyn müße, zeigt, denke ich, der meiste Theil seiner Kinder.  
Bei Philosophie und Gelehrsamkeit oft wie unwißend und unkräftig in Sachen des 
Leben und des gesunden Verstandes!”15  Herder’s use of the term “mechanical” led 
him, not surprisingly, to oppose it to “life,” to the capacities and powers that make 
human beings into something more than merely intricate machines.  The mechanical 
mode of thought seemed dangerous for Herder because it functioned as a soporific, 
putting such human capacities to sleep and ultimately withering them away.16   
Simultaneously, however, Herder gave the term “mechanical” a surprising 
twist.  The claim that Enlightenment rationality ultimately turned society into a 
“machine”17 was not a claim about the instrumentality of Enlightenment reason.  
Herder did not portray Enlightenment thought as having ignored something “higher” 
or more spiritual in favor of means-end calculation or utilitarian concern with the 
production of particular results in the most efficient manner.  Quite the opposite, 
Herder argued that Enlightenment reason was not nearly instrumental enough.  It had 
lost sight of the fact that philosophy and theory were not to be ends in themselves but 
rather tools to achieve particular goals and to provide a means for action: 
 
                                                 
15  SW/V: 535. 
 
16  “Wenn meistens neue Methoden in jeder Art und Kunst die Welt veränderten – neue 
Methoden entübrigten Kräfte, die voraus nöthig waren, sich aber jetzt (denn jede ungebrauchte Kraft 
schläft!) mit der Zeit verlohren” (ibid., 534). 
 
17  Ibid., 534. 
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Statt, daß in den alten Zeiten der philosophische Geist nie für sich 
allein bestand, von Geschäften ausging und zu Geschäften eilte, also 
auch nur Zweck hatte, volle, gesunde, würkende Seelen zu schaffen, 
seit er allein stehet und Handwerk geworden – ist er Handwerk.  Der 
wievielste Theil von euch betrachtet Logik, Metaphysik, Moral, Physik 
als was sie sind – Organe der Menschlichen Seele, Werkzeuge, mit 
denen man würken soll!18 
 
 
The mechanistic nature of the new philosophy thus did not consist for Herder in some 
sort of fatal ignorance of what was truly human and a blind adherence to means-end 
rationality.  Rather it consisted in fatal ignorance of real life and in an inability to 
produce practical results.  For Herder, Enlightenment rationality had ceased to produce 
tools that could be put to practical use.  Instead, it merely spun a web of cross-indexed 
encyclopedias, dictionaries, and philosophical systems that lost all reference to outside 
reality.  The result was mere ivory tower learning: 
 
Auf dem Papier wir rein! wie sanft! wie schön und groß; heilos im 
Ausführen! bei jedem Schritte staunend und starrend vor ungesehenen 
Hindernißen und Folgen. […] Wörterbücher und Philosophien über 
alle, ohne eine einzige mit dem Werkzeug in der Hand zu verstehen: 
sind allesammt abrégé raisonné ihrer vorigen Pedanterie geworden – 
abgezogener Geist!  Philosophie aus zwei Gedanken, die Mechanischte 
Sache von der Welt.19 
 
The claim that Enlightenment reason was mechanistic thus implied for Herder not that 
it was instrumental but rather the direct opposite: that it was autonomous, cut off from 
real life.  “Mechanik” was not opposed to the spiritual but was simply the other face of 
“abgezogener Geist.”  Herder’s argument against the mechanistic philosophy of the 
Enlightenment, therefore, surprisingly enough anticipated the sort of accusations that 
engineers and natural scientists would start leveling against philosophy and art half a 
century later: that they were self-absorbed, detached from reality, and therefore 
ineffective or indeed purposeless. 
                                                 
18  Ibid., 535. 
 
19  Ibid., 536-7. 
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 Herder thus arrived at the startling conclusion that the mechanistic 
philosophers were in fact mere dreamers – “staunend und starrend.”  Such conclusion 
was possible only because Herder criticized Enlightenment reason on two fronts: he 
opposed Mechanik not only to feeling (Empfindung) but also to activity (Tätigkeit) and 
action (Handlung).  This association of feeling and action emerges clearly in a key 
passage in Auch eine Philosophie, in which Herder defended the Middle Ages against 
the charge of having been nothing more than a thousand years of pointless and petty 
feudal quarrels: 
 
“Daß es jemandem in der Welt unbegreiflich wäre, wie Licht die 
Menschen nicht nährt!  Ruhe und Üppigkeit und sogenannte 
Gedankenfreiheit nie allgemeine Glückseligkeit und Bestimmung seyn 
kann!”  Aber Empfindung, Bewegung, Handlung – wenn auch in der 
Folge ohne Zweck, (was hat auf der Bühne der Menschheit ewigen 
Zweck?) wenn auch mit Stößen und Revolutionen, wenn auch mit 
Erfindungen, die hie und da schwärmerisch, gewaltsam, gar 
abscheulich werden – als Werkzeug in den Händen des Zeitlaufs, 
welche Macht! welche Würkung! Herz und nicht Kopf genährt! mit 
Neigungen und Trieben alles gebunden, nicht mit kränkelnden 
Gedanken! […]   Gährung Menschlicher Kräfte.  Große Kur der ganzen 
Gattung durch gewaltsame Bewegung, und wenn ich so kühn reden 
darf, das Schicksal zog, (allerdings mit grossem Getöse, und ohne daß 
die Gewichte da ruhig hangen konnten) die große abgelaufne Uhr auf! 
da raßelten also die Räder!20 
 
 
In the above passage Herder described feeling and action as linked faculties of the 
heart.  Only the capacity to feel passionately could produce the impulse to action.  
Such action might be unwise, irrational, or even destructive, but as a sheer release of 
energy it served a positive purpose by putting events into motion, even if the direction 
of that motion might not be under control.  The head, the faculty of reason, 
consequently appeared mired in “kränkelnde Gedanken:” the result was a ceaseless 
curbing of energy, or a form of contemplation that might be peaceful but was 
unnourishing and unproductive. 
                                                 
20  Ibid., 525-6. 
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 This association of feeling and action against mechanical reason is one of the 
characteristic features of Herder’s critique of Enlightenment.  Such a double front, 
however, became unsustainable for most thinkers after Herder.  By the early to mid-
nineteenth-century, the different sides of Herder’s critique had developed in absolutely 
opposite directions: Mechanik could be opposed either to Empfindung or to Tätigkeit, 
but not to both.  Thus one side of Herder’s critique clearly anticipated a conservative, 
Burkean position valorizing feeling, tradition, and even prejudice over the coldly 
rational and ruthlessly destructive revolutionary drive.  Napoleon’s notorious 
comment that “diffuse metaphysics” lacked “knowledge of the human heart and of the 
lessons of history”21 clearly made use of Herderian categories, even if giving them a 
different political shading.  Simultaneously, however, Herder’s opposition of 
Mechanik to Tätigkeit glorified revolutionary upheaval for its own sake, perceiving it 
as the rattle of chains and creaking of gears that accompanied the rewinding of the 
clock of history.22  This side of Herder’s thought valorized action over mere 
philosophy or theory.  Such valorization of revolutionary action led Herder to criticize 
autonomous reason or paper knowledge in terms that occasionally sound straight out 
of Marx.  Statements such as “Ideen geben eigentlich nur Ideen”23 show how Herder’s 
claim that Enlightenment thought had lost the ability to function as a tool anticipated 
Marx’s later attack against idealist philosophy as having failed to change the world.   
 Herder thus straddled several of the conceptual positions that later crystallized 
as basic oppositions of nineteenth- and twentieth-century culture.  Herder was at times 
one of the Enlighteners, at times their militant critic; at times he anticipated Romantic 
conservatism, and at times revolutionary socialism.  This apparent schizophrenia has, 
nonetheless, a certain logic to it.  That logic lies in the notion of formalism underlying 
Herder’s criticism of Enlightenment reason. 
                                                 
21  Quoted in Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, rev. ed. 
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1983): 154.  Napoleon’s comment, which dates from 1812, was made 
in reference to Destutt de Tracy’s science of ideology. 
 
22  It should be emphasized that the quotation under discussion dates from 1774, and therefore 
Herder’s revolutionary enthusiasm was not an echo but rather an anticipation of the French Revolution. 
 
23  SW/V: 539. 
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 Herder associated mechanical philosophy with the search for generalizing 
principles.  The debilitating autonomy of Enlightenment thought lay in its constant 
striving for generality.  For Herder, the reduction of phenomena to their most general 
form did not distill their essential characteristics but rather drained them of precisely 
the qualities that made them real.  Seen through the lens of generalization, the real 
world became merely a collection of imperfect or impure examples from which pure 
abstract principles were to be derived.  Individual phenomena lost the characteristics 
that set them apart from one another, as such differences appeared merely as the 
accidental variation obscuring the general rule underlying the particular examples.  
Once enough examples had been examined that the general rule could be defined, the 
phenomenal world became unnecessary.  In place of the painstaking examination of 
detail, “wo jeder Vorfall als der behandelt und untersucht werden soll, der er ist – hat 
[the new philosophy] darin welch schönes, leichtes, freies Urtheil gebracht, nach zwei 
Vorfällen alles zu meßen und abzuthun!  über das Individuelle, worin allein Species 
facti besteht, hinüber, sich am hellen, vortrefflichen Allgemeinen zu halten.”24  This is 
not only one of Herder’s most important themes but also one of the points where he 
most significantly influenced nineteenth-century historicism: the rejection of 
generalizing reason in favor of examination of the individual, unique phenomena.25   
 Herder leveled four major complaints against the generalizing drive he felt 
characteristic of Enlightenment philosophy.  The first, as has been seen, was the 
production of a philosophical discourse cut off from practical results, that is, of an 
autonomous philosophical discourse.  The displacement of individual form by general 
rule constructed a wall that Herder felt locked Enlightenment philosophy within an 
ivory tower.  An impassable divide opened up between the real world – where actions 
were carried out on and through individual phenomena and results produced in 
particular situations – and the generalized or abstracted universe created by 
mechanistic philosophy:  
                                                 
24  Ibid., 536. 
 
25  The displacement of the eternal principles of natural law by “eine individualisierende 
Betrachtung” involving devotion to the unique and particular constitutes the great theme of Friedrich 
Meinecke’s classic Die Entstehung des Historismus (München and Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 1936): 2. 
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Zwischen jeder Allgemeingesagten, wenn auch der schönsten Wahrheit 
– und ihrer mindesten Anwendung ist Kluft!  Und Anwendung am 
einzigen rechten Orte? zu den rechten Zwecken? auf die einzige beste 
Weise? – Der Solon eines Dorfs, der würklich nur Eine böse 
Gewohnheit abgebracht, nur Einen Strom Menschlicher Empfindungen 
und Thätigkeiten in Gang gebracht – er hat tausendfach mehr gethan, 
als all ihr Raisonneurs über die Gesetzgebung, bei denen alles wahr und 
alles falsch – ein elender allgemeiner Schatte ist.26 
 
The Kluft Herder described here illustrated two issues.  First, this divide separated 
mechanical reason from action.  The raisonneurs pondering theoretical legal principles 
stood on the other side of the gap from the village lawmaker who took action that 
affected lives.  Second, Herder identified this divide as that separating knowledge of 
the general and knowledge of the particular.  The village lawmaker’s capacity to act 
was rooted in an ability to respond to particular situations and circumstances within a 
well-defined community with concrete problems.  The logic of generalizing reason 
concluded that the actions of the village lawmaker were petty and insignificant 
because of their failure to apply universally.  Herder, however, insisted that it was 
generalizing reason that was petty because its universal principles could not apply to 
any particular case.  By striving to grasp the universe, generalizing reason had lost the 
real world: action and practical application remained on the other side of the impasse. 
 Herder’s second complaint against generalizing reason was that, by constantly 
searching for equivalencies between individual cases, it distorted the phenomena 
examined.  Not only did generalizing reason reduce phenomena to their lowest 
common denominator in order to formulate the general rule that contained them all.  It 
went a step further and, when confronted with new individual cases, distorted them 
until they fit within the categories established beforehand.  The result of this rigid 
conceptualization was a form of mass production of knowledge: the categories set up 
by generalizing knowledge served as molds or forms into which the more pliant 
material represented by individual phenomena was pressed.  Any excess material that 
flowed over the edge was simply discarded, and the end result was a series of identical 
                                                 
26  SW/V: 542. 
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products that all fit the mold used to produce them.  The cognitive problem was 
obviously that these end products were something quite different from the raw 
material; the original purpose of the conceptual molds had not been to create new 
objects in their own image but rather to understand and express the raw material itself.  
 Herder viewed this forced adaptation of the particular to the universal literally 
as a form of violence.  The drive of generalizing reason to produce equivalencies for 
the purpose of establishing laws of universal applicability was a form of cognitive 
imperialism.  Herder did not hesitate to portray authoritarian rule as the political 
counterpart to generalizing reason.  In Herder’s historical narrative, the great example 
of such an authoritarian political structure was the Roman Empire.  Herder’s 
understanding of Rome was pronouncedly negative and, indeed, responded more to 
Enlightenment historiography on Rome than the actual features of Roman history.  He 
did not perceive Rome as the foundation-builder of a common European culture but 
rather as the destroyer of untold cultural wealth: “Unglaublich ist der Nachtheil, den 
Roms Beherrschung an dieser Ecke der Welt den Wissenschaften und Künsten, der 
Cultur des Landes und der Menschen zufügte.”27  This damage was wrought not only 
by constant wars of conquest but also by the oppression, “das eherne Joch,”28 with 
which Rome forced subject peoples into slavery or servitude and rooted out their 
native cultures.  As much as Herder argued against the reduction of historical 
phenomena to concepts or symbols, he made this one exception.  Roman history 
represented for him the very symbol of ruthless authoritarianism: 
 
Der Name knüpfte Völker und Weltstriche zusammen, die sich voraus 
nicht dem Laut nach gekannt hatten.  Römische Provinzen! in allen 
wandelten Römer, römische Legionen, Gesetzte, Vorbilder von Sitten, 
Tugenden und Lastern.  Die Mauer ward zerbrochen, die Nation von 
Nation schied, der erste Schritt gemacht, die Nationalcharaktere aller zu 
zerstören, alle in eine Form zu werfen, die “Römervolk” hieß.29 
 
                                                 
27  SW/XIV: 171. 
 
28  Ibid., 170. 
 
29  SW/V: 500-1. 
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This passage, with its appeal to “national character,” is a good example of the 
difficulties Herder can present for readers attempting to categorize him through 
modern political labels.  At first site Herder appears to be rejecting Roman civilization 
by extolling the virtues of narrow provincialism, of ignorance of the surrounding 
world, or of satisfaction with one’s lot, right or wrong.  The lament that “die Mauer 
ward zerbrochen, die Nation von Nation schied” appears as a flagrant apology for an 
anti-cosmopolitanism.  But the passage can also be understood in an entirely different 
light.  For Herder was in fact not so much valorizing national self-satisfaction as he 
was criticizing the violent suppression of differences for the sake of centralized power.  
Herder thus refused to assume any of the standard political positions recognizable for 
a modern reader.  The appeal to national character appears conservative, tribally 
nationalistic, pregnant with intolerance for the village on the other side of the river.  
But at the same time the lament against the Roman Empire’s destruction of different 
cultures appears as an enlightened or liberal defense of individuality, anti-
authoritarianism, a call for toleration of differences. 
 The point, of course, is not to label Herder with modern political categories but 
rather to identify the logical principle that united such apparently conflicting 
implications.  That logical principle was the rejection of generalizing reason in favor 
of examination of the particular.  Herder’s perception of the cruelty and 
destructiveness of Roman rule served him as an illustration of the authoritarianism of 
generalizing reason.  The reason why Herder lamented the destruction of walls 
separating neighboring peoples and cultures was not that it brought an end to ignorant 
self-absorption but that it cleared a surface on which could be imposed a uniform grid 
of laws and pre-determined patterns: the Gesetzte and Vorbilder of the Roman Empire.  
The physical violence with which the Romans imposed this grid on their provinces 
was for Herder merely an extreme manifestation of the conceptual violence inherent in 
generalizing reason. 
 The historical example of the Roman Empire illustrated for Herder another of 
the deficiencies of generalizing reason as well: the capacity for seemingly infinite 
expansion.  Generalizing reason produced conceptual systems with a potentially 
unlimited cognitive capacity.  Herder viewed this, however, not as a strength but as the 
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mark of superficiality.  Since such systems forced phenomena into pre-established 
molds, there was no limit to the number of individual cases such a system could 
absorb.  Indeed, once such a system of conceptual molds was in place, the entire 
universe was already implicitly accounted for, as the system would not allow any 
phenomena not to fit within its categories.  Thus Herder saw in generalizing reason the 
threat of a “bad infinity:” the threat of an infinite capacity for expansion that was 
based on the mere repetition or mechanical copying of an original structure.  This was 
precisely how Herder perceived the expansion of the Roman Empire.  Herder’s Rome 
was inflexible and absolutely unreactive to the cultures it swallowed, which was what 
gave it the ominous capacity to engulf such an enormous territory.  The laws and 
patterns of Roman society (again, in Herder’s contentious narrative) applied in 
unmodified form from the deserts of northern Africa to the foot of Hadrian’s Wall.  
All of the various cultures encountered were simply thrown into “eine Form” as this 
social administrative system steamrollered over the particular geographical, climatic, 
and cultural obstacles to its expansion.  The expansion of the Empire therefore was not 
limited by any external factors but merely by internal momentum.  The northern 
boundary must certainly have struck Herder as an appropriate image of the infinite 
capacity for Roman expansion: a boundary formed not by a river or mountain range, 
but by a wall that could just as easily have stood a mile, ten miles, fifty miles further 
north. 
 Herder perceived several dangers in this capacity for infinite expansion.  The 
first, of course, was the implication of a violent imposition of uniformity, of a 
cognitive Gleichschaltung.  Herder was haunted by the sheer cost of such uniformity: 
the loss of variation, of subtlety, of individual and irreplaceable cultures.30  The 
establishment of universal systems, whether social or cognitive, entailed for Herder an 
impoverishment of the world.  The situation was exacerbated, however, by the fact 
that Herder felt that the bad infinity of generalizing reason did not even produce the 
advantage it promised, the advantage of greater order in the world.  Rather it led to 
                                                 
30  “Und was war der Erfolg dieser Mühe?  Zerstörung und Verheerung.  Ich rechne die 
Menschen nicht, die von beiden Seiten erschlagen wurden […] die Aufhebung ihrer Gemeinheiten 
sammt der Zerstörung ihrer Städte war das größere Unglück, das diesem Lande geschah, weil es bis in 
die fernste Nachwelt reichte” (SW/XIV: 170). 
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chaos: the conceptual systems of generalizing reasons proliferated uncontrollably, 
dividing and expanding without end: “Wie überschwemmt mit schönen Grundsätzen, 
Entwickelungen, Systemen, Auslegungen – überschwemmt, daß fast niemand mehr 
Boden sieht und Fuß hat – eben deßwegen aber auch nur hinüberschwimmet.”31  The 
flood of systems, principles, and analyses swirled beyond control, sweeping the 
observer away.  In the process, everything was put into motion and the real world, the 
ground on which one used to stand, was lost. 
 This led to Herder’s fourth and final complaint against generalizing reason: the 
excess, the “Überfluß” produced by the drive to systematize the world, was in itself 
harmful.  The overabundance of explanatory power was inherently debilitating: “Was 
hilft dem Kranken alle der Vorrath von Leckerbißen, den er mit siechem Herzen nicht 
geniessen kann, ja deß Überfluß ihn eben siechherzig machte.”32  Herder’s critique of 
generalizing reason thus merged with a critique of modern decadence.  The cognitive 
argument became a social one: the overactive drive to systematization was a form of 
sickness, sickliness, or disinvigorating luxury.  Herder viewed modern European 
culture as suffering from over-sophistication; the flood of knowledge and wealth had 
resulted in a loss of virtue and basic moral grounding.  Unlike Rousseau, however, 
Herder did not contrast the debilitating luxury of modern Europe with an abstract state 
of nature but rather with particular cultures and peoples that, for the European, 
counted as uncivilized.  The lifestyle of the native inhabitants of California functions 
in the Ideen as the epitome of material impoverishment and the raw struggle for 
survival.  Nonetheless, Herder noted, the native Californian was capable of greater 
generosity and warmer humanity than “das verschwemmte Herz des müßigen 
Kosmopoliten.”33  Herder did not stop short of pointing out that the wealth and 
sophistication of modern Europe were founded on a barbarous exploitation of the rest 
of the world.34 
                                                 
31  SW/V: 540-1. 
 
32  Ibid., 541. 
 
33  SW/XIII: 339. 
 
34  “‘Unser System des Handels!’ Ob man sich etwas über das Verfeinte der allumfaßenden 
Wißenschaft denke?  Was warens für elende Spartaner, die ihre Heloten zum Ackerbau brauchten, und 
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 But this moral corollary to Herder’s critique of generalizing reason did not 
simply raise a scolding finger at modern Europe.  Not only the exploited but also the 
exploiters paid the price of supporting such decadent abundance.  For the price of 
excessive knowledge was the loss of live experience: 
 
Glaubet es nicht, ihr Menschen, daß eine unzeitige, maaslose 
Verfeinerung oder Ausbildung Glückseligkeit sei oder daß die todte 
Nomenclatur aller Wissenschaften […] einem lebendigem Wesen die 
Wissenschaft des Lebens gewähren könne […].  Ein mit Kenntnissen 
überfülleter Kopf und wenn es auch goldene Kenntnisse wären; er 
erdrücket den Leib, verenget die Brust, verdunkelt den Blick und wird 
dem, der ihn trägt, eine kranke Last des Lebens.  Je mehr wir 
verfeinernd unsre Seelenkräfte theilen, desto mehr ersterben die 
müssigen Kräfte […].35 
 
Herder portrayed the abundance secured by generalizing reason as having been bought 
at the price of a thinner or watered down form of experience.  The “maßlose 
Verfeinerung oder Ausbildung” did not in fact increase the modern European’s range 
of experience, since it was achieved only by spreading the finite Seelenkräfte ever 
thinner.  This form of Enlightenment constituted a slow process of self-
mummification: the dead nomenclature of the sciences unfolded interminably like 
bandages slowly circling and wrapping the body and eyes.  The head, too stuffed with 
knowledge, functioned as a weight on the body, presenting a further obstacle to 
movement or action.  The result of such decadent abundance was thus paralysis and 
idleness, Müßigkeit.   
 In the above passage, however, Herder also reveals the terms through which he 
resisted generalizing reason and the physical idleness it produced: “life” and 
Lebenskraft.  Herder’s principle of vitalism was perhaps his most significant 
                                                                                                                                            
für Barbarische Römer, die ihre Sklaven in die Erdgefängniße einschloßen!  In Europa ist die Sklaverei 
abgeschafft, weil berechnet ist, wie viel diese Sklaven mehr kosteten und weniger brächten, als freie 
Leute: nur Eins haben wir uns noch erlaubt, drei Welttheile als Sklaven zu brauchen, zu verhandeln, in 
Silbergruben und Zuckermühlen zu verbannen – aber das sind nicht Europäer, nicht Christen, und dafür 
bekommen wir Silber und Edelsteine, Gewürze, Zucker und – heimliche Krankheit” (SW/V: 550). 
 
35  SW/XIII: 336. 
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contribution to strict philosophical discourse.36  Precisely this principle of vitalism lay 
behind the fundamental move of Herder’s thought: the turn from the “light of reason” 
towards the “light of history.”  Herder signaled this association of history and vitalism 
through the very metaphors he used to describe history.  In Auch eine Philosophie 
Herder described history as a massive and powerful tree: 
 
Großes Geschöpf Gottes!  Werk dreier Welttheile, und fast sechs 
Jahrtausende! die zarte Saftvolle Wurzel, der schlanke, blühende 
Sprößling, der mächtige Stamm, die starkstrebende verschlungne Äste, 
die luftigen weit verbreiteten Zweige – wie ruhet alles auf einander, ist 
aus einander erwachsen!37 
 
Herder thus perceived history not as a dead nomenclature describing past life, but 
rather as something itself alive and organic.  History was an organic phenomenon not 
simply because it treated of human beings and their cultures and societies, but also by 
virtue of the recurring developmental cycles of birth, development, decay and death, 
through which historical entities passed.  For Herder, history – the record of purely 
human capacities and failings – became a phenomenon of nature.  Natural history was 
the only kind possible.38   
                                                 
36  For an interpretation of Herder’s vitalist principle of Kraft as an attempt to address the post-
Kantian discourse on the mind-body dichotomy, see Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German 
Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1987): 145-48. 
 
37  SW/V: 554. 
 
38  “Der Gott, den ich in der Geschichte suche, muß derselbe seyn, der in der Natur ist: denn 
der Mensch ist nur ein kleiner Theil des Ganzen, und seine Geschichte ist wie die Geschichte des 
Wurms mit dem Gewebe, das er bewohnt, innig verwebet” (SW/XIV: 244).  In the Ideen, the conceptual 
interpenetration of history and nature was heavily influenced by Goethe, with whom Herder was in 
close contact at the time.  This interpenetration constitutes a major difference between Herder’s 
understanding of history and Vico’s principle of verum et factum convertuntor.  Under Vico’s principle, 
history was inherently more comprehensible than nature, since it was the product of human activity.  
Where Vico’s principle strictly demarcated history from nature, Herder’s vitalism attempted to identify 
the two.  By the mid-nineteenth-century, of course, such an identification had become absolutely 
untenable, and thinkers such as Droysen, Dilthey, Rickert and Windelband, far from presupposing an 
identity of history and nature, faced the challenge of formulating a Geisteswissenschaft, or principles of 
historical cognition, that could claim at least a share of the authority wielded by the 
Naturwissenschaften, which had become the model for rational knowledge as such.  Therefore, while 
Vico’s demarcation ultimately triumphed over the Herderian identification of history and nature, the 
triumph was not in favor of the historical but rather of the natural sciences. 
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 This organic conception of history meant that Herder needed to address the 
question of historical development.  The majority of Herder’s contemporaries regarded 
history as being driven forward by the engine of progress, which culminated in the 
achievements of contemporary European civilization.  For Herder, however, such a 
notion of progress was incompatible with the organic nature of history.  The passage 
quoted above continues with the question: 
 
aber wozu? zu welchem Zwecke? 
     Daß offenbar dies Erwachsen, dieser Fortgang aus einander nicht 
“Vervollkommung im eingeschränkten Schulsinne sei, hat, dünkt mich, 
der ganze Blick gezeigt.”  Nicht mehr Saamenkorn, wenns Sprößling, 
kein zarter Sprößling mehr, wenns Baum ist.  Über den Stamm ist 
Krone; wenn jeder Ast, jeder Zweig derselben Stamm und Wurzel seyn 
wollte – wo bliebe der Baum?39 
 
Progress in the “Schulsinne” involved a simple quantitative increase, but development 
in the organic sense involved qualitative change and functional differentiation.  The 
yearling could not be viewed simply as an inferior version of the fully-grown tree.  
And on the fully-grown tree, one could not claim that the trunk or crown was “better” 
than the twigs and branches, for all had their place and purpose.  Variety and 
multiplicity were preconditions for healthy development of the whole. 
 Herder was too much of an Enlightener to deny altogether that history 
displayed some sort of positive development and bore witness to the improvement of 
the human condition.  This is especially clear in the Ideen, where Herder occasionally 
indulged in outright encomia to the marvels of modern engineering, statecraft, and the 
like.  Nevertheless, he was unable to accept the postulate that the present constituted 
the telos of history and the final self-realization of the true form of rationality, or that 
contemporary principles of rationality could be expanded and applied infinitely.  The 
former claim appeared as a debasement of past generations, and the latter as a 
banalization of the future.   
 Herder’s way out of this double bind appears at first to be nothing more than a 
linguistic trick.  In Auch eine Philosophie he avoided using the term Fortschritt, 
                                                 
39  SW/V: 554. 
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preferring instead the terms Fortgang and Entwickelung.40  In the Ideen he went one 
step further and primarily employed the term Wachstum.  This last term in particular 
allowed Herder to combine – or waver between – a standard Enlightenment faith in 
the progress of history on the one hand and his organic, anti-teleological 
understanding of history on the other.  The term Wachstum allowed Herder to make 
some fairly standard claims about the benefits of progress while bringing those claims 
into the orbit of the organic and vegetative metaphors he used elsewhere to criticize 
the notion of progress: “Der Verfolg der Geschichte zeigt, daß mit dem Wachsthum 
wahrer Humanität auch der zerstörenden Dämonen des Menschengeschlechts wirklich 
weniger geworden sei; und zwar nach innern Naturgesetzen einer sich aufklärenden 
Vernunft und Staatskunst.”41  This terminological substitution, however, was more 
than simply a metaphorical strategy for fudging the issue.  In Herder’s understanding 
of Wachstum, progress was inseparably linked to history.  Development was not a 
process of correcting and thereby erasing the mistakes of past generations but rather of 
selective gathering and study of the lessons contained in “der Verfolg der Geschichte.”  
Progress for Herder thus constituted more a process of recovery or cultivation of the 
past than of discovery of the new. 
 Consequently, the postulate of a Wachstum or flowering of humanity was not 
incompatible for Herder with the notion that each successive stage of development 
was complete in itself.  The completion or perfect form of the developmental structure 
was not to be found in its final stage but rather across the entire spectrum of stages.  
Each stage was complete because none was in fact complete: only when all stages 
were taken together would the development reveal its real meaning and true shape: 
 
Die Fortpflanzung der Geschlechter und Traditionen knüpfte also auch 
die menschliche Vernunft an einander: nicht als ob sie in jedem 
Einzelnen nur ein Bruch des Ganzen wäre, eines Ganzen, das in Einem 
Subjekt nirgend existiret [sic], folglich auch nicht der Zweck des 
                                                 
40  See Hans Dietrich Irmscher, “Nachwort,” in Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur 
Bildung der Menschheit (Stuttgart: Phillip Reclam jun., 1990): 146. 
 
41  SW/XIV: 217. 
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Schöpfers seyn konnte; sondern weil es die Anlage und Kette des 
ganzen Geschlechts so mit sich führte.42 
 
Understanding the present as the final, perfected stage of development would have 
required the existence of a transcendental subject that could encompass the whole.  
But the whole was too enormous for any one subject, even the most advanced, to 
comprehend.  Even the single links of this developmental chain were so grand that 
they appeared in themselves to form a whole:  
 
Groß muß das Ganze seyn, wo in jeder Einzelnheit schon so ein Ganzes 
erscheint! in jeder Einzelnheit aber nur auch immer so ein 
unbestimmtes Eins, allein aufs Ganze, sich offenbaret!  Wo kleine 
Verbindungen schon grossen Sinn geben, und doch Jahrhunderte nur 
Sylben, Nationen nur Buchstaben, und vielleicht Interpunktionen sind, 
die an sich nichts, zum leichtern Sinne des Ganzen, aber so viel 
bedeuten!  Was, o einzelner Mensch, […] bist du? – und willt, daß sich 
an dir allseitig die Vollkommenheit erschöpfe? – 43 
 
The book of history was simply too huge for any nation or culture – mere letters or 
punctuation marks on its pages – to master.  Even the particular sentence in which 
such a culture found its place was bigger than any of its elements and gave a meaning 
only once all had been put together.  The period at the end of the sentence might 
represent the culmination, but it was meaningless without the words that came before. 
This notion of a Wachstum that on the one hand showed progress and 
development, but on the other retained the trace of its history in each successive stage, 
lay at the foundation of perhaps the central and most influential concept of Herder’s 
mature philosophy of history: the concept of culture.  Raymond Williams has 
identified Herder’s use of the term “culture” in the Ideen as the moment where the 
term functioned no longer as a synonym but rather as an alternative to “civilization.”44  
The crucial innovation lay in Herder’s thoroughgoing historicization of the term 
                                                 
42  Ibid., 247. 
 
43  SW/V: 584. 
 
44  Williams, Keywords, 89.  The later chauvinistic valorization of German Kultur over French 
and English Zivilisation, it should be noted, is not present in Herder. 
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“culture.”  For Herder, it was impossible to consider the present stage of culture 
independently of its earlier stages: unlike the concept of civilization, culture 
necessarily revealed its nature as a palimpsest of its developmental stages.  Culture 
was literally a process of Fortpflanzung or “Saat und Ernte:”45 cultivation whereby 
that which was planted in the past returned to enrich the present and future.  The 
cultural formations of the past did not die in vain, nor did they disappear altogether, 
for their remains fertilized the ground and thereby cultivated what came after: “[…] so 
ist auch kein abgefallenes Blatt eines Baums, kein verflogener Same eines Gewäches, 
kein Leichnam eines modernden Thiers, noch weniger Eine Handlung eines 
lebendigen Wesens ohne Wirkung geblieben.”46   
Herder’s historicization of culture altered not only the structure but also the 
very object designated by the term culture.  For the significance that Herder attached 
to every historical phenomenon as contributing to the soil from which later formations 
grew entailed a second important difference from the term he consciously avoided, 
“civilization.”  Culture for Herder did not designate only selected monuments of 
artistic, intellectual, and scientific achievement; culture was rather everywhere in 
history, just as every fallen leaf contributed to the soil from which later developments 
grew.  No longer a litany of impressive accomplishments or a pedigree qualifying 
social or political status, Herder’s notion of culture approached what would now have 
to be called an anthropological status: culture was everywhere, and no historical 
phenomenon was too insignificant to qualify. 
In this manner Herder added a second dimension to the term.  Culture was not 
simply a diachronic narrative but rather a synchronic field upon which various 
traditions and peoples existed side by side, each in various stages of their own 
development.  All contributed to the overall landscape, even when they had no direct 
connection with each other.  These various “Blüthe des Zeitgeistes”47 together created 
the garden “wo hier diese, dort jene menschliche Nationalpflanze in ihrer Bildung und 
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Natur blühet.”48  Every expression of Lebenskraft was an integral component of this 
garden, not only the most successful or most decorative.  Each plant in this garden 
deserved respect as a unique and transient phenomenon, and conversely, even the most 
magnificent flora would eventually wither and die: 
 
Die Pflanze blühet und blühet ab; eure Väter starben und verwesen: 
euer Tempel zerfällt: dein Orakelzelt, deine Gesetztafeln sind nicht 
mehr: das ewige Band der Menschen, die Sprache selbst veraltet; wie?  
und Eine Menschenverfassung, Eine politische oder Religions-
Einrichtung, die doch nur auf diese Stücke gebauet seyn kann; sie 
sollte, sie wollte ewig dauern?49 
 
Herder was of course far from regarding this transience with despair.  Such transience 
did not reveal the pointlessness of human action but rather the self-sufficient nature of 
Lebenskraft.  The purpose of cultural phenomena was not the attainment of a state of 
perfection but simply sheer, transitory existence.  Herder viewed this transience of 
historical phenomena not as the mark of death and decay but rather of life.  Only that 
which was once alive could fade; that which endured eternally had never truly been 
vital. 
 This anthropological and radically historicized understanding of culture finally 
provided Herder with the conceptual tools he required to replace the formalist logic of 
“mechanical” philosophy.  Study of history and culture, which necessarily focused on 
the uniqueness and irreducibility of its objects of knowledge, immediately revealed the 
inadequacies of generalizing reason.  For Herder, the attempts of historians such as 
Hume, Voltaire, and Robertson to evaluate the past “nach der einen Form ihrer Zeit”50 
was a cognitive appropriation as violent as the Roman Empire’s efforts “die 
Nationalcharaktere aller zu zerstören, alle in eine Form zu werfen.”51  The imposition 
of alien conceptual standards was the defining characteristic of formalist thought; what 
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the study of culture revealed, however, was that it was not possible “mit dem 
Maasstabe einer andern Zeit zu meßen.”52  Herder was thus led to formulate a 
cognitive ideal that would avoid this conceptual violence and would allow the unique 
forms of historical phenomena to reveal themselves without distortion: 
 
Ganze Natur der Seele, die durch Alles herrscht, die alle übrige 
Neigungen und Seelenkräfte nach sich modelt, noch auch die 
gleichgültigsten Handlungen färbet – um diese mitzufühlen, antworte 
nicht aus dem Worte, sondern gehe in das Zeitalter, in die 
Himmelsgegend, die ganze Geschichte, fühle dich in alles hinein – nun 
allein bist du auf dem Wege, das Wort zu verstehen.53 
 
In this expression of his vision of a truly historical mode of cognition – one that would 
avoid the formalist strictures of generalizing reason – Herder coined two terms, 
Einfühlung and Verstehen, in a usage that practically set the program for nineteenth-
century historicism.54  Not representing concepts so much as procedures or attitudes, 
these terms designated the methodological consequence of Herder’s notion of culture.  
Einfühlung described a procedure of empathizing with another time or culture so 
intensely that one left behind the assumptions, values, and standards of one’s own 
time.  Rather than taking one’s own Maßstab wherever one went, one allowed a new 
standard of measurement to emerge from every different culture.  Such empathy thus 
presupposed a loss of independent subjectivity, a forgetting of oneself, with the aim of 
thereby coming to a fuller, less distorted understanding of an alien subject. Such alien 
subject could emerge in its true and unique form because the examining subject 
imposed no a priori cognitive categories upon it.  Friedrich Meinecke wrote that:  
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Verstehen des anderen durch Hineinfühlen […] war nur möglich, wenn 
die starre Scheidung von Subjekt und Objekt fiel, wenn alles mit allem 
zusammenhing und ineinander wirkte, nicht nur kausalmechanisch, wie 
es auch die Aufklärung sich vorstellte, sondern durch eine begrifflich 
nur annähernd, intuitiv und gefühlsmäßig aber rasch zu erfassende 
innere Lebensgemeinschaft und Einheitlichkeit des Ganzen.55 
 
The price of empathy was thus the momentary loss of self: a moment when the active 
judging subject was replaced by passive perception.  But for Herder such price was 
justified by the understanding gained.  With the watchwords of empathy and 
Verstehen, Herder felt he had provided the tools for a methodological procedure based 
not on generalizing reason, but on the anti-formalistic principles of historical reason. 
 
 
II. In the Presence of History 
 
The second of Nietzsche’s Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen, “Vom Nutzen und Nachteil 
der Historie für das Leben,”56 unfolded a bitter polemic against the nineteenth-century 
historical consciousness.  Even though the historicism of the Historical School – the 
unnamed target of Nietzsche’s attack – presented itself as a direct outgrowth of 
Herder’s attempts to describe a historical reason, Nietzsche perceived this historicism 
not as an alternative to but rather as a degenerate form of scientific thought.  Thus the 
reversal revealed in the garden metaphor: the historical consciousness had come to 
represent for Nietzsche not the cure for, but instead the very source of decadent 
Müßigkeit and deadening, pseudo-scientific formalism.   
 The forcefulness of Nietzsche’s anti-historicist rhetoric in this text gives it at 
times the appearance of an early modernist manifesto, and it has indeed been read as 
such.57  Nietzsche often appears to identify “life” – the positive force that he felt the 
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historicist consciousness had withered – with the expression of an “incandescent point 
in time”58 that began to cool into an ossifying formalism as soon as it slipped into the 
past.  In such a reading of HL, modernity and history related to each other like fire and 
water: history was unequivocally destructive of the vital forces that drove the 
ceaseless self-creation required by the modernist.59  Nevertheless, such a modernist 
reading of HL cannot account for other moments where Nietzsche was quite serious 
about the claim “dass das Leben aber den Dienst der Historie brauche.”60  At such 
moments Nietzsche appears to be directing his polemic not against history as such, but 
rather against the degenerate consciousness of history that he deemed characteristic for 
nineteenth-century Europe.  The very title of the text makes clear that Nietzsche 
intended not only to criticize the abuses of the historical consciousness but also to 
illustrate the potential usefulness of history as well.61 
   This ambiguity in the status of history in HL cannot be resolved by textual 
analysis, for the ambiguity is objectively present.  At times Nietzsche appealed to a 
vital consciousness of history that was to be rescued from the greedy grip of the 
historicists; at such moments Nietzsche echoed Herder’s prescription of history as the 
antidote to formalist thought.  At other times, however, Nietzsche clearly opposed 
history and the past unfavorably to the vital energy of the fleeting present moment: 
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here he anticipated an avant-garde temporal discourse that vilified the historical tout 
court.  Although the ambiguity cannot be resolved, it can be explained by observing 
that Nietzsche’s text marks a crucial shift in the ideological status of the category of 
history.  While Nietzsche retained traces of the Herderian aspiration for the historical 
as a dissolving agent against formalist thought, the rhetorical momentum of his 
argument consistently pushed the category of history into an alliance with formalist 
thought. This is why the judicious balance announced in Nietzsche’s title – that history 
can be useful as well as harmful – hardly comes through in the body of the text.  For 
even when Nietzsche articulated what a vital historical consciousness might look like, 
he ascribed that vitality to the ability to make history present.  Nietzsche’s text thus 
illustrates an ideological shift whereby formalist thought could be countered only by 
the insistence on a vital present.  The consequence of this shift was that the notion of 
historicism – the decadent or degenerate consciousness of history – began to subsume 
the very category of history.   
As far as concerns the concept of formalism that they oppose, Herder’s 
founding historicist texts and Nietzsche’s scathing anti-historicist polemic have much 
in common.  The valorization of “life” announced in Nietzsche’s title took the form of 
an ideal of Lebenskraft, a term that had been central for Herder as well.  Nietzsche 
understood Lebenskraft as sheer expressive force.  The direction or manner in which 
such life force radiated was not so important, and indeed Nietzsche assumed that such 
force could not be contained by moral considerations.  Vitality went hand in hand with 
injustice: “Es gehört sehr viel Kraft dazu, leben zu können und zu vergessen, in wie 
fern leben und ungerecht sein Eins ist.”62  In this valorization of expressive force over 
the ends to which that force moved, Nietzsche echoed Herder’s sentiment: “Aber 
Empfindung, Bewegung, Handlung – wenn auch in der Folge ohne Zweck […] wenn 
auch mit Empfindungen, die hie und da schwärmerisch, gewaltsam, gar abscheulich 
werden – […] welche Macht! welche  Würkung!”63  What such life force 
accomplished, therefore, was simply its own expression, the transformation of 
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difference into a unique, unitary and recognizable shape.  Life force represented the  
“plastische Kraft eines Menschen, eines Volkes, einer Cultur […], ich meine jene 
Kraft, aus sich heraus eigenartig zu wachsen, Vergangenes und Fremdes umzubilden 
und einzuverleiben, Wunden auszuheilen, Verlorenes zu ersetzen, zerbrochene 
Formen aus sich nachzuformen.”64  This process of “zu Blut umschaffen,”65 
“digestion,” or “incorporation” of outside data of perception into one’s body was 
Nietzsche’s extremely visceral way of portraying the process of self-expression (sich 
äußern).  Lebenskraft served its function therefore by consuming raw materials and 
transforming them into the expression of a strong and consistent identity. 
This expressive ideal lay behind the notion of “style” by which Nietzsche 
judged the strength of a culture.  Nietzsche wrote that “Die Cultur eines Volkes als der 
Gegensatz jener Barbarei ist einmal […] als Einheit des künstlerischen Stiles in allen 
Lebensäusserungen eines Volkes bezeichnet worden.”66  Such a unified style was the 
expression of the Lebenskraft of a culture: its ability to transform the myriad elements 
of which it was composed into characteristic patterns and original forms.  Those 
patterns and forms were the signature of the culture, its recognizable features.  The 
characteristic unity of such a style represented, in short, its ability to construct and 
express a unique identity.   
Nietzsche’s understanding of cultural style was different from Herder’s notion 
of culture in its emphasis on the aggressive force involved in expression; at least in 
Herder’s later Ideen, cultures appeared more as fragile plants coexisting peacefully 
than as arrogant competitors vying for their place in the sun.  But Nietzsche’s 
understanding of cultural style does recall Herder’s identification of every culture as a 
unique totality or microcosm in which all parts had their place.  The association of 
style with holism remained with Nietzsche until his very last writings.  The “Einheit 
des künstlerischen Stiles” described above reappeared in reverse outline in Nietzsche’s 
description of the style of literary decadence in Der Fall Wagner: 
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Ich halte mich dies Mal nur bei der Frage des Stils auf. – Womit 
kennzeichnet sich jede litterarische décadence?  Damit, dass das Leben 
nicht mehr im Ganzen wohnt.  Das Wort wird souverain und springt 
aus dem Satz hinaus, der Satz greift über und verdunkelt den Sinn der 
Seite, die Seite gewinnt Leben auf Unkosten des Ganzen – das Ganze 
ist kein Ganzes mehr.67 
 
The idea of decadence that Nietzsche described here, in which the details overpowered 
the whole, did not simply expresses a characteristic of the style of certain individuals, 
the modern decadents.  It was the condition of a culture: modern decadence.  This 
decadence of modernity is Nietzsche’s later formulation of what appeared in HL as the 
weak culture of the modern historical sense.  The proliferation of detail in decadence 
had its precursor in the eclecticism of modern historicist society, with its uncontrolled 
promulgation of incompatible styles borrowed from past epochs.  Eclecticism and 
decadence were related names for the weakness of modern society: a society that, 
having lost the capacity to express a powerful identity, merely accumulated details that 
formed no whole.   
 What Nietzsche felt the modern age had lost was the ability to draw an 
experiential horizon.  The expression of a strong identity could only take place when 
Lebenskraft had been focused: “Und dies ist ein allgemeines Gesetz: jedes Lebendige 
kann nur innerhalb eines Horizontes gesund, stark und fruchtbar werden.”68  The 
failure to draw such an experiential horizon was the cause of the debilitating 
eclecticism of the modern; a shifting horizon resulted in a continual shifting of 
perspective that stymied the “Einheit des künstlerischen Stiles” required for a strong 
culture.  Herder had described how the limited experiential horizon of the village 
lawmaker, the “Solon eines Dorfes,” allowed him to take action where the 
sophisticated legal theorist remained bogged down in theoretical subtleties and 
“kränkelnde Gedanken”.  He had similarly contrasted the physical condition and 
generosity of heart of “uncivilized” peoples who survived under the harshest of 
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conditions with the “verschwemmtes Herz” of the European cosmopolite, 
sophisticated and experienced but correspondingly jaded and inactive.  Nietzsche used 
a remarkably similar vocabulary in his description of the necessity of a horizon of 
experience: 
 
Das historische Wissen und Empfinden eines Menschen kann sehr 
beschränkt, sein Horizont eingeengt wie der eines Alpenthal-
Bewohners sein […] und trotz aller Ungerechtigkeit und allem Irrthum 
steht er doch in unüberwindlicher Gesundheit und Rüstigkeit da und 
erfreut jedes Auge; während dicht neben ihm der bei weitem 
Gerechtere und Belehrtere kränkelt und zusammenfällt, weil die Linien 
seines Horizontes immer von Neuem unruhig sich verschieben, weil er 
sich aus dem viel zarteren Netze seiner Gerechtigkeiten und 
Wahrheiten nicht wieder zum derben Wollen und Begehren 
herauswinden kann.69 
 
What Nietzsche and Herder both described with the image of a horizon was the 
capacity to draw a close to contemplation, consideration, and thus hesitation.  The 
modern propensity to over-reflect on every act was paralyzing.  Herder had described 
the mechanical philosophers of the Enlightenment, “staunend und starrend vor 
ungesehenen Hindernißen und Folgen,” as unable to put their sophisticated theories to 
concrete use.  For Nietzsche, the modern European was similarly paralyzed by the 
eclectic abundance of knowledge that prevented the taking of a decisive perspective.  
The ideal of an experiential horizon thus functioned for both Herder and Nietzsche as 
a safeguard against a hyperbolic reflection or hyperconsciousness.  Reflection had to 
be cut off somewhere – perhaps randomly, perhaps ruthlessly – if a conclusion was to 
be reached and acted upon. 
 Nietzsche described the modern failure to draw such horizons – again, with the 
same vocabulary as Herder had used – as an Übermaß or Übersättigung, consumption 
without hunger.  The greed of modern historians prevented them from digesting the 
mass quantities of historical information they consumed.  The information, instead of 
being transformed by active Lebenskraft into an expression of the modern identity, 
simply remained as an eclectic mass of detail: “Das Wissen, das im Uebermaasse ohne 
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Hunger, ja wider das Bedürfniss aufgenommen wird, wirkt jetzt nicht mehr als 
umgestaltendes, nach aussen treibendes Motiv […].”70  The accumulated knowledge 
weighed on the body and resulted in torpor.  Herder’s claim that “ein mit Kenntnissen 
überfülleter Kopf und wenn es auch goldene Kenntnisse wären; er erdrücket den 
Leib”71 was a more polite formulation but clearly anticipated Nietzsche’s image of 
modern historians incapacitated by indigestion.   
 The inability to digest what was consumed meant that the modern identity was 
a split identity.  The materials devoured were not organically transformed into an 
expressive form.  Thus the expressive unity of the strong style was shattered by an 
inner tension between form and content: “das Volk, dem man eine Cultur zuspricht, 
soll nur in aller Wirklichkeit etwas lebendig Eines sein und nicht so elend in Inneres 
und Aeusseres, in Inhalt und Form auseinanderfallen.”72  Nietzsche perceived in this 
split between content and form the same result that Herder had decried in the case of 
generalizing reason.  Contents were forced into pre-existing forms rather than being 
allowed to express themselves naturally.  Nietzsche wrote: “[…] wie gewaltsam muss 
die Individualität des Vergangenen in eine allgemeine Form hineingezwängt und an 
allen scharfen Ecken und Linien zu Gunsten der Uebereinstimmung zerbrochen 
werden!”73  But Nietzsche took the critique of formalism one step further than Herder: 
he did not only disparage the cognitive distortions of formalist reason but found that 
this rule of form had transformed modern society into a society of outer appearances, 
role-playing, and dissimulation.  The split between content and form served as a 
device for hiding rather than expressing identities.  Paradoxically, the enormous 
quantities of eclectic historical knowledge infusing modern society ultimately made 
everyone appear the same: “historische Bildungsgebilde, ganz und gar Bildung, Bild, 
Form ohne nachweisbaren Inhalt, leider nur schlechte Form, und überdies Uniform.”74  
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Thus the modern anemia, the shortage of Lebenskraft, the incapacity to express 
identities, transformed historicist society into a two-dimensional stage set: form with 
nothing behind it. 
 Nietzsche criticized the formalism of modern society with a vocabulary very 
similar to Herder’s, but with a reversed temporal valorization: the historical 
consciousness was not the antidote to but rather the cause of such formalism.  Here it 
is necessary to regard skeptically Nietzsche’s remarks to the effect that he was 
describing the contrast between a positive conception of history, a historical 
consciousness that was driven by Lebenskraft, and the debilitating modern historical 
consciousness.  This skepticism is necessary not simply because his critique of modern 
historicism is the predominant and more compelling part of his text, but because the 
very possibility of a history “useful for life” is called into question by his basic logic. 
 Herder and Nietzsche are on common ground with their notions of an 
experiential horizon.  For both of them, such a horizon focused the consciousness by 
setting it limits.  In this way it brought a halt to a process of reflection that threatened 
to go on infinitely without ever translating into action.  But the mechanisms each 
posited for setting this horizon were different.  For Herder, the methodological means 
of setting a horizon was empathy.  By immersing oneself in the past, one escaped the 
infinite, paralyzing reflectivity of Enlightenment reason.  The momentary loss of self 
enabled the profound identification with a foreign subject, and thus a profound 
understanding of the uniqueness and individuality of that subject.  It was the loss of 
self in another subject that in effect brought a halt to reflexivity, by erasing the 
distance between subject and object.  The line of the horizon produced through 
empathy thus traced the boundaries of that subject’s individuality.   
 Nietzsche, however, understood empathy through the Rankean dictum of 
Selbstauflösung, or as a methodological motto expressing the attempt to achieve a 
purified objectivity.  Nietzsche interpreted the ideal of objectivity as one of the most 
injurious consequences of the application of scientific standards to history.  
Objectivity was nothing other than “ewig[e] Subjectlosigkeit,”75 a passivity or 
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“impotentia”76 that clearly acted as an impediment to action by removing all pretense 
of interest in the object.  Nietzsche described the objective historian in decidedly 
unflattering terms: 
 
Aber wie gesagt, es ist ein Geschlecht von Eunuchen; dem Eunuchen 
ist ein Weib wie das andere, eben nur Weib, das Weib an sich, das ewig 
Unnahbare – und so ist es gleichgültig was ihr treibt, wenn nur die 
Geschichte selbst schön “objectiv” bewahrt bleibt, nämlich von 
solchen, die nie selber Geschichte machen können.  Und da euch das 
Ewig-Weibliche nie hinanziehen wird, so zieht ihr es zu euch herab und 
nehmt, als Neutra, auch die Geschichte als ein Neutrum.77 
 
Objectivity was thus for Nietzsche incompatible with vital Lebenskraft because it 
quelled passion and enthusiasm, and thus the motivation to action.  Thus 
Selbstauflösung as a mechanism for achieving objectivity did not bring the 
phenomenal world closer, as Herder felt empathy would.  Rather it ensured that the 
phenomenal world remained cut off: an object of passive perception with which one 
did not interact. 
 But Nietzsche did formulate a different principle that functioned for him much 
the same way empathy functioned for Herder.  Nietzsche described the capacity to 
forget as the key to the focusing of Lebenskraft.  Memory accompanied the human 
psyche as a sort of doom: a chain keeping us from moving forward, or a ghost that 
“stört die Ruhe eines späteren Augenblicks.”78  Thus the capacity to forget represented 
for Nietzsche a liberation from the action of a consciousness that continually returned 
to what had already passed.  The act of forgetting thus released Nietzsche from the 
reflectivity of consciousness just as empathy had Herder.  That release was the 
prerequisite for the exercise of Lebenskraft through action: “Zu allem Handeln gehört 
Vergessen: wie zum Leben alles Organischen nicht nur Licht, sondern auch Dunkel 
gehört.”79 
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 Thus Nietzschean forgetting and Herderian empathy both expressed the 
presupposition that one must “lose onself” in order to gain a more vital capacity.  Both 
functioned as an escape mechanism from the “kränkelnder Gedanke” and from an 
infinite reflexivity: for Nietzsche, the infinite return of the experienced moment, and 
for Herder the infinite return of our own conceptual presuppositions.  But for Herder 
this release from the self occurred through a loss of the present: the historian made 
contact with the past by forgetting the conceptual forms and measures of his or her 
own epoch.  For Nietzsche, this release was effected through the loss of the past, 
which was abandoned as so much ballast hindering the active subject.  This logical 
progression whereby Nietzsche linked life with action and action with forgetting 
produced a fundamental tension in HL.  The initial pronouncement that “das Leben 
aber den Dienst der Historie brauche, muss eben so deutlich begriffen werden als der 
Satz […] das ein Uebermaass der Historie dem Lebendigen schade”80 comes under 
pressure from the terms established elsewhere.  Despite Nietzsche’s continual provisos 
that the historical sense is harmful only when taken to excess, and that it is therefore 
necessary to establish the limit or horizon within which history remains a vital and 
constructive force, the de facto horizon that emerged from the text is the present.  
History would be harmless only so long as it were present.  Geschichte provided a 
vital impulse if it was still Geschehen or action.  But the pre-requisite for action was 
forgetting the past.   
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Chapter Three 
 
FLEETING REVELATIONS 
Marx and the Deictic Dilemma 
 
Versuchen wir den Spiegel an such zu betrachten, so entdecken wir 
endlich Nichts, als die Dinge auf ihm.  Wollen wir die Dinge fassen, so 
kommen wir zuletzt wieder auf Nichts, als auf den Spiegel. – Diess ist 
die allgemeinste Geschichte der Erkenntnis.1 
 
 
 
As if fascinated by the mirror image of revolution, Marx repeatedly turned his scrutiny 
to events he deemed banal but which claimed revolutionary status.  Perhaps the most 
famous such event was the “Umwälzung ohne Gleichen” of the German ideologists, 
an event whose actors felt themselves involved in “eine Revolution, wogegen die 
französische ein Kinderspiel ist, ein Weltkampf, vor dem die Kämpfe der Diadochen 
kleinlich erscheinen.”2  For Marx, of course, such claims were absurd.  The only real 
significance of this false revolution was the frightening depth of delusion it illustrated, 
“[…] den tragikomischen Kontrast zwischen den wirklichen Leistungen dieser Helden 
und den Illusionen über diese Leistungen […].”3  A similar contrast between 
revolutionary claim and banal reality characterized the 18th Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte.  Dressing itself in the rhetoric, gestures, and costumes of its great ancestor, 
this false revolution only revealed its own comic emptiness of content.  Despite the 
difference between the naïve earnestness of the German ideologists and the shrewd 
political manipulation of Louis Bonaparte, it is clear that for Marx, the same false 
                                                 
1  Friedrich Nietzsche, Morgenröte, in Kritische Studienausgabe, eds. Giorgio Colli and 
Mazzino Montinari, vol. III (München and Berlin: DTV and De Gruyter, 1988): 202-3. 
 
2  Marx/Engels Gesamtausgabe, vol. I/5, ed. V. Adoratsklij (Berlin: Marx-Engels-Verlag 
G.M.B.H., 1932): 7.  (This edition hereinafter referred to as MEGA followed by a volume number.) 
 
3  Ibid., 8. 
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revolution had occurred, as it were, twice: the first time as tragicomedy, the second as 
farce. 
 What linked these false revolutions was their pretension: the conceited claims 
that masked a wretched reality.  Marx’s characterization of these events as unfolding 
within this gap between appearance and reality was consistent with the 
characterization he generally used for phenomena he deemed degenerate or alienated.  
The key term in this characterization was “externality” (Äußerlichkeit).  This term of 
course echoes clearly in the very word Marx used for alienation, Entäußerung, which 
was quite literally a “making external.”  Similarly, ideology for Marx consisted in the 
false independence of consciousness, which created a realm of “mere theory” that lay 
external to material reality.  The revolution of the German ideologists was farcical 
precisely because it took place in this realm of mere theory, remaining external to, and 
thus anything but revolutionary for, the society that produced it.  And the second 
edition of the 18th Brumaire rang hollow precisely because of the way its forms and 
gestures remained external to its real content.   
 In contrast to these various alienated or externalized phenomena, Marx 
implicitly posited an ideal of holistic integration: that which was external was to 
become once more internal to its source of meaning.  Thus de-alienated consciousness 
would again be smoothly integrated with material reality; the de-alienated individual 
again coextensive with species being.  Externalities would be replaced by dialectical 
integration.  
 What is curious, however, is that when describing these images of dialectical 
integration, Marx displays a stubborn tendency to slip into language that again 
suggests the externality he decried at the outset.  Perhaps the best example of this is 
the base/superstructure image.  Although this image was clearly intended to express a 
dialectical integration of material relations of production with the products of 
consciousness, it is infamous for its pliancy in the hands of those who would interpret 
it quite differently: as expressing the externality or superfluity of the superstructure.  
Despite the legions of Marxists who, ever since shortly after Marx’s death, have 
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endeavored to recover the dialectical vibrancy of the image, the ambiguity remains.4  
The term “superstructure” (Überbau) indeed suggests something floating “above” 
what is essential, and thus implies that this additional construction is unnecessary or, 
to shift metaphors, a mere reflection of reality.  Such a deterministic interpretation of 
the image is not only the work of positivist social scientists of the Second International 
or vulgar apparatchiks of the Third.  Marx himself denigrated “mere theory” or “mere 
philosophy” often enough to give a certain credence to such interpretations, or at least 
to suggest that this ambiguity is deeply rooted. 
 The ambiguity at work here is illustrated most clearly in the theory of 
consciousness Marx developed in Die deutsche Ideologie.  The concept of de-
alienated consciousness Marx described in opposition to ideology was characterized 
by being absolutely integrated with material reality.  The paradox, however, emerges 
whenever Marx attempted to talk of such de-alienated consciousness independently.  
For the moment one spoke of such consciousness independently of the material reality 
with which it was to be integrated, such consciousness again appeared as ideology.  
This can be termed Marx’s deictic dilemma: de-alienated consciousness, because of its 
absolute integration with material reality, cannot be “pointed to” at all without 
reassuming the position of externality that characterized its corrupted form, ideology.  
Put another way, de-alienated consciousness can have no theoretical location, for if it 
had a location, it would be merely theoretical.  Consciousness avoids floating “above” 
the material, and thus being superfluous, only when it is absent. 
 This deictic dilemma holds for that other false revolution as well.  If Die 
deutsche Ideologie showed the externalized version of consciousness to be ideology, 
then Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte showed the externalized version 
of historical action to be mere playacting and costume drama.  What were external 
were the forms and gestures, which had been borrowed from another historical period 
rather than emerging from the content of the event itself.  This terminology of a 
historical form at odds with its content, and thus hiding rather than expressing that 
                                                 
4 The first figure to try to correct the mechanically determinist reading of this image was none 
other than Engels himself (see his letter to Bloch of September 21-22, 1890, in The Marx-Engels 
Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker, 2nd ed. [New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1978]: 760-765). 
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content, clearly anticipated Nietzsche’s characterization of modern historicist culture 
as one that must “so elend in Inneres und Auesseres, in Inhalt und Form 
auseinanderfallen.”5  Historicism is thus the proper name for the externalized or 
alienated form of historical action.  Historicized gesture represented a merely 
ornamental form that floated “above” its content just as ideology floated above the 
material.  Such ornamental layer constituted an inessential and distorting screen that 
covered over and masked a historical truth.   
 Thus Marx’s deictic dilemma reveals another axis to the critique of historicism 
handed down to the twentieth-century avant-garde.  Nietzsche had formulated the 
temporal axis of that critique: history that was “useful for life” was inevitably figured 
as a kind of presence, as a component of the fleetingly incandescent moment in which 
life force was expended.  The paradox that resulted from this formulation was that of 
self-immolation.  Such a presence was already gone the moment one reached out to 
grab it. 
 Marx formulated the spatial axis of this critique.  True historical action was 
marked by an absolute integration of form and content.  Where such action became 
alienated or externalized, then the form appeared as an inessential supplement, an 
ornamental layer applied on top of what was fundamental.  This spatial axis, however, 
brought its own paradox: the moment history became visible by giving form to the 
present, it became external, and thus slipped into historicism.  Truly historical action – 
the archetype of which was for Marx of course the proletarian revolution – thus could 
take no historical form: “Die soziale Revolution des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts kann 
ihre Poesie nicht aus der Vergangenheit schöpfen, sondern nur aus der Zukunft.”6  But 
this poetry was no more visible than de-alienated consciousness.  For the moment one 
pointed to it, it turned into scripted farce.  
 
 
                                                 
5 Friedrich Nietzsche, Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen II: “Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der 
Historie für das Leben,” in Kritische Studienausgabe, eds. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, vol. I 
(München and Berlin: DTV and De Gruyter, 1988): 274 
 
6  Marx, Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte (Moskau: Verlag für fremdsprachige 
Literatur, 1950): 228.  (Hereinafter “AB”.) 
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I. The Conceits of Consciousness 
 
Marx’s ideal of a consciousness cured of ideology posited its absolute integration with 
all other activities involved in the production of material existence.  Such a 
consciousness constituted a form of labor because of its inseparability from the life-
process: “Das Bewußtsein kann nie etwas Andres sein als das bewußte Sein, und das 
Sein der Menschen ist ihr wirklicher Lebensprozeß.”7  De-alienated consciousness 
equaled existence, and existence consisted in the production of the conditions of life.  
Marx implicitly associated this condition with a pre-Lapsarian state.  At some 
originary moment, consciousness had in effect been material, or in some vague way 
had formed such a completely transparent window onto the material life-process that 
there was no way to conceive of it independently.  Marx wrote: “Die Produktion der 
Ideen, Vorstellungen, des Bewußtseins ist zunächst unmittelbar verflochten in die 
materielle Tätigkeit und den materiellen Verkehr der Menschen, Sprache des 
wirklichen Lebens.  Das Vorstellen, Denken, der geistige Verkehr der Menschen 
erscheinen hier noch als direkter Ausfluß ihres materiellen Verhaltens.”8  The de-
alienation of consciousness thus involved the recovery of this transparency that 
consciousness had originally (“zunächst”) possessed. 
 This original state had been disrupted in Marx’s account by the inevitable 
development of the division of labor.  The division of labor was itself an inseparable 
and unavoidable component of the development of that “material activity” with which 
consciousness had originally been so thoroughly integrated.  Yet a particular moment 
in that development sundered the integrated whole and set consciousness off on a 
trajectory bearing only a mediated relation to processes of material production.  Marx 
wrote that:  
 
Die Teilung der Arbeit wird erst wirklich Teilung von dem 
Augenblicke an, wo eine Teilung der materiellen und geistigen Arbeit 
eintritt.  Von diesem Augenblicke an kann sich das Bewußtsein 
                                                 
7  MEGA I/5: 15. 
 
8  Ibid., 15.  
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wirklich einbilden, etwas Andres als das Bewußtsein der bestehenden 
Praxis zu sein, wirklich etwas vorzustellen, ohne etwas Wirkliches 
vorzustellen – von diesem Augenblicke an ist das Bewußtsein im 
Stande, sich von der Welt zu emanzipieren und zur Bildung der 
“reinen” Theorie, Theologie, Philosophie, Moral etc. überzugehen.9 
 
This moment thus represented the birth of ideology from a spiritualized consciousness.  
Where others might find a triumphant milestone in human development – the 
emergence of free-standing consciousness – Marx perceived the beginning of an 
insidious process, the first step in a development that would find its inane culmination 
in the effulgent but empty pronouncements of the German ideologists. 
 The reason Marx sensed this moment as one of loss rather than emancipation 
was its structural similarity to the externalizations he had long associated with the state 
of alienation.  In the Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte of 1844, in which Marx 
had first elaborated in detail his thoughts on the process of alienation, Marx had 
written: “Worin besteht nun die Entäußerung der Arbeit?  Erstens, daß die Arbeit dem 
Arbeiter äußerlich ist, d.h. nicht zu seinem Wesen gehört […].  Der Arbeiter fühlt sich 
daher erst außer der Arbeit bei sich und in der Arbeit außer sich.”10  Alienation 
(Entäußerung) was thus a process of division whereby that which should have been 
integrated became externalized (äußerlich).  Marx largely retained this concept, if not 
the term, of alienation in Die deutsche Ideologie when he described the division within 
each individual between a personal identity and a historically accidental (“zufällig”) 
class-determined identity.11   
 The connection between this understanding of alienation as externalization and 
Marx’s understanding of ideology, however, becomes particularly clear in Marx’s 
descriptions of the manner of operation of the ideological mind.  The peculiar logic of 
ideology is visible, for example, in Marx’s analysis of the idealist historian.  Marx had 
in mind those forms of historical analysis that “in der Geschichte nur politische Haupt- 
und Staatsaktionen und religiöse und überhaupt theoretische Kämpfe sehen können, 
                                                 
9  Ibid., 21.  Emphases in original. 
 
10  MEGA, I/3: 85. 
 
11  See MEGA, I/5: 65. 
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und speziell bei jeder geschichtlichen Epoche die Illusion dieser Epoche teilen 
müssen.”12  The ideological element of such approach would at first sight appear to lie 
in the misguided emphasis on spiritualized narratives such as religious or political 
dramas, the “theoretical struggles” that simply drew one’s attention away from the 
material conditions that allowed such dramas to be enacted in the first place.  
Alternately, the ideological element might appear to lie in the acceptance of each 
epoch’s illusions about itself, illusions resulting in an account that could not fail to be 
ideological in the sense of class-biased since it served to justify and protect the 
interests of a ruling class.  These are obviously significant aspects of the ideological 
character Marx described here.  But they are more the expression than the mechanism 
of ideology.  Marx described the conceptual structure that produced these ideological 
errors as follows:  
 
Die ganze bisherige Geschichtsauffassung hat diese wirkliche Basis der 
Geschichte entweder ganz und gar unberücksichtigt gelassen, oder sie 
nur als eine Nebensache betrachtet, die mit dem geschichtlichen 
Verlauf außer allem Zusammenhang steht.  Die Geschichte muß daher 
immer nach einem außer ihr liegenden Maßstab geschrieben werden; 
die wirkliche Lebensproduktion erscheint als Urgeschichtlich, während 
das Geschichtliche als das vom gemeinen Leben getrennte, extra-
überweltliche erscheint.13 
 
The conceptual structure that prevented the idealist historian from connecting those 
various ideological narratives with the “real base” from which they sprouted was the 
conjecture of an “external standard.”  Such external standards introduced the 
appearance of a division between a grandiose, true realm of history and a banal history 
of everyday life.  The existence of an external standard thus resulted in a division 
between a historical realm “above” and one “below.”  The idealist historian was 
convinced that what lay above was the essential narrative of history and of greater 
interest than the historical noise constituting the underlying everyday life.  But Marx 
perceived such higher realms as something “extra-überweltliche.”  Detached from the 
                                                 
12  Ibid., 28.  Emphasis in original. 
 
13  Ibid., 28. 
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real base of history, such narratives were external, extraneous, supplemental and thus 
divorced from deeper meaning. 
 The foregoing examples of Marx’s use of the concept of externalization reveal 
a significant characteristic of that concept.  The various externalizations that 
accompanied the state of alienation did not simply divide what should have been 
whole: they divided it, as it were, unequally.  One part of the original phenomenon – 
whether it be labor, the individual, or the historical understanding – lost the organic 
relation it once had to the essence or Wesen (laborer, species being, or relations of 
production) that gave it meaning.  Thus the two parts resulting from such division had 
to be evaluated differently.  One part represented what was externalized: made 
supplemental and losing its deeper meaning, this was the part that, properly speaking, 
was alienated in the sense of entäußert.  The other part, the essence, or that from 
which the first part was externalized, remained essentially intact.   Nonetheless, the 
essential core did become more difficult to perceive: encased in or hidden behind the 
externalized term, its significance appeared more distant.  Thus the ideologist-
historian overlooked the significance of everyday life as it became hidden behind the 
idealist narratives that were foregrounded precisely by virtue of being externalized.   
 This structure of essence and supplement precisely describes the relation of 
mental and material labor in Die deutsche Ideologie.  Material labor remained the core 
that gave meaning to human activity and constituted the essence of human activity.  
Mental labor took on the character of supplemental activity that was not only void of 
meaning in itself but, even worse, obscured and disguised the true significance of 
material labor.  Marx described this double action of mental labor as the conceit of 
consciousness.  In his account of the emergence of mental from material labor Marx 
had claimed that “[v]on diesem Augenblicke an kann sich das Bewußtsein wirklich 
einbilden, etwas Andres als das Bewußtsein der bestehenden Praxis zu sein, wirklich 
etwas vorzustellen, ohne etwas Wirkliches vorzustellen.”14  Marx used the term 
“conceit” (Einbildung) over and over again in Die deutsche Ideologie in connection 
with consciousness.   The term simultaneously described two processes.  First, 
                                                 
14  Loc. cit. 
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consciousness perceived its own fall into ideology and the shattering of its original 
unity in a surprising manner.  Rather than feeling unhappiness or a sense of loss, 
consciousness gained an exaggerated sense of importance and self-satisfaction: 
consciousness became, literally, conceited.  At the same time, consciousness began to 
attribute to the realm of thought or imagination (Einbildung) a degree of reality 
properly belonging to material phenomena.  The inappropriate conceitedness of 
consciousness, therefore, sprang from the importance it attributed to its own products, 
that is, to products of the imagination or “mere conceits.”  Consciousness perceived 
itself and its products as the driving force of history, forgetting or at least underplaying 
in its self-satisfaction the influence that material factors such as production, 
technology and property relations had on its forms.  This conceit of consciousness, 
which blinded it to its own nature, was the reason why the division of mental and 
material labor could not constitute for Marx a liberation and why it could “wirklich 
etwas vor[…]stellen, ohne etwas Wirkliches vorzustellen.”  The independence of 
consciousness was only apparent, a delusion, but by accepting this delusion as the 
truth about itself, consciousness committed an error that was all too real. 
 Marx felt it essential to counter the conceit of consciousness by regaining a 
holistic view of history.  Where ideology only perceived the narratives that it itself had 
spun, and thus continually admired itself in the mirror while ignoring everything it 
deemed beneath its dignity, the holistic view of history Marx described would cast its 
scrutiny on the totality of historical phenomena: 
 
Diese Geschichtsauffassung beruht also darauf, den wirklichen 
Produktionsprozeß, und zwar von der materiellen Produktion des 
unmittelbaren Lebens ausgehend, zu entwickeln und die mit dieser 
Produktionsweise zusammenhängende und von ihr erzeugte 
Verkehrsform, also die bürgerliche Gesellschaft in ihren verschiedenen 
Stufen als Grundlage der ganzen Geschichte aufzufassen und sie 
sowohl in ihrer Aktion als Staat darzustellen, wie die sämtlichen 
verschiedenen theoretischen Erzeugnisse und Formen des Bewußtseins, 
Religion, Philosophie, Moral, etc. etc. aus ihr zu erklären und ihren 
Entstehungsprozeß aus ihnen zu verfolgen, wo dann natürlich auch die 
Sache in  ihrer Totalität (und darum auch die Wechselwirkung dieser 
verschiedenen Seiten auf einander) dargestellt werden kann.15 
                                                 
15  MEGA, I/5: 27. 
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The difference between this conception and the idealist historiography was not merely 
that one favored one “realm” rather than the other.  The difference was that while the 
idealist conception always resulted in a division between history and ordinary life, 
between the extraneous standard and everything below, the materialist conception “hat 
in jeder Periode nicht, wie die idealistische Geschichtsanschauung, nach einer 
Kategorie zu suchen […].”16  Idealist history set up a category and explained it, but 
could not explain the material ground of history.  Thus it had to relegate that material 
ground to the realm of nature and posit an antithesis between history and nature.  The 
materialist conception of history, on the other hand, required no such antithesis: it not 
only explained the material ground of history but the ideological forms above it as 
well.  In fact, the materialist conception operated on the understanding of a 
“Wechselwirkung” between material ground and forms of consciousness.  Therefore, 
because the forms of consciousness did not lie outside its scope of explanation, the 
materialist conception produced what the idealist conception could not: a depiction of 
history as a totality rather than as a division. 
 
II. Transparency and Inversion 
 
Such a totalizing conceptual structure thus revealed once again the essence that had, 
under ideology, been hidden behind the supplement.  The forms of consciousness 
would no longer obscure or block one’s view of the material ground beneath them, but 
rather would be transparent to that ground, revealing clearly the dialectical 
“Wechselwirkung” between the elements that had previously appeared independent of 
each other.  This model of transparency seems the necessary consequence and only 
possible alternative to Marx’s understanding of ideology as division and 
externalization.  Nevertheless, a central tension in Die deutsche Ideologie consists in 
the simultaneous existence of this model with another model for consciousness having 
                                                                                                                                            
 
16  Ibid., 27. 
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very different implications.  This second model effectively abandoned as utopian the 
aim of re-achieving a non-ideological form of consciousness.  In this model – so 
influential for the development of Marxism in the nineteenth-century and so often 
decried as vulgar in the twentieth – consciousness did not represent a prodigal son 
whose return was eagerly anticipated and whose future reintegration with material 
practice vehemently asserted.  Rather, consciousness appeared as a realm of falseness 
and illusion for which no rehabilitation could be possible.  Consider Marx’s sarcastic 
discussion of the ideologist’s perplexity regarding 
 
Wie man denn eigentlich “aus dem Gottesreich in das Menschenreich 
komme”, als ob dieses “Gottesreich” je anderswo existiert habe als in 
der Einbildung und die gelahrten Herren nicht fortwährend, ohne es zu 
wissen, in dem “Menschenreich” lebten, zu welchem sie jetzt den Weg 
suchen, –  und als ob das wissenschaftliche Amüsement, denn mehr als 
das ist es nicht, das Kuriosum dieser theoretischen Wolkenbildung zu 
erklären, nicht gerade umgekehrt darin läge, daß man ihre Entstehung 
aus den wirklichen irdischen Verhältnissen nachweist.17 
 
Here Marx equated the Einbildung characteristic of consciousness with 
Wolkenbildung, or mere castles in the air.  Consciousness appears as simply a realm of 
self-indulgent curiosities and amusements.  To be sure, Marx is talking here about the 
German ideologists, so it is clear that this is intended as a negative example.  But his 
scorn is so intense that he leaves no theoretical space for the ideal of any kind of 
consciousness other than such ideology.  For such idealistic indulgence could only be 
brought to an end by an approach that “bleibt fortwährend auf dem wirklichen 
Geschichtsboden stehen.”18  The schema of castles in the air floating above the “real 
ground” of history pitted an innate ethereality of consciousness against the solidity and 
undeniable truth of material activity.  As a result, consciousness called for the epithet 
“mere” and could be dismissed as empty talk, pure speculation, or self-indulgent 
philosophizing.  The difference between consciousness and ideology collapses here so 
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entirely that the prospect of ever returning to a de-alienated consciousness appears to 
have vanished altogether. 
 Once consciousness appeared as an object of scorn in this manner, the 
conceptual structure for economic determinism was obviously already in place.19  For 
this model retained the structure that Marx attributed to vulgar idealism but simply 
reversed the terms.  The realm of material production assumed the exclusive claim to 
reality that the idealists had ascribed to the various forms of consciousness.  This 
process of inversion clearly left its mark on some of Marx’s most famous images for 
historical materialism, such as the camera obscura or Hegel standing on his head.  
Although surrounding passages may imply that something more than a simple 
inversion is taking place, the fact remains that simple inversion is what these images 
express most powerfully.   
The point, obviously, is not to claim that deep down Marx was actually an 
economic determinist; there is too much counter-evidence to accept such a conclusion.  
But neither should one dismiss those moments in Marx’s texts that do indeed support 
such determinist logic.  The point is to acknowledge two contradictory models 
between which Marx moves as if they were fully compatible: on the one hand the 
model in which consciousness is governed by the ideal of integration with material 
activity, and on the other hand the model where consciousness is secondary, illusory, 
or at best a reflection of material production, which was portrayed as the only solid 
ground for real knowledge. 
                                                 
19  Raymond Williams has described this aptly: “The uses of ‘consciousness’ and ‘philosophy’ 
depend almost entirely on the main argument about the futility of separating consciousness and thought 
from the material social process.  It is the separation that makes such consciousness and thought into 
ideology.  But it is easy to see how the point could be taken, and has often been taken, in a quite 
different way.  In a new kind of abstraction, ‘consciousness’ and ‘philosophy’ are separated, in their 
turn, from ‘real knowledge’ and from the ‘practical process’.  This is especially easy to do with the 
available language of ‘reflexes’, ‘echoes’, ‘phantoms’, and ‘sublimates’.  The result of this separation, 
against the original conception of an indissoluble process, is the farcical exclusion of consciousness 
from the ‘development of men’ and from ‘real knowledge’ of this development.  But the former, at 
least, is impossible by any standard.  All that can then be done to mask its absurdity is elaboration of the 
familiar two-stage model (the mechanical materialist reversal of the idealist dualism), in which there is 
first material social life and then, at some temporal or spatial distance, consciousness and ‘its’ products.  
This leads directly to simple reductionism: ‘consciousness’ and ‘its’ products can be nothing but 
‘reflections’ of what has already occurred in the material social process” (Marxism and Literature 
[Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1977]: 61). 
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The terminology of totality Marx used in his earlier descriptions of a 
consciousness transparent to material reality clearly has no place in this “mechanical 
materialist reversal of the idealist dualism.”20  In the model of inverted realism, the 
material is complete in itself.  Confronted with a consciousness irretrievably divided 
from the material, floating above it as if resting on a cloud, the correct response could 
no longer be to seek to integrate what hovered above with what lay below into a 
totality, as it was in Marx’s critique of the extraneous standard on idealist history.  The 
correct response could rather only be to focus attention on the real ground below 
without becoming distracted by the shadow play taking place above.  The palace 
revolutions in these castles in the air thus became mere symptoms or reflections of 
“real” contradictions being worked out below; they could be easily explained by 
material factors, but such explanation did not so much integrate them into the material 
as reveal their utter lack of substance.  The inversion model thus portrayed the 
material as self-sufficient.  Consciousness became parasitic, and the ideological 
division between mental and material became insurmountable. 
Why did Marx oscillate between these two models, the latter of which rejected 
the ideal motivating the former?  Why did he vacillate between viewing the 
reintegration of consciousness as a historical project of the first magnitude and 
scorning “mere” consciousness as an irredeemable source of self-indulgence and 
delusion?  That this oscillation could result from a slip in logic is unlikely.  Quite the 
contrary, the oscillation resulted from logical consistency: despite the tensions 
between the two models, the inversion model always lay implicit within the 
transparency model.  Inversion and transparency were two moments of a single 
system.  One emerged from the blind spot of the other. 
 Why this should be so becomes clear from a closer consideration of Marx’s 
ideal of de-alienated consciousness.  Such a consciousness was to constitute a 
perfectly transparent window onto material life: “Wie die Individuen ihr Leben 
äußern, so sind sie.  Was sie sind, fällt also zusammen mit ihrer Produktion […].”21  
                                                 
20  Williams, loc. cit. 
 
21  Ibid., 11. 
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Consciousness equaled expression, which equaled being, which equaled production: 
consciousness, therefore, equaled production.  Through this chain of identities, 
consciousness effectively evaporated and could not be pointed to as an independent 
phenomenon.  Marx’s transparency model did not so much integrate consciousness 
and material production as make them identical. 
 The problem was how such a de-alienated consciousness could ever be 
represented.  Given the transparency model, consciousness was no more representable 
than a pane of glass: one could either depict the frame or the distortions in the glass, 
which in such analogy would be equivalent to depicting ideology rather than de-
alienated consciousness, or one could depict the panorama revealed behind the pane of 
glass, which was the panorama of material production.  De-alienated consciousness 
itself, however, remained unrepresentable.  This is the deictic dilemma of the 
transparency model.  Consciousness was “there” only so long as it was alienated.  De-
alienated consciousness could be represented only in the form of an ideal generated 
from the negation of that alienation.  Once that ideal was posited as achieved, 
however, the object desired – consciousness – disappeared. 
 This is why the “vulgar” inversion model did not constitute a mere logical or 
rhetorical slip.  Inversion stepped in precisely at this blind spot of transparency, made 
necessary by the impossibility of representing something figured as absolutely 
transparent.  That inversion brought with it its own blind spot hardly needs to be 
stated.  For such an inverted idealism, consciousness always remained supplemental: 
“mere” consciousness, empty theory, self-indulgent philosophy.  Such a consciousness 
could be represented, but only as an ornamental appendage or distorting screen 
imposed onto “real,” that is, material reality.  The blind spot of inversion, in other 
words, was that it was incapable of even formulating the ideal of de-alienated 
consciousness.  The dilemma of Marx’s model of consciousness thus lay between 
these two blind spots: de-alienated consciousness could not be represented or pointed 
to without already having it fall back into ideology, without already re-assuming its 
parasitic position above the material.  Consciousness either disappeared or became 
superfluous.  Between autonomy and identity there was no third way. 
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III. Revolution as Revelation 
 
The issue of representation returned in Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte.  
The representability of revolution, or the proper manner of such representation, is 
raised by the opening contrast between 1789 and 1851, between uncle and nephew.  
The oppositions Marx raised in the opening lines between tragedy and farce, original 
and repetition, present and representation all clearly portrayed Louis Bonaparte’s coup 
d’état as a false affair, while 1789 served as the foil revealing that falsity.  The 
rhetorical power of Marx’s contrast has made this into one of his most famous 
passages, but the contrast does introduce a certain confusion.  For within a few lines it 
becomes clear that the real contrast Marx wishes to emphasize is that between 
bourgeois revolutions (in whatever form) and socialist revolution.  Whereas bourgeois 
revolutions “beschwören […] ängstlich die Geister der Vergangenheit zu ihrem 
Dienste herauf,”22 socialist revolution “kann ihre Poesie nicht aus der Vergangenheit 
schöpfen, sondern nur aus der Zukunft.”23  From this angle the similarity between the 
uncle and the nephew appears more important than the differences.  That similarity 
consisted in the borrowing of past forms for the actions of the present.  Bourgeois 
revolutions, in other words, transformed the present into representation.   
 These revolutions, therefore, were marked by a tension between the content 
they contained and the form in which it was represented.   In bourgeois revolution, 
form attempted to generate meaning so to speak from within itself rather than by 
drawing on content.  Because the forms did not emerge as the expression of a content, 
they had to be borrowed from another source.  This is why for Marx bourgeois 
revolution was forced to conjure up past forms or “Namen, Schlachtparole, Kostüm, 
um in dieser altehrwürdigen Verkleidung und mit dieser erborgten Sprache die neue 
Weltgeschichtsszene aufzuführen.”24  Bourgeois revolution required such resurrection 
                                                 
22  AB, 226. 
 
23  Ibid., 228. 
 
24  Ibid., 226. 
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of the dead “um sich über ihren eigenen Inhalt zu betäuben.”25  The self-conscious 
Roman rhetoric of the French Revolution, the ancient drapery its main protagonists 
felt themselves to be animating once more, the Old Testament posturing of the English 
Revolution, all expressed this gap between content and form. 
 Once again the falsity Marx perceived took the structure of essence and 
supplement.  One could describe the relation of form and content in Der achtzehnte 
Brumaire as one of alienation: form had become external to content.  Precisely 
because the forms were externalized and thus foregrounded as costume, mask or 
theatrics, the essence of the revolutionary action, its content, was hidden.   
 Both 1789 and 1851 shared this alienated structure, but there was obviously a 
difference between the events.  Marx’s expression of this difference as a shift in genre 
from tragedy to farce indicated that more than just a difference of degree was 
involved.  While the English and French Revolutions involved an element of self-
deception or theatrical delusion, there was no question that these were in fact historical 
turning points of the first magnitude.  The bourgeoisie may not have been capable of 
looking at itself honestly in the mirror and comprehending what it really represented, 
but its accession to power truly shook European society to its foundations.  Thus, 
while the antiquarian forms and gestures with which it expressed itself did not emerge 
from its underlying content, 1789 at least had a real content: the victory of bourgeois 
capitalism over aristocratic feudalism. The situation in 1851 was quite different in 
Marx’s account.  This replay of a replay of course had some kind of significance as a 
historical fluctuation or as a symptom, but nothing near the magnitude it claimed for 
itself.  The consolidation of finance capital in France was a local event representing a 
significant variation in bourgeois power structures, but it was no revolutionary 
paradigm shift.  Thus what made 1851 into farce was that it did not simply hide the 
true features of what was occurring, but attempted to hide its true pettiness. 
 The contrast between 1789 and 1851, therefore, was that between true 
historical action (albeit enacted in historical costume) and mere historicist pose.  
While the French Revolution was unable to face its true features in the mirror, Louis 
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Bonaparte was unable to stop admiring himself.  Louis Bonaparte thus shared a basic 
characteristic of the German ideologists: conceit.  The fine figure Bonaparte admired 
in the mirror was, needless to say, simply the product of a flattering uniform and a 
carefully calculated pose – there was nothing more to it.  Because of this absence of 
content, Bonaparte’s posturing formed the counterpart to the German ideologists’ 
castles in the air.  In both cases the bombast rested on nothing solid.  The degree of 
alienation in both cases had reached a level causing a qualitative change: the theatrical 
gestures had literally no meaning other than as the sign of a profound depth of 
alienation.  The French Revolution required deciphering, but a meaning would 
ultimately be found; similarly, an alienated worker might appear as an utterly 
mechanized example of humanity, but closer contact would reveal a unique soul.  The 
false revolutions of Louis Bonaparte and the German ideologists, however, were sheer 
pretence.   
 In contrast to these bourgeois revolutions, socialist revolution would according 
to Marx be characterized by an absolute transparency.  Marx’s claim that this 
revolution would take its poetry not from the past but from the future clearly indicated 
an end to the borrowing of form endemic to bourgeois revolution.  The content and 
form of socialist revolution would exist transparently to and in “Wechselwirkung” 
with each other in the same manner that Marx described de-alienated consciousness 
and material production    as being “unmittelbar verflochten,” the former as the 
“direkter Ausfluß” of the latter.  Terry Eagleton has described this holistic image of 
immediacy and balance as Marx’s “aesthetic ideal:” “the emancipated society, for 
Marx as much as for the Rousseau from whom he has learnt here, is an aesthetic 
interfusion of form and content.  An interfusion of form and content, in fact, may be 
taken as Marx’s aesthetic ideal.”26  This aesthetic ideal can be expressed in another 
way: socialist revolution for Marx represented the revelation of the true identity of the 
present.  1789 had been too afraid to look upon its own features, and thus borrowed 
costumes from the past; 1851 had no real identity, and thus constituted a walking, 
power-grabbing phantom uniform.  The socialist revolution according to Marx would 
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finally lay down the masks and shed the costumes.  For the first time an honest 
physiognomy would be revealed.  Only in socialist revolution would the identity of the 
present be revealed as it really was. 
 Marx described this revelation of the content of the present as follows: “Die 
Revolution des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts muß die Toten ihre Toten begraben lassen, 
um bei ihrem eigenen Inhalt anzukommen.  Dort ging die Phrase über den Inhalt, hier 
geht der Inhalt über die Phrase hinaus.”27  The content of this revolution would not be 
determined or distorted by the application of dead forms but would reveal itself in the 
spontaneous creation of new, transparent forms.  Marx’s formulation, however, points 
to a complication in this aesthetic ideal of form and content existing in perfect balance.  
For Marx speaks not of a balance but of content “going beyond” the phrase (“über die 
Phrase hinaus”).  Instead of transparency, as the aesthetic ideal would lead one to 
expect, this formulation suggests rather a complete submersion or disappearance of 
form into content.  This has led Eagleton to suggest that at moments Marx’s aesthetic 
ideal becomes radicalized into a notion of the sublime.  The Marxist sublime in 
Eagleton’s words is: 
 
less a matter of discovering the expressive forms “adequate to” the 
substance of socialism, than of rethinking that whole opposition – of 
grasping form no longer as the symbolic mould into which that 
substance is poured, but as the “form of the content”, as the structure of 
a ceaseless self-production.28 
 
Socialist revolution thus did not draw the line at the point where form and content 
came into aesthetic harmony, but rather crossed that line and shattered form altogether 
so as to liberate content absolutely. 
 The radicalization of the aesthetic ideal into a Marxist sublime again had its 
counterpart in the theory of ideology.  That counterpart was Marx’s move from 
describing the ideal of consciousness’ transparency to material production to 
emphasizing the need to dispel the illusions of ideology by focusing on the “real 
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ground” of history.  Just as the extreme case of the German ideologists pushed Marx 
to the more radical formulation of consciousness as hopelessly ideological and 
innately supplemental, the move here from the aesthetic ideal to the Marxist sublime 
appears to have been motivated by the radical formalistic emptiness of the second 
edition of the 18th Brumaire.  Since the 18th Brumaire appeared as not simply an 
imbalance but as the utter submersion of content under form, Marx responded by 
inverting the terms and calling for the submersion of form under content.  The farce of 
Louis Napoleon thus drove Marx literally from the ridiculous to the sublime. 
 But again, this radicalization also has a deeper cause.  That cause is the 
problematic nature of representing something that has gone beyond all boundaries of 
representation.  Eagleton describes this dilemma as follows: 
 
What is in question here is the whole concept of a representational 
aesthetics.  Previous revolutions have been formalistic, engrafting a 
factitious “phrase” or form onto their content; but the consequence of 
this is a dwarfing of the signified by the signifier.  The content of 
socialist revolution, by contrast, is excessive of all form, out in advance 
of its own rhetoric.  It is unrepresentable by anything but itself, 
signified only in its “absolute movement of becoming”, and thus a kind 
of sublimity.29 
 
This calling into question of a representational aesthetics is nothing other than the 
return of Marx’s deictic dilemma.  Just as de-alienated consciousness slipped through 
one’s fingers the moment one tried to grasp it, socialist revolution similarly resisted 
representation.  Representation would necessarily impose form on its content.  
Socialist revolution, however, precisely by being so true to itself and by consisting so 
absolutely in its own unique content, could not take form.  The heart of this paradox 
lies in Marx’s implicit understanding of socialist revolution as a moment of revelation, 
a moment when the face and identity of the present are revealed.  Such an absolute 
presence cannot be represented: the moment when that identity is revealed is 
accompanied so to speak by a flash that momentarily blinds the observer.  Once that 
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moment can finally be represented, it has lost its privileged status, and the real identity 
of the present remains “out in advance of its own rhetoric.” 
Marx’s deictic dilemma thus resulted in a situation where true consciousness 
and the true face of the present were representable only when absent.  Both became 
transparent or invisible once posited as achieved.  This dilemma would perhaps itself 
appear merely theoretical did it not reemerge in the struggles of twentieth-century 
aesthetics to purge itself of historicism.  The Realism Debate, as was argued in 
Chapter One, largely revolved around the issue of how to represent the physiognomy 
of the present.  The two sides of that debate made use of a discourse calling for 
elimination of the distortions of historicism: for a shedding of the costumes and 
lowering of the masks so as to reveal the present in naked honesty.  But this gesture of 
revelation proved problematic.  The crux of the Realism debate was precisely the 
impossibility of determining when the historicist mask had in fact been lowered. 
Marx’s deictic dilemma helps explain why this was so.  The aesthetic 
grounding of the avant-garde was Marx’s transparency model.30  Just as for Marx 
consciousness was to become integral to material production and thereby cease to 
exist as an external, ideological supplement, so art for the avant-garde had to cease to 
be art, had to purify itself through self-immolation until transforming into a social or 
political fact.  Marx’s conflict of materialism against ideology reemerged as the 
conflict of politics against autonomous art, or more generally, as the praxis versus 
theory dilemma of crucial importance especially to the architectural discourse of the 
avant-garde.  Hence the avant-garde’s ceaseless involutions on itself and constant self-
recreation: for the moment it took form it had already betrayed the ideal of 
transparency.  Just as Marx, when confronted with this dilemma, slipped into the 
model of inversion so as to be able to point to his topic, so too did the adherents of 
Realism.  The theory of reflection was the camera obscura translated into an aesthetic 
principle.  Under this principle, art turned into a shadow realm, projecting images not 
of a higher, brighter world, but rather of sober forces of production.  The embarrassing 
                                                 
30  For an excellent discussion of the ideal of transparency among the Russian Constructivists, 
see Daniel Herwitz, Making Theory/Constructing Art: On the Authority of the Avant-Garde (Chicago: 
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1993), chapter 2. 
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dilemma of the reflection model was how to save art from being anything beyond 
ornamental shadow play or distorting ideology, in short, “mere” art.31  Between them, 
the protagonists of the Realism Debate repeated the strategies of transparency and 
inversion put forward by Marx.  But the revelation sought, the face of the present, 
remained elusive. 
                                                 
31  H. R. Jauß has expressed this as follows: “a materialist history of art which reduces the 
whole range of aesthetic problems to a mere critique of ideology can no longer give any reason for its 
interest in the art of the past” (“The Idealist Embarrassment” in New Literary History 7 [1975]: 193). 
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Chapter Four 
 
THE STYLE OF THE PRESENT 
Teige and the Question of Dualism 
 
Was erstens die Würdigkeit der Kunst betrifft, wissenschaftlich 
betrachtet zu werden, so ist es allerdings der Fall, daß die Kunst als ein 
flüchtiges Spiel gebraucht werden kann, dem Vergnügen und der 
Unterhaltung zu dienen, unsere Umgebung zu verzieren, dem Äußeren 
der Lebensverhältnisse Gefälligkeit zu geben und durch Schmuck 
andere Gegenstände herauszuheben.  In dieser Weise ist sie in der Tat 
nicht unabhängige, nicht freie, sondern dienende Kunst.  Was wir aber 
betrachten wollen, ist die auch in ihrem Zwecke wie in ihren Mitteln 
freie Kunst.1 
 
 
 
In late 1922, the Czech avant-garde circle Devětsil released two group publications.  
The first, Revoluční sborník Devětsil [Devětsil Revolutionary Almanac],2 appeared 
under a plain cover of somber, almost military green.  Inside the design was heavy 
with text and with woodcut illustrations of a vaguely Cubist quality.  The main critical 
articles, written by Karel Teige, attempted to redefine and thereby resuscitate the 
slogan of “proletarian art” that Devětsil had adopted as its own in 1921.  The second 
publication was entitled Život II [Life II]3 and appeared only a few months later.  This 
cover, abandoning the disciplined design of the earlier anthology, displayed a collage 
superimposing an automobile wheel over a Doric column, beyond which lies the open 
sea.  The body of the publication utilized a variety of experimental layouts and 
typefaces, with illustrations juxtaposing ocean liners to Tibetan architecture, and 
                                                 
1  G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, in Werke, vol. 13 (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 
1986): 20. 
 
2  Revoluční sborník Devětsil, eds. Karel Teige and Jaroslav Seifert (Praha: Večernice V. 
Vortel, 1922). 
 
3  Život II: Nové umění, konstrukce, soudobá intelektuelní aktivita [Life II: The New Art, 
Construction, Contemporary Intellectual Activity], ed. Jaromír Krejcar (Praha: umělecká beseda, 1922). 
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modernist sculpture to Native American totem poles or snow-plow trains, very much 
in line with the “new spirit” proclaimed shortly before by Le Corbusier.  Život II had 
little to say about proletarian art but much about purism, constructivism, new media 
such as cinema and photography, and the primacy of the machine for contemporary 
cultural production.   
 The appearance of these two publications within such a short period does not 
simply bear witness to the speed with which Devětsil developed away from a program 
fairly provincial in shape4 towards concerns just being taken up by the international 
avant-garde at that time.  This swiftness also suggests that, despite the apparent 
revolutionary shift that the covers of the publications illustrate, the transformation was 
in fact evolutionary.  There was but a short step from proletarian art, with its nostalgic 
ideal of a coming “Socialist Gothic” that would end the perceived aesthetic 
“interregnum”5 by creating a modern folk art for the proletariat, to the radical embrace 
of technology exhibited in Život II.6 
 The ease of this inversion from millenarian expectations of renewal to 
confident optimism in the new represents more than just a footnote to an account of 
Teige’s development as an avant-garde theorist of European significance.  Rather, it 
suggests that the boundary separating historical nostalgia from militant hostility to past 
cultural forms is permeable.  Given Teige’s development towards an ever more radical 
functionalism – well illustrated by his later criticism of no less a figure than Le 
Corbusier for practicing “historicism” – the question then arises of how much this 
                                                 
4  To be sure, Devětsil’s theory of proletarian art was influenced by the Soviet Proletkult 
movement, primarily as mediated by S. K. Neumann in the journals Kmen and Červen.  Nevertheless, 
the theory of proletarian art, with its leading themes of lidovost (popular character) and tendentiousness, 
was very much a response to particular cultural dynamics in the early period of the first Czechoslovak 
republic. 
 
5 See, e.g.,  “Nové umění a lidová tvorba” [“The New Art and Folk Production”] in Stěpán 
Vlašín, ed., Avantgarda známá a neznámá, vol. I (Praha: Svoboda, 1971): especially 152 and 154. 
 
6 The smoothness of this transition is especially marked in the theoretical texts by Teige, since 
not all of his work appearing in Život II was actually composed after the articles from the earlier 
volume.  To complicate the matter even further, the article “Proletářské umění” [“Proletarian Art”] (co-
authored with the poet Jiří Wolker and appearing under the latter’s name in Var I/9 [271-275]), must 
have been written only shortly before Teige’s revisionist main piece in Revoluční sborník Devětsil, 
“Nové proletářské umění” [“The New Proletarian Art”].  (Both articles were delivered as lectures in the 
Spring of 1922 and, perhaps significantly, neither originally appeared under Teige’s name.) 
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later, radical position might retain traces of the nostalgia expressed openly in the early 
calls for proletarian art. 
 Such traces are in fact evident in the basic structure of Teige’s theoretical 
program between 1923 and 1930.  The most characteristic feature of that program was 
Teige’s simultaneous articulation of the twin poles of Constructivism and Poetism.  
Teige clearly envisioned this dual structure as the expression of a dialectical unity 
within a series of opposed terms: rationality and irrationality, purposeful action and 
anti-instrumental Wohlgefallen, scientific functionalism and pure lyricism, and 
everyday life and aesthetic elation.  While the project of delineating a consistent 
theoretical framework for the avant-garde out of mutually incompatible characteristics 
displays an open utopianism, in Teige’s case this utopianism was not the product of a 
theoretician’s greed.  Rather, this utopianism (the aim of reconciling the 
irreconcilable) can be shown to issue from precisely the most earthbound element of 
Teige’s thought: his hard-headed functionalism.  The prime interest of Teige’s dual 
program, therefore, lies neither in his formulations of Constructivism or Poetism taken 
independently, nor even in his juxtaposition or attempted dialectical synthesis of the 
two poles. The significance of the dualism lies in the distinctness with which Teige 
unwittingly betrays that Constructivism cannot even exist without Poetism.  Poetism, 
the apparent opposite of Constructivism, is actually its inevitable logical consequence; 
Poetism would be there in shadowy outline even if it were not explicitly articulated.   
 The utopianism in Teige’s dualism – which at first appears as naïve 
exuberance or willful positing of a unity of opposites – is thus the mark of theoretical 
consistency: the very purity of Teige’s Constructivism was what summoned its radical 
antithesis.  That such utopianism was unavoidable, rather than simply a choice or a 
theoretical oversight, was due to its origin in the inversion described above.  Poetism 
thus represents the trace of Constructivism’s origin in historical nostalgia.   
 Teige’s theoretical position in the mid- to late twenties largely developed 
through attempts to resolve the contradictions resulting from his denial of this 
historical nostalgia at the base of Constructivism. The contradiction that was really 
crucial here was not, as one might expect, any of the particular conceptual tensions 
between Constructivism and Poetism.  Those tensions functioned more as the fuel for 
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the dialectical engine: their combustibility was what kept Teige’s system moving 
forward.  What ultimately revealed the overall route as a dead-end, however, was the 
very structure of the dualism itself.  The critique of historicism that formed an integral 
part of Teige’s theory of Constructivism centered precisely on the identification of a 
conceptual dualism marring the integrity of historicist architecture: a conceptual 
dualism that for Teige took material form in the application of a decorative layer of 
historical ornamentation on top of a functional structure that should have been deemed 
complete in itself.  Given the importance of this critique in Teige’s writings of the 
twenties, the appearance of a parallel dualism in the Constructivism-Poetism structure 
is striking indeed.  Teige himself exerted considerable effort to avoid having Poetism 
appear as a decorative addendum to the severe teachings of Constructivism: effort that 
not only involved ever more laborious formulation of the dialectical unity of the poles 
but that also drove him to articulate his Constructivism in ever more radical tones (as 
Le Corbusier was to experience first hand).  These efforts, however, opened up a 
vicious circle: the more radically Teige pushed the limits of Constructivism, the more 
insistently Poetism appeared as its ultimate promise – while at the same time the more 
difficult it became to justify this dual structure given the standards of Constructivism.7 
 The source of this dilemma must be sought in those few short months in late 
1922.  For what occurred in Teige’s theoretical position roughly in the period between 
preparation of Revoluční sborník Devětsil and Život II was a miniaturized and 
accelerated version of the shift explored in Chapter 2 in relation to Herder and 
Nietzsche.  For this reason Teige’s dilemma is not simply the record of an error: it 
                                                 
7  1929-30 was a pivotal period in this respect.  It not only witnessed the disbanding of Devětsil 
during the course of the so-called “Generational Discussion,” but for Teige also culminated in the 
breakdown of the Constructivism-Poetism dualism, primarily due to the contradiction at issue here.  
Teige came to see the heart of the Generational Discussion in the “crisis of criteria” characterizing 
avant-garde artistic theory (Poetism) in contrast to the conceptual clarity of avant-garde architectural 
theory (Constructivism).  For the next several years Teige focused his attention almost exclusively on 
architectural theory, and when he did return in 1934 to artistic theory in the form of Surrealism, he did 
not attempt to resuscitate the “unified field theory” of the avant-garde that had been so characteristic of 
and problematic for his work in the twenties.  Surrealism and functionalist architecture co-exist 
peacefully in Teige’s writings of the thirties, but he never formulated them as a dialectical pair as he 
had Constructivism and Poetism.  (For an analysis of the implicit connections between Teige’s later 
functionalism and Surrealism, see Rostislav Švácha, “Surrealismus a architektura,” in Lenka Bydžovská 
and Karel Srp, eds., Český surrealismus, 1929-1953, [Praha: Argo & Galerie hlavního města Prahy, 
1996): 268-279].) 
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replays and reveals a paradox fundamental to the avant-garde thesis of a radical 
rejection of the past.  At issue here is the shift from a perception of the present as 
existing in a historical vacuum, with the consequent attempt to address this by 
navigating some sort of reinsertion into the historical flux, to the perception of the 
present as being mired in a surfeit of historical detritus, calling forth the attempt to 
address this through a radical clearing of the tables and a new instauration.  Teige’s 
understanding of Constructivism has its roots in his early nostalgic longing for a new 
historical style that would lead the present out of its aesthetic interregnum and give it a 
standing equivalent to the great historical styles, and to the Gothic above all.  But the 
promise of Constructivism to create such historical standing quickly became 
predicated on its radical rejection not only of all traces of historical decorative 
systems, but also of the very gesture of measuring oneself against the past.   
 
I. From Socialist Gothic to Style of the Present 
 
The claim that socialist revolution would create the conditions for the emergence of a 
new and all-encompassing artistic style – often referred to as a “Socialist Gothic” – 
was a common element of the rhetoric of proletarian art.8  Teige used this idealized 
image to describe an art that would stand in some sort of immediate relation and be 
spontaneously comprehensible to the masses rather than only to an elite.  He claimed 
that such a wide social grounding had been achieved most effectively by Gothic art: 
 
In antiquity, Christian art was a secondary, derivative, immature style 
and only in the Romanesque period, when the break between the old 
and the new worlds occurred, did it expand to cultural and stylistic 
[slohové] dimensions […], then to transform into the Gothic, which 
was able to develop into the most typical style.  In socialist society, just 
as in the Gothic, there will be no difference between the ruling art and 
the underlying current of primary production.  Popular [lidové] 
                                                 
8  See, e.g., Jiří Wolker [and K. Teige], “Proletářské umění,” in Dílo Jiřího Wolkera, ed. 
Miloslav Novotný, vol. I, 5th ed (Praha: Václav Petr, 1930): 292; and Vladislav Vančura, “Nové umění” 
[“The New Art”], in Host 3 (1923): 120. 
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proletarian art will achieve the same power as that which created the 
Gothic cathedrals.9 
 
This image of the Gothic thus provided Teige with a model for the criterion of lidovost 
(popular character) that played such a prominent role in his understanding of 
proletarian art.  At the same time it functioned as an image to hold up in contrast to the 
autonomy of art in bourgeois society.  From this perspective, capitalism appeared has 
a force that had alienated art from its natural function by pushing it along a course of 
autonomous development and separating it from the everyday concerns and interests 
of the great mass of people.  Proletarian art, by preparing the ground for a modern art 
that would be lidové as the Gothic had allegedly been, thus promised a release from 
the constraints of autonomous art and a return to the direct interconnection of art and 
everyday life that had been deformed in bourgeois society.  In this way, Teige 
implicitly linked the revolutionary action of proletarian art with a process of historical 
restoration.  Proletarian art cleared the path for a return to the historical process of 
stylistic development that had been interrupted by the autonomy of art under 
capitalism. 
 The precedent for Teige’s use of the Gothic as a symbol of artistic and stylistic 
integrity, at least as concerns Czech influences,10 is easy to locate.  The literary and art 
critic F. X. Šalda, whom Teige described in 1927 as the “founder of Czech 
                                                 
9  “Nové umění proletářské,” originally in Revoluční sborník Devětsil, here quoted from Karel 
Teige, Výbor z díla, eds. Jiří Brabec, Vratislav Effenberger, Květoslav Chvatík, and Robert Kalivoda, 
vol. I (Praha: Československý spisovatel, 1966): 60-1.  (This edition hereinafter referred to as “VzD” 
followed by a volume number.)  All translations herein, unless an English edition is cited, are my own. 
 
10  This symbolic image of the Gothic can, of course, also be found in other contexts of the 
early avant-garde.  A relevant example is Gropius’ 1919 Bauhaus program, which called for “a new 
guild of craftsmen” that would forge the “new structure of the future, which will embrace architecture 
and sculpture and painting in one unity and which will one day rise toward heaven from the hands of a 
million workers like the crystal symbol of a new faith” (in Ulrich Conrads, ed., Programs and 
Manifestoes on 20th-Century Architecture [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970]: 49).  Gropius’ text was 
illustrated with a woodcut by Lyonel Feininger depicting a shining cathedral.  The Gothic as a symbol 
of a society that was integrated rather than divided into areas of specialization reassumed importance in 
the 1930s in the rhetoric of some members of the Prague Linguistic School, as is discussed by Jindřich 
Toman, The Magic of a Common Language: Jakobson, Mathesius, Trubetzkoy, and the Prague 
Linguistic Circle (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995): 181-83. 
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modernism” and the “herald of a new era in our cultural life,”11 had written in 1904 of 
“the new Gothic, an iron Gothic” portended by modern industrial structures.12  For 
Šalda, the Gothic was simply the most natural image for connoting the enormous 
potential for social cohesion contained in the true artistic styles.  This strong definition 
of style (designated by Teige with the word sloh in Czech, a word that lacks the 
connotations of style as passing fashion or modish design often attached to the word 
styl) implied the power to reveal the various unrelated manifestations of a particular 
epoch as creating some sort of recognizable whole.  In Šalda’s words: “Style is 
nothing other than conscience and consciousness of the whole, consciousness of 
mutual coherence and connection […].  Style is in conflict with everything that breaks 
this unity, with everything that takes up and isolates details from the whole, links from 
the chain, beats from the rhythm.”13  The true styles, by linking isolated details into a 
whole, thus revealed a distinct and recognizable physiognomy for an entire historical 
epoch.  Šalda’s emphasis on the organic totality characterizing strong artistic styles, in 
its turn, recalled Nietzsche’s description, in the second of the Unzeitgemäße 
Betrachtungen, of the ideal of “unity of artistic style in all the expressions of the life of 
a people.”14  Through Šalda, therefore, Teige’s early exaltation of the Gothic as “the 
example of an epoch that is stylistic [slohové] beyond reproach”15 strongly echoed the 
                                                 
11  “Vůdce české moderny” [“The Leader of Czech Modernism”], in VzD/I: 248.  On Šalda’s 
influence on the Devětsil generation, see also Vratislav Effenberger, “Nové umění,” in VzD/I: 582. 
 
12  F. X. Šalda, “Nová krása – její genese a charakter” [“The New Beauty – Its Genesis and 
Character”], in Boje o zítřek: Meditace a rapsodie, 1898-1904, here quoted from vol. I of Soubor díla 
F. X. Šaldy, eds. Jan Mukařovský, Václav Černý, Felix Vodička, and Jiří Pistorius (Praha: Melantrich, 
1948): 97. 
 
13  Ibid., 93.  It should be noted that Šalda does use the word styl here in this passage. 
 
14  Friedrich Nietzsche, Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen II: “Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der 
Historie für das Leben,” in Kritische Studienausgabe, eds. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, vol. I 
(München and Berlin: DTV and De Gruyter, 1988): 274.  On the influence of the Unzeitgemäße 
Betrachtungen on Šalda, and on how Nietzsche’s critique of historicism became intertwined with 
Šalda’s critique of the formal eclecticism of the Lumír generation, see Vladimír Kafka, “F. X. Šalda a 
německá literatura,” in Studie a úvahy o německé literatuře (Praha: KRA, 1995): 32, 45, and 89. 
Equally evident here is Šalda’s indebtedness to Nietzsche’s well-known description of the “style of 
literary decadence” in Der Fall Wagner (in Kritische Studienausgabe, vol. 6, 21).  See the discussion of 
these passages in Chapter 2. 
 
15  “Umění přítomnosti,” in Život II, 132. 
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ideal of an integrated, creative epoch that Nietzsche had held up in contrast to the 
weak, historicist culture of the nineteenth-century. 
Equally important for Teige’s reception of this terminology, however, was 
Šalda’s association of this strong notion of style with a proto-constructivist discourse.  
Šalda opposed the integrity of the true styles to the ornamental architecture of 
historicism and of much of the Czech Succession.  A direction for modern 
architecture, Šalda insisted, would not be found in any new ornamental vocabulary but 
rather in the strict logic of industrial structures.  Šalda wrote of the power of the 
impression made “by a huge railway bridge, bare, desolate, without ornament, the 
sheer embodiment of constructive thought,” and concluded that “the new beauty is 
above all the beauty of purpose, inner law, logic and structure.”16  Since Šalda was 
first and foremost a critic of literature and painting, such an emphasis on the style-
creating capacity of functional architecture is perhaps surprising.  But this language 
almost certainly reflects the influence of Jan Kotěra, one of the groundbreaking 
architects of Czech modernism and a student of Otto Wagner, with whom Šalda co-
edited the Succession journal Volné směry at the time.17  In this manner Šalda set an 
important precedent for Teige through his application of terms stemming from the 
discourse of early architectural modernism – in particular the terms “ornament” and 
“eclecticism” – to art and culture in general.18 
                                                 
16  “Nová krása,” 97-98.  See also Šalda’s 1909 note upon the opening of the Secession-style 
Municipal House in Prague: “So the scaffolding has come down and now one can clearly see what will 
be representing [Prague]: […] something immensely petty despite its enormous size; a sort of magazine 
kiosk on a larger scale.  And next to it looms that fantastic, black Gothic tower, the [15th century] 
Powder Tower, that pithy verse from a stone poem, masculine and robust like the age from which it 
comes. It does not represent anything: it simply is what it is.  Standing before it, you feel shame from 
the bottom of your soul for the representational piece of cardboard next to it and for the age with a 
paper soul […, which] forgets that before one can represent, one must be something […]” 
(“Representační dům pražský,” in Soubor díla F. X. Šaldy, vol. 16, 433). 
 
17  Kotěra was the only figure of the Czech turn-of-the-century whom Teige considered to rival 
Šalda in significance (see VzD/I: 246-8). 
 
18  Further, as Markéta Brousek has pointed out, Šalda’s transmission of such proto-
constructivist concerns must be added to the influences on the early Teige alongside Soviet 
Constructivism and French Purism (Le Corbusier) (see Brousek, Der Poetismus. Die Lehrjahre der 
tschechischen Avantgarde und ihrer marxistischen Kritiker (München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1975): 103. 
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This ideal of the true style served as the context for Teige’s account of the 
failure of art in the bourgeois era.  Bourgeois art had never succeeded in creating such 
a style, but the reason for this was not that artists in bourgeois society had been 
incapable of creating forms sufficiently beautiful or powerful.  Teige had enormous (if 
selective) respect for the artistic accomplishments of the nineteenth-century, and often 
emphasized how groundbreaking many of those accomplishments had been.  Nor did 
Teige, even though a political radical, blame the failure to develop a true style on the 
absence of progressive political views among many of the most powerful or 
aesthetically progressive nineteenth-century artists.  No matter how strongly the vision 
of an individual artist in the nineteenth-century may have been motivated by concern 
for social issues or by outright socialist allegiances (Teige pointed to Courbet and Van 
Gogh as examples), no matter how brilliant the aesthetic achievement may have been, 
and no matter how pervasive the influence on the later development of art, all 
remained the visions of individuals.  No such vision was so powerful that it could 
succeed, through sheer persuasiveness, to force its way to lasting cultural dominance.  
The vicious circle of bourgeois culture was, indeed, that precisely the aesthetic power 
of its greatest artists perpetuated and deepened the most insidious feature of its art: 
individualism, chaos, and the simultaneity of incompatible visions.  To “think” or 
“will” one’s way out of this dilemma was impossible.  Every coherent proposal for a 
way out of the chaos simply took its place as one more monadic vision, and increased 
thereby the chaos.   
Teige’s explanation of this situation made use of a fairly orthodox Marxist 
argument.  For a true style to gain hold, there needed to be a minimum level of social 
continuity.  Previous ruling classes had aimed to preserve the existing relations of 
production, which constituted the bases of their power.  This resistance to change, 
disastrous as it may have been for the establishment of more just class relations, did 
produce fertile ground for art.  Precisely the social stagnation of pre-bourgeois 
societies had resulted in the continuity necessary for the development of a true style.  
As Marx had observed in The Communist Manifesto, however, the ruling position of 
the bourgeoisie was no longer based on preserving but rather on constantly 
revolutionizing the relations of production.  For Teige, the resulting “overturning of 
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production, […] creating chronic uncertainty and nervousness,” and the repetition of 
cycles of overproduction and economic crisis, all resulted in an analogous 
“pathological acceleration of the development of modern art, which cannot settle on a 
definite form of stylistic expression.”19  This was ultimately why, in Teige’s view, 
bourgeois art was condemned to a chaotic individualism.  This was also why the 
emergence of a true style was contingent not upon strength of aesthetic vision but 
rather upon revolutionary change of the structure of society.  Proletarian art functioned 
only as an anticipatory vision, or as Teige termed it, a předobraz; the true Socialist 
Gothic could only emerge out of a transformed society: “Style will only come with the 
new social order.”20  Artistic and political revolution were thus linked for Teige not 
merely by a shared spirit of rebelliousness – which was of course a dominant feature 
even of bourgeois art – but by logical necessity. 
This account of the necessary stylistic failure of bourgeois art served Teige as 
the basis for a further thesis: that bourgeois art inevitably tended towards historicism.  
The pathological acceleration of production displaced art away from the present: 
 
[…] bourgeois society, which is, on the whole, essentially anaesthetic, 
provided no positive impulses for art; hence historicism and the 
romantic turn to the past, the flight from everyday and class realities, 
appeared for several decades to be the only salvation from the general 
banalization of art. […] The artist, under the influence of historical and 
economic-political shifts and circumstances, lived cut off from the 
mass of society.  In such a state of emergency, the artist – incapable of 
living in a vacuum – invents a different society, which belongs to either 
the past or the future.  Acting either as historian or rebel, the artist 
addresses his work to fictional societies or collectivities.  […Art] lives 
off of the spirit of negation, its gaze fixed on the past and the future.21 
 
                                                 
19  “Umění přítomnosti,” in Život II, 127.  See also “Doba a umění,” [“Art and the Age”] in 
Stavba a báseň: Umění dnes a zítra [Building and Poem: Art Today and Tomorrow] (Praha: Vaněk & 
Votava, 1927): 29. 
 
20  “Umění přítomnosti,” in Život II, 127.  See also “Nové umění proletářské,” in VzD/I: 62-63, 
and “Umění dnes a zítra,” in Revoluční sborník Devětsil, 198. 
 
21  “Nové umění proletářské,” in VzD/I: 44-45.  See also “Doba a umění,” in Stavba a báseň, 
39. 
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This flight from the present meant that “the connection between art and the spectator 
was broken.”22  The artist in bourgeois society did not speak to the surrounding 
society, but in spite of it.  Thus pushed into a relation of tension with the present, the 
bourgeois artist could express critical distance only through flight to spatial or 
temporal distances, that is, through exoticism or historicism (which Teige viewed as 
simply variations on a single theme).  No matter how justified or critical such negation 
of the present may have been, the result was indistinguishable from the dreamy 
nostalgia of the passive bourgeois citizen: 
 
When frightened spirits feel the present to be too cruel, too unrelenting, 
too uncertain, that is when the perfect beauty of the past makes itself 
felt. [… People begin to] live in the past or in far-off places, in dream 
or in reminiscence: in their minds they undertake adventurous voyages 
to long-past centuries or to the moon, the dead planet.  Historicism, 
exoticism, and the revival of the Rousseauist idyll – these anachronistic 
forms of Romanticism turn the mind from concrete tasks and present 
life.23 
 
Aesthetic negation, in other words, was socially affirmative.24  Or translated into 
Teige’s emerging Constructivist terms, art under capitalism had lost its functional 
                                                 
22  “Umění dnes a zítra,” in Revoluční sborník Devětsil, 189. 
 
23  “Doba a umění,” in Stavba a báseň, 31.  It should be pointed out that exoticism, the 
excitement of long-distance travel, and the discovery of the “primitive” were also major ingredients of 
Poetist rhetoric in the mid-twenties.  Teige never explicitly contrasted these two forms of exoticism.  
Poetist exoticism, however, was largely driven by the parallels between the ultra-exotic and the ultra-
modern: Tibetan architecture was inspiring largely for its similarities to the American skyscraper; the 
excitement of discovering far-off lands was inseparable from the excitement over the ocean liner or 
airplane that brought one there.  In this way, exoticism, technology, and cosmopolitanism were always 
linked themes in Teige’s texts on Poetism.  They expressed the development of closer ties between 
previously isolated cultures and peoples as well as the emergence of a “world culture” of modernism.  
In this Poetist exoticism reflects James Clifford’s description of “the discovery of things ‘nègre’ by the 
European avant-garde[, which was] mediated by an imaginary America, a land of noble savages 
simultaneously standing for the past and future of humanity – a perfect affinity of primitive and 
modern” (The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art 
[Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1988]: 198). 
 
24  For a comparison of Teige’s sociology of art with Marcuse’s account of affirmative art, see 
Květoslav Chvatík, “Karel Teige a Herbert Marcuse o společenské funkci umění,” in Melancholie a 
vzdor: Eseje o moderní české literatuře (Praha: Československý spisovatel, 1992): 57-74.  (German 
version: “Herbert Marcuse und Karel Teige über die gesellschaftliche Funktion der Kunst,” in Axel 
Honneth and Albrecht Wellmer, eds., Die Frankfurter Schule und die Folgen [Berlin: de Gruyter, 
1986].) 
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efficacy.  Historicist art (in Teige’s broad sense, which included any kind of escapist 
art), through its forced abnegation of any meaningful role in the structure of capitalist 
society, became merely ornamental: art could perhaps cover over the banality of the 
present, but could do nothing to effect change. 
 Teige also linked the historicism of bourgeois art to his claim about the 
endemic individualism of art under capitalism.  He wrote: 
 
The economic conditions of the nineteenth-century led society to 
individualism, to that criminal level of anarchy in life and ideology 
which made style impossible, corroded the pristine collective pathos of 
the age of Empire and, through stylistic degeneration, spread the cruel 
plague of historicizing eclecticism in architecture, transforming cities 
and streets into a regular museum full of frightful exhibits.25 
 
Teige thus equated the chaotic individualism that accompanied the loss of a true style 
with the eclecticism of historicist architecture.  Just as the literary styles of, say, a 
Hugo and a Baudelaire were too incompatible to be regarded as facets of a single, 
over-arching style, so the various historical revival styles of nineteenth-century 
architecture could never come together into a recognizable unity.  Individualism and 
eclecticism were parallel for Teige because both consisted in a plurality of self-
enclosed and incompatible systems existing side-by-side.   Just as individualism meant 
that no particular artistic vision could claim authority or primacy over its competitors, 
eclecticism also suffered from a lack of any solid criterion with which to distinguish 
any one of the systematized historical styles available to the architect as the primary or 
true style of the age.  The somewhat desperate question that served as the title to 
Heinrich Hübsch’s 1828 polemic on architecture – “In What Style Should We 
Build?”26 – captures well Teige’s point about eclecticism.  The very possibility of 
raising such a question indicated that none of the potential answers – Neo-Hellenic, 
                                                                                                                                            
 
25  “Nové umění proletářské,” in VzD/I: 44.  See also “Doba a umění,” in Stavba a báseň, 39. 
 
26  See Heinrich Hübsch, et al., In What Style Should We Build? The German Debate on 
Architectural Style, trans. Wolfgang Hermann (Santa Monica: Getty Center for the History of Art and 
the Humanities, 1992). 
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Spitzbogenstil, Rundbogenstil, etc.– could ever be definitive.27  The plurality of 
historicist styles was inescapable: in place of a unified style there were mere 
stylizations, drawing architecture into the conceptual orbit of fashion.28  For Teige, a 
choice for one or another of the available stylistic systems could express nothing other 
than individual preference, taste, or interpretation. 
 Teige’s critique of historicism thus had two distinct dimensions, corresponding 
to his use of the terms “ornament” and “eclecticism.”  The former term delineated the 
vertical dimension.  The cleft separating ornament from structure in historicist 
architecture was the material expression of a much deeper tension within bourgeois 
art: the severed connection between art and its public, or between art and its present.  
Ornament – and Teige, like Šalda, did not restrict his use of this term only to 
architecture – was thus the scarlet letter for the sin of art’s autonomy.  The presence of 
ornament betrayed that where there should have been “conscience and consciousness 
of the whole,” there was instead a pernicious dualism.  Further, because ornament was 
(from the logic of Constructivism) superfluous, it only served to cover over, and thus 
hide from view, what was of structural importance.  In Teige’s model of historicist 
architecture, therefore, the system of historical ornamentation that was applied to the 
self-sufficient structure constituted a deception: a historical disguise that sought to 
hide the true form and identity of the present.  In this equation of historical ornament 
with lie, Teige’s critique of historicism revealed the depth of its dependence on 
Nietzsche’s account of the dishonesty, deceptiveness, and protective Innerlichkeit of 
modern historicist culture.   
 The horizontal dimension of Teige’s critique, expressed in the term 
“eclecticism,” related not to tensions within the individual artwork but rather to the 
overall make-up of the cultural landscape.  This horizontal dimension thus indicated 
                                                 
27  However much Teige’s prejudice against nineteenth-century eclecticism may now appear 
one-sided, his interpretation of the inherent open-endedness of historicist styles had some justification: 
in 1898 – 70 years after Hübsch’s text – the title of an article in the leading Czech art journal Volné 
směry on the Prague Architecture and Engineering Exhibition posed the exact same question!  See 
Otakar Nový, Česká architektonická avantgarda (Praha: Prostor, 1998): 80. 
 
28  See “K teorii konstruktivismu” [“On Constructivist Theory”], in VzD/I: 363; and “Výtvarná 
práce sovětského Ruska” [“Creative Work in Soviet Russia”], in VzD/I: 272. 
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the existence of independent aesthetic systems existing side-by-side but without any 
essential connection.  Like the partial systems that Lukács had identified as one of the 
consequences of reified rationalism, these individual eclectic systems were complete 
in themselves and for this reason mutually exclusive.  The internal consistency of each 
unit resulted in the chaotic inconsistency of the cultural landscape viewed as a whole.  
 Teige’s critique of bourgeois art as inherently historicist thus emerged from the 
context of his theory of proletarian art.  Teige in this period (1921 through mid-1922) 
portrayed the present as just starting to emerge from an aesthetic interregnum that 
stretched back to the beginning of art’s autonomy under capitalism.  Proletarian art 
could only guess at and try to lay rough foundations for what would emerge as the 
next truly lidový and all-encompassing historical style – the Socialist Gothic to emerge 
out of the ashes of revolution.  The historicism of bourgeois art, therefore, had less to 
do with the dominance of historical themes than with the situation in this historical 
interregnum: bourgeois art was historicist precisely because it did not belong to any 
true historical style.  Capitalism had interrupted the great narrative, and the Soviet 
revolution was the first sign that such narrative was to be taken up again.  Thus 
Teige’s theory of proletarian art implicitly understood revolution in its etymological 
sense: as a return – at a higher level of development of course – to an earlier state, that 
is, as the return to history. 
 With the publication of Život II and Teige’s increasing focus on 
Constructivism, this scheme changed.  To be sure, there was a fairly natural evolution 
from Teige’s proletarian art rhetoric to his Constructivist terminology.  Even within 
his theory of proletarian art, with its suspicion of the cult of the machine,29 Teige had 
begun to introduce functionalist rhetoric in the name of “life” and of the reunion of art 
with the masses and the everyday.  He stated, for example, that “art is a function of 
life,”30 and that “in the new world art has a new function.  There is no need for [the 
new art] to serve as an ornament or decoration of life, for the beauty of life, bare and 
                                                 
29 Teige in this period was critical not only of the Italian Futurists for their aestheticization of 
the technology of war (see “Obrazy a předobrazy,” in VzD/I: 26) but also of the “maschinism” he felt 
characterized much of the Soviet avant-garde (see Teige’s review of Ehrenburg’s Yet It Turns, quoted in 
VzD/I: 520). 
 
30  “Nové umění proletářské,” in VzD/I: 52. 
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powerful, does not need to be painted over or disfigured with dangling ornaments.”31  
Only a short step was required for this vitalist celebration of the beauty of unadorned 
life to develop into a purist celebration of the beauty of the unadorned machine: “The 
beauty of a machine, of an automobile, is the beauty of reality and of the pure form, 
which doesn’t need to be dolled up with ornaments or crowned with poetry.”32 
 Underneath this apparently evolutionary rhetorical shift, however, a major 
change had occurred in the temporal scheme by which Teige defined the avant-garde.  
Rather than merely anticipating the end of an interregnum, Constructivism already 
revealed what was coming: 
 
A simple glance at the world is enough to reveal the error of the 
common statement that we live in a styleless age.  A style is emerging 
continuously right before our eyes, not from aesthetic manifestoes or 
the interiors of ateliers, but rather from the collective and in many cases 
anonymous, disciplined, and directed work of laborers and 
technicians.33 
 
With the adoption of Constructivism, Teige felt that the step into the new style no 
longer lay in the future but had already been taken.  Constructivism identified the 
“determining feature of the contemporary epoch of culture and civilization […]” and 
represented, therefore, “the style of the present.”34 
 This shift in the status of the present altered Teige’s view of the past as well.  
The first indication of this was that, by the end of 1922, the metaphor of socialist 
cathedrals and the expectation of a coming Gothic completely disappeared from 
Teige’s vocabulary. Such rhetoric was now denigrated as an expression of reactionary 
                                                 
31  “Umění dnes a zítra,” in Revoluční sborník Devětsil, 199.  Emphasis in original. 
 
32  “Foto Kino Film,” in Život II, 158. 
 
33  “K nové architektuře” [“Towards a New Architecture”], in VzD/I: 112. 
 
34  “Konstruktivismus a likvidace umění” [“Constructivism and the Liquidation of Art”], in 
VzD/I: 129.  Emphasis in original. 
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nostalgia and historicism.35  More significantly, however, Teige began to use the term 
“historicism” less and less as a historical category describing nineteenth-century 
bourgeois art and increasingly as a term describing a deficient aesthetic structure.  The 
more the term became de-historicized in this manner, the more Teige began using it to 
describe all art before Constructivism.  Where previously Teige had opposed 
bourgeois art to the organic unity of Gothic forms, by the mid- and later twenties this 
contrast between creative Gothic and parasitic neo-Gothic had disappeared.  Teige 
portrayed even medieval art as an unstable “compromise” between aesthetic and 
utilitarian functions: 
 
This compromise was the stylistic, historical, essentially medieval 
trinity of fine arts: architecture as the leading art, then painting and 
sculpture.  The individual arts then went through a similar process of 
compromise: the architectural styles [slohy] were various compromises 
between practical and aesthetic functions, between construction and 
decoration.  Painting was a compromise between depiction and self-
regulating color composition: wherever the color harmony did not have 
the upper hand over the task of depiction, painting also became 
architectural decoration.36 
 
Gothic in this formulation no longer represented an ideal totality: while its 
compromise solutions perhaps “balanced” the practical and aesthetic functions more 
deftly than did bourgeois architecture, they were marked by the same essential tension 
between construction and ornament.  With this shift, even the historical styles came to 
represent for Teige only superficial or fashionable changes of form: 
 
The most important cultural fact that the intellectual and revolutionary 
avant-garde owes to the great and celebrated communist Revolution is 
that today we stand at the gates of an enormous, complete, all-
encompassing revolution – in this sense the first revolution in art that 
                                                 
35  See Nový, Česká architektonická avantgarda, 188.  Teige later singled out for criticism 
along these lines the early Bauhaus under Gropius, despite the fact that proletarian art had used similar 
imagery at that time.  See “Deset let Bauhausu” [“Ten Years of the Bauhaus”], in VzD/I: 478.  
 
36  “K teorii konstruktivismu,” in VzD/I: 361-62. 
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does not mean a mere exchange of one fashion, one school, one 
generation, for another.37 
 
Constructivism thus no longer occupied the position of a restoration or a modern 
Gothic.  Rather it represented a clean break with all previous “decorative” 
architecture, a radical new beginning.   
 Where proletarian art had portrayed the historicism of bourgeois art as the 
result of its existence within the historical vacuum created by capitalism, 
Constructivism elided all differences between historicism and the very category of 
history.  Everything that had come before the clean sweep of Constructivism now bore 
for Teige the stigma of historicism.  Precisely the de-anchoring of the term as a label 
for a particular phenomenon in nineteenth-century art allowed Teige to transfer the 
negative connotations associated with bourgeois historicism to the past as a whole.  
The temporal scheme supporting Teige’s adoption of Constructivism thus rested on a 
paradox: Teige’s elision of history and historicism in effect meant that the entire 
history of culture had to have unfolded in a historical vacuum.  Only with the new 
instauration of Constructivism, that is, with the radical rejection of the past, could a 
“truly” historical epoch commence. 
This enormous referential expansion of the term “historicism” was reflected by 
its increasing proximity in Teige’s rhetoric to the more abstract term of “formalism.”  
Teige of course did not use the term formalism as would his later antagonists in the 
realism debates of the thirties, and his use of the term cannot be understood in the 
standard context of a form/content distinction.  Quite the contrary, the more Teige 
inveighed against formalism, the more he emphasized that “art is not compatible with 
ideological content, with thematic tendentiousness.”38  The more he insisted that 
Constructivism was “not concerned with forms,”39 the more he celebrated the 
“liberation of form”40 as embodied in automobile designs, airplanes, and functionalist 
                                                 
37  “Výtvarná práce sovětského Ruska,” in VzD/I: 272. 
 
38  “Doba a umění,” in Stavba a báseň, 45. 
 
39  “Konstruktivismus a likvidace umění,” in VzD/I: 129. 
 
40  “Doba a umění,” in Stavba a báseň, 51. 
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architecture.  Formalism designated for Teige rather any general discourse that 
preceded and attempted to predetermine individual cases.  He insisted that forms must 
emerge not from a pre-given system or formula (which he derisively termed “a priori 
aesthetics”), but from the dictates of the particular situation: in effect, another way of 
stating that form must follow function.  Ornament and eclecticism, which betrayed the 
application of an a priori system hindering the natural expression of structure, thus 
turned out to be simply subcategories or particular manifestations of formalism. 
 Once formalism emerged as the major derogatory term in Teige’s critical 
vocabulary, Teige had in effect replayed within a few years the same shift that had 
occurred in the century between Herder’s and Nietzsche’s major statements on 
historicism.  As was examined in Chapter 2, that shift became perceptible with 
Nietzsche’s echo of the notion of formalism that Herder had used to characterize the 
“mechanical” rationality of the Enlightenment.  While Herder, however, had opposed 
such formalist logic through his “turn to history” and the logic of empathy connected 
therewith, Nietzsche had opposed formalist logic through the appeal to a ceaseless 
self-recreation, that is, through an appeal to a self-immolating yet incandescent 
presence.  In this way, formalism came to represent for Nietzsche not the opposite but 
rather the essence of the historical.  The result of this conceptual fusion of history and 
formalism was a notion of historicism that had seminal influence on the temporal logic 
of the later avant-garde. The pervasiveness of that influence is demonstrated precisely 
by Teige’s unwitting adoption of the Nietzschean notion of historicism upon his turn 
to Constructivism.  The paradox lurking in this notion, however, soon left its imprint 
on the very structure of Teige’s theoretical program.  
 
II. The Dead-Ends of Dualism 
 
Constructivism had barely assumed the center stage in Teige’s theoretical discourse 
when it suddenly had to share the spotlight.  Over the course of 1923, the credo of 
Poetism – Czech culture’s most original contribution to the interwar avant-garde – 
emerged as a counterpart to Constructivism. While Poetism was formed from a 
confluence of sources (Teige and the poet Vítězslav Nezval being the most 
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important41), the conjoining of Constructivism and Poetism into a double program was 
entirely Teige’s contribution.42  At first sight, the conjunction is strange indeed.  While 
in this period Teige was establishing an international reputation as one of the most 
ideologically severe proponents of Constructivism,43 in Czechoslovakia he was 
becoming equally known for statements such as the following definition of Poetism: 
 
The art that Poetism brings is casual, jesting, fantastic, playful, 
unheroic, and amorous.  It contains not a trace of Romanticism.  It was 
born in an atmosphere of invigorating conviviality, in a world that 
laughs – what matter if it should shed a tear.  The humorous disposition 
holds sway, pessimism has been sincerely left behind.  The emphasis 
has shifted away from stuffy workshops and ateliers and onto the 
experiences and beauties of life; it reveals a path coming from and 
going nowhere, tracing circles in a wonderfully fragrant park, because 
that is the path of life.  The hours are carried in on blossoming roses.  Is 
this a fragrance?  Is this a memory? 
 Nothing – nothing other than the lyric-plastic excitement at the 
spectacle of the modern world.  Nothing other than a loving inclination 
towards life and all of its manifestations, a passion for modernity, 
modernolatry, to borrow a term from Umberto Boccioni.  Nothing other 
than happiness, love and poetry, the things of paradise, which money 
cannot buy and which are not of such consequence that anyone would 
kill for them.  Nothing other than joy, magic, a more optimistic faith in 
the beauty of life.  Nothing other than the immediate data of sense 
perception.  Nothing other than the art of passing the time.  Nothing 
other than a melody of the heart.  A culture of miraculous dazzle.  
Poetism wishes to make life into an enormous amusement undertaking.  
An eccentric carnival, a circus of feeling and imagination, the drunken 
wobble of a strip of film, a miraculous kaleidoscope.  Its muses are 
                                                 
41  On this double origin of Poetism, see Brousek, Der Poetismus, 81-87. 
 
42  Bedřich Václavek (also a member of Devětsil in the twenties, although in the thirties a 
proponent of Socialist Realism), following Teige, developed a similar dual program around the poles of 
čistá a účelná tvorba (see Oleg Sus, “Estetické antinomie v české levé avantgardě,” in Estetické 
problémy pod napětím: meziválečná avantgarda, surrealismus, levice (Praha: Hrnčířství a 
nakladatelství Michal Jůza & Eva Jůzová, 1992): 12-34. 
 
43  In 1923 Teige became editor of the architectural journal Stavba and quickly turned it into a 
leading European tribune for Constructivism (see Vratislav Effenberger, “Nové umění,” in VzD/I: 593; 
and Rostislav Švácha, The Architecture of New Prague, 1895-1945 [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1995]: 328). 
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kind, tender, merry; its glances are as fascinating and incomprehensible 
as the glances of a lover.44 
 
This Poetist paradise, with its eudemonism and emphasis on anti-instrumental action, 
is clearly a very different place than the space of Constructivism, characterized by the 
“anonymous, disciplined and directed work of laborers and technicians.”45  The terms 
appear to be not complimentary but rather contradictory.  Where Constructivism 
demanded discipline, order, and a pragmatic outlook, Poetism celebrated the free play 
of imagination and the carefree indulgence of the senses.  Essentially, this tension was 
the consequence of the simultaneous exaltation of hyper-rationality and of a lyrical 
irrationality. 
  Teige’s case for the plausibility of such a conjunction of opposites has several 
aspects.  The most important of these was the claim that both Constructivism and 
Poetism brought about a radical restructuring – indeed total elimination – of the very 
category of art.  Teige wrote of Constructivism: 
 
If we consider Constructivism to be the style of the present, to be the 
determining feature of the contemporary epoch of culture and 
civilization, then we must emphasize that Constructivism does not 
introduce a new formalistic program, an a priori aesthetic order, but 
that it abandons all traditional formulae and forsakes the nine muses of 
classical Parnassus: it is not concerned with forms, but with functions.  
The domain of all previous art is formalism.  Constructivism announces 
the rejection of formalism through functionalism.  It has nothing to do 
with a new artistic formula for the basic reason that it has nothing to do 
with art. […] With Constructivism, we advance to the systematic 
liquidation of art.46 
                                                 
44  “Poetismus” [“Poetism”], in VzD/I: 123-24.  This text from 1924 constitutes Teige’s classic 
statement on Poetism, and is commonly referred to as the “first Poetist Manifesto” to distinguish it from 
the 1927 “Manifest Poetismu” [“Manifesto of Poetism”] (VzD/I: 323-59).  I shall refer to it herein as the 
“Poetism Manifesto.” 
 
45  Loc. cit. 
 
46  “Konstruktivismus a likvidace umění,” in VzD/I: 129-30.  Emphases in original.  In Teige’s 
account, Suprematism had performed the final liquidation of painting: Malevich’s white canvas had 
brought abstraction to its ne plus ultra.  Suprematism could go no further, and consequently Malevich 
devoted himself to analytical work and Rodchenko and other leading Suprematists moved on to 
Constructivism, for which the liquidation of art was no longer the goal but the starting point (see 
“Dnešní výtvarná práce sovětského Ruska,” in SSSR: úvahy, kritiky, poznámky, ed. Bohumil Mathesius 
[Praha: Čin, 1926]: 158). 
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The claim that Constructivism represented the style of the present went hand-in-hand 
with the thesis of the liquidation of art: aesthetic renewal emerged from the 
disappearance of the aesthetic.  Teige thus argued that the very category of art had 
been complicit in the stylistic failure of the period prior to the emergence of 
Constructivism.  By this account, movements that still understood themselves through 
reference to the term “art” inevitably took the form of prescriptive aesthetics.  Their 
claim to authority could ultimately be reduced to a demand: the demand that a 
particular prescription be accepted by a community, or the demand that art thereafter 
be made in this or that image.  Such positing of a priori systems, however, landed one 
squarely in the dilemma that Teige had identified as the eclecticism or individualism 
of bourgeois art, since no external criterion could possibly determine the choice 
between one or another of the competing aesthetic systems.   
Teige insisted that Constructivism, through its involvement in the liquidation 
of art, had ceased making the kind of a priori demands made by artistic movements.  
Rather than inventing a set of principles and arguing for its general validity, the 
Constructivist merely listened carefully and followed those principles that imposed 
themselves necessarily from the nature of modern life.  Necessity – measured through 
the strict criterion of functionality – was the guarantee that Constructivism expressed 
deeply rooted, communal realities rather then arbitrary, individual choices.  Teige 
therefore perceived Constructivism not as a set of theses to be accepted or rejected, but 
rather as sober recognition of present realities.  In this way, the emergence of 
Constructivism as an aesthetic paradigm or style of the present presented no 
contradiction to the claim that Constructivism undertook the liquidation of art.  The 
liquidation of art in the previous understanding as a priori system or formalism was in 
fact a prerequisite for the emergence of a communally binding aesthetic paradigm. 
With Poetism, Teige undertook a second attack on the category of art.47  
Extending a line of argument that went back to the ideal of lidovost in the proletarian 
                                                                                                                                            
 
47  Teige’s program of the 1920s thus seems a textbook case of what Peter Bürger has 
described as the aim of the “historical” avant-garde: the negation of art as an institution (Theory of the 
Avant-Garde, Michael Shaw, trans., [Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1984]). 
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art period, Poetism identified not only artistic genres of mass culture – Westerns, 
sentimental novels, slapstick comedy, and other forms of “low” art – but even non-
artistic activities such as sports, folk celebrations, the circus or carnival, as the source 
of a new aesthetic vision. 48  The clown, the traveler, and the amateur athlete were to 
displace the painter and writer as the unacknowledged legislators of the age.  Thus 
Teige did not intend Poetism as a new artistic movement that would create its own 
characteristic forms of painting, sculpture, and literature, but rather as an assault on 
the very notion that art was to be found in such traditional activities.  The Poetism 
Manifesto is in fact organized around a series of claims about what Poetism is not: it is 
not literature, it is not painting, it is not an “ism,” it is not in the end even art at all.  
The scarcity of claims about what Poetism actually is reflects its status as an 
atmosphere or state of mind.  Teige concludes his list of all the things that Poetism is 
not with the claim: “Poetism is above all a modus vivendi.”49  The key word, of course, 
is “vivendi.”  By turning its back on the traditional genres of art, by encompassing any 
activity, no matter how banal, so long as it was performed with enthusiasm, Poetism 
was to express the immediacy of its contact with life.  Poetism thus represented an art 
that: 
 
welcomes every promising hypothesis, sympathizes with 
experimentation, and whose methods are as gentle, as rich in sources, 
as inexhaustible as life itself. […]  If there is a new art and if it is what 
we designate as POETISM, the art of life, 
the art of living and enjoying, 
then in the end it must be as self-evident, as delightful, as accessible as 
sport, love, wine, and all other delicacies.  It must not be a profession 
but rather a general need.50 
                                                                                                                                            
 
48  Teige had written as early as 1922 that the inspiration for proletarian art was to be found in 
“Westerns, Buffalo Bills, Nick Carter novels, sentimental novels, American movie serials or Chaplin’s 
grotesques, amateur comedy theater, variété jugglers, wandering minstrels, clowns and acrobatic circus 
riders, Springtime folk celebrations, a Sunday football match, in short, almost everything on which the 
cultural life of the vast majority of the proletariat thrives. These literary forms – many of you will say: 
deformities – are nowadays truly the one and most characteristic popular [lidovou] literature” (“Nové 
umění proletářské,” in VzD/I: 58). 
 
49  “Poetismus,” in VzD/I: 126. 
 
50  Ibid., 121.  Emphasis in original. 
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By abandoning the traditional genres of art, Poetism was to discover sources of 
aesthetic experiences more powerful, fresher, and more deeply rooted in the new 
possibilities offered by modern civilization, than any form of painting or literature, no 
matter how revolutionary, could ever conjure.  To describe this double movement of 
Poetism as both a rejection of art and a rediscovery of the aesthetic, Teige adopted a 
phrase from the Soviet Constructivist Ilya Ehrenburg, which became one of the most 
frequently repeated mottoes in Teige’s articles in the mid-twenties: “The new art has 
ceased to be art.” 
 These two claims – that Constructivism involved the “liquidation of art” and 
that Poetism’s “new art has ceased to be art” – reveal the primary contact point 
between the two sides of Teige’s program.  The shared critique of the standard notion 
of autonomous art was to reveal the apparently contradictory dualism as moments of a 
single dialectical argument: the recovery of an effective form of aesthetic experience 
demanded the abandonment of art.  Constructivism dissolved and resolved art into 
functionality: “the word ‘art’ [umění] comes from the verb ‘to be able’ [uměti] and its 
products are artifacts [umělosti][…].  Art is simply a way of using a specific means 
for a specific function, and both function and means are more or less exchangeable 
quantities.”51  Poetism, meanwhile, dissolved art into the notion of a “new beauty” that 
would be capacious enough to include areas and activities that had previously been 
stigmatized as extra- or anti-aesthetic.  Poetism’s new beauty would thus storm the 
physical barriers that Teige felt had confined bourgeois art within autonomous spaces: 
the museum, the church, and the gallery.   
 Teige’s vision of the dialectical unity of Constructivism and Poetism is best 
expressed in his metaphor of a reunited urban fabric: 
 
The new, endless, blossoming beauty of the world is the daughter of 
contemporary life.  It was not born from aesthetic speculation, from the 
Romantic atelier mentality, but simply results from purposeful, 
disciplined, positive production and from the life activity of the 
populace.  It has not taken root in cathedrals or galleries; out on the 
                                                 
51  “Konstruktivismus a likvidace umění,” in VzD/I: 130.  Emphasis in original. 
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streets, in the architecture of the cities, in the invigorating green of the 
parks, in the bustle of the harbors and in the furnaces of industry, which 
provide for our primary needs – this is where the new art finds its 
home.  It does not dispense formalized prescriptions: modern forms and 
formulations are the result of purposeful work, produced with perfected 
methods under the dictates of an objective and of economics.  This new 
beauty has taken the engineer’s equation and filled it with poetic vision.  
Urbanism, the science of city planning, thus results in works both 
captivating and poetic; the delineation of the ground plan of life, a fore-
image of the future, a utopia that the red future shall realize.  Its 
products are the instruments of wealth and happiness.52 
 
The Poetist liberation of art from the confines of the museums and cathedrals thus led 
straight onto the streets, into the city, and onto the stage of modern life.  But it led 
even further, going all the way to the fringes of the city, to the factories and housing 
projects, redeeming these zones from the stigma of being extra-aesthetic.  Thus 
Poetism’s new beauty led directly to those urban areas developing under the aegis of 
Constructivism.   The topographical metaphor of a city no longer divided into 
representative zones of aesthetic escape and banal zones of material necessity – of 
center versus surroundings – is the clearest image of how Teige envisioned 
Constructivism and Poetism as forming an integrated whole.    
 The holistic urge that lay behind Teige’s conjoining of Constructivism and 
Poetism stands out clearly when the context of his critique of historicism is recalled.  
The dialectical joining of Constructivism and Poetism was directly motivated by the 
desire to overcome the eclecticism dividing cities into zones governed by different 
aesthetic principles.  With the discovery of beauty in the functional, and with the 
production of aesthetically pleasing objects that were integrated with everyday life 
through their functionality, the dual program aimed at ending the division of modern 
culture into structural and decorative realms.  The dualism was thus to inaugurate the 
“unity of artistic style” Nietzsche had called for half a century earlier. 
 The radicality of this totalizing drive – as well as the outline of the aporia to 
which it led – emerged in full force during Teige’s 1929 polemic with Le Corbusier 
over the latter’s Mundaneum project.  Although Teige had been a tremendous admirer 
                                                 
52  “Poetismus,” in VzD/I: 122. 
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and had been enormously influenced by Le Corbusier ever since their first meeting in 
mid-1922,53 Teige perceived the Mundaneum project as in effect a design for an 
avant-garde cathedral.  Teige stated that “in its obvious historicism and academicism, 
the Mundaneum project shows the present non-viability of architecture thought of as 
art.”54  Le Corbusier responded to this criticism with the claim that “aesthetics are a 
fundamental human function” and contrasted his own “quest for harmony” with the 
“police measures” of those utilitarians (Teige) who equated all elegant solutions, all 
aesthetic effectiveness, with ideological apostasy.55  Le Corbusier indicated that Teige 
had failed to appreciate that architecture must appeal not only to the brain but also to 
the passions.  Functionality was only the first step for the architect: what transformed a 
mere building into architecture was the further step whereby the architect addressed 
the task of making the functional structure beautiful as well.  Le Corbusier concluded 
that “the function beauty is independent of the function utility; they are two different 
things.”56  Teige, it appeared, had overlooked the beauty function. 
 Examining the polemic with Le Corbusier in the context of Teige’s other 
writings on Constructivism, however, it becomes clear that Le Corbusier 
misunderstood Teige’s point.  Teige was quite as committed as Le Corbusier to the 
precept that avant-garde architecture be beautiful.  His disagreement, however, was 
precisely with the postulate of an independent beauty function.  Teige claimed that the 
beauty of architecture could only originate in its strict functionality.  Four years before 
the Mundaneum polemic Teige had written: 
 
It could be objected that certain machines, even though perfectly 
functional, may still be ungainly or ugly. […] We could respond that an 
ungainly machine calls for further perfecting, that its ugliness is a 
                                                 
53  This meeting in Paris was certainly one of the main catalysts behind the development of 
Teige’s position between Revoluční sborník Devětsil and Život II.  Le Corbusier together with Ozenfant 
contributed an original article to Život II entitled “Le Purisme” (Život II, 8-16). 
 
54  Karel Teige, “Mundaneum,” trans. Ladislav Holovsky et al., in Oppositions 4 (1974): 89.  
 
55  Le Corbusier, “In Defense of Architecture,” trans. Nancy Bray et al., in Oppositions 4 
(1974): 94. 
 
56  Ibid., 98. 
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symptom of incompleteness.  We assert that the more a machine is 
perfected, the more beautiful it will be.  And it will be absolutely 
perfected, and consequently beautiful, only if the perfection of its 
practicality, and not beauty, has been the constructer’s sole interest. 
Given two machines with the same purpose and whose practical 
perfection is judged to be equal, but one of which is uglier, do not 
doubt that the second, more beautiful machine will also be the more 
functional in practice.57 
 
In other words, beauty would be found only when it was not sought.58  Teige’s 
problem with Le Corbusier’s Mundaneum project thus had nothing to do with the 
beauty of the end result, but with the act of seeking beauty somewhere outside of 
function: 
 
According to Le Corbusier, architecture as art believes that its mission 
begins where construction ends, namely with the rational solution and 
products of the engineer.  It aspires to eternity, while the engineer 
responds to actuality. […] In short, according to this argument, to 
become dignified as architecture, there must be added some “plus” to 
the rational solution.  Now this “plus” can either help purposefulness 
and strengthen function, in which case it is simply purpose and function 
and is not a “plus,” or hinder it, in which case it is of course a minus.  
Further, it can neither help nor hinder, in which case it is superfluous 
and unnecessary, and that is a minus as well.59 
 
In Teige’s view, this structure of the “plus,” or of a supplement added on to something 
already whole, betrayed that Le Corbusier’s beauty function was nothing other than a 
more subtle form of ornamentation.  While Le Corbusier felt that the beauty function 
completed the work begun by the utility function and thereby created a whole, Teige 
perceived an already self-sufficient whole being destroyed through the addition of a 
superfluous supplement.  Hence Le Corbusier’s “obvious historicism:” the claim that 
one added aesthetic value after completion of the functional structure was for Teige 
                                                 
57  “Konstruktivismus a likvidace umění,” in VzD/I: 141.  Emphases in original. 
 
58  This is a paraphrase of Jaromír Krejcar (see Rostislav Švácha, The New Prague 
Architecture, 270). 
 
59  Teige, “Mundaneum,” 91. 
 
  
110  
 
 
 
the theoretical equivalent of completing a building by covering it with, say, a Neo-
Renaissance façade.   
Teige’s hardnosed advocacy of the strictest functionalism, therefore, was not 
the expression of a dry, humorless rationalist applying “police measures” against those 
with greater visions for architecture, as Le Corbusier had suggested.  Teige’s vision of 
the promise held by Constructivism was just as grandiose as Le Corbusier’s, as 
Teige’s premise of a style of the present makes clear, and his expectation of a new 
beauty was also no less intense, as the credo of Poetism expressed.  Teige even went 
so far as to claim that the rigor of functionalism, by eliminating the stifling formalism 
represented by an ornamentalizing beauty function, would return humanism to 
architectural form.60  The strictness of Teige’s functionalism was, therefore, precisely 
the result of the enormity of his claims for Constructivism: the claim that it would heal 
the basic diremptions of modern culture, the insidiousness of which was made clear by 
the way eclecticism and ornamentation could creep into the work even of a modern 
master such as Le Corbusier.  The radicality of Teige’s functionalist rationalism issued 
directly from the radicality of his totalizing vision.   
This utopian hope for an integrated modernist culture clearly caught Teige in a 
vicious circle, expressed in the paradoxes that Le Corbusier refused to admit: a new 
beauty would only result from a radical elimination of the independent beauty 
function, and a humanist architecture would only emerge from the insistence that 
architecture take its measure from the machine and from its function.  The ideals of 
beauty and humanism thus became unattainable the moment they were openly named; 
they needed to remain, as it were, always beyond the horizon if they were ever to be 
reached.  These paradoxes, however, are not the sign of a logical failure on Teige’s 
                                                 
60  “Constructivism, abandoning worn-out aesthetic principles, returned to man as the measure 
of all things” (“K teorii konstruktivismu,” in VzD/I: 365).  Statements like this demonstrate the 
difficulty with interpreting the Mundaneum polemic through Le Corbusier’s own terms, as is done by 
Kenneth Frampton in “The Humanist v. Utilitarian Ideal” (Architectural Design 37.3 [1968]).  
Frampton largely equates Teige’s position with that of Hannes Meyer, and identifies them as 
representatives of the emerging radical and dogmatic utilitarian wing of the modernist movement.  
However, examining Teige’s critique of Le Corbusier in the context of claims such as those quoted 
above – and bearing in mind the larger conjunction of Constructivism with Poetism – clearly reveals 
that the interpretation of the Mundaneum debate as the opposition of Teige’s utilitarianism to Le 
Corbusier’s humanism runs against the problem that Teige was neither a utilitarian nor an anti-
humanist. 
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part.  Indeed, given the functionalist premise, Teige’s position is much more consistent 
than Le Corbusier’s appeal to architecture as “spiritual food.”61  These logical 
quandaries resulted rather from precisely the meticulousness of Teige’s functionalist 
logic and the extremity of his totalizing claims. 
The final expression of this vicious circle was, of course, Teige’s dual program 
itself.  Why did the effort to theorize avant-garde culture as an organic, totalizing unity 
take the form of a dualism of Constructivism and Poetism?  How could this 
programmatic pairing of terms avoid repeating the historicist dualism of structure and 
ornament that Teige had all along taken such pains to eliminate?  Was not Poetism 
simply a disguised form of the independent beauty function that Teige had criticized 
so vehemently in Le Corbusier?  Appeals to the dialectical unity of the terms are 
obviously insufficient.  The dualism degenerates too easily into undialectical 
formulations, several of which have gained a foothold in the secondary literature on 
Teige.  Primary among these are formulations favoring one pole of the dualism as the 
primary element of Teige’s program and viewing the other pole as the logical 
complement to the first;62 or the formulation of the dualism as an attempt to achieve 
comprehensiveness through a simple proclamation of the unity of opposites.63  Such 
formulations never raise the most challenging and most productive questions for an 
                                                 
61  Le Corbusier, “In Defense of Architecture,” 95. 
 
62  Very few accounts in fact avoid viewing Teige’s dual program primarily through the lens of 
either Poetism or Constructivism.  The best treatments of the program as striving for a dialectical unity 
are Vratislav Effenberger, Realita a poezie: K vývojové dialektice moderního umění (Praha: Mladá 
fronta, 1969), especially 187-222, as well as his concluding essays to each volume of VzD; Oleg Sus, 
“Totožnost člověka uprostřed víru,” in Estetické problémy pod napětím, 35-47; and Květoslav Chvatík, 
Smysl moderního umění (Praha: Československý spisovatel, 1965), especially 76-77, 80, and 87.  The 
hazards of interpreting either of Teige’s programs as primary and the other as subordinate are well 
illustrated in Vladimír Müller, Der Poetismus. Das Program und die Hauptverfahren der tschechischen 
literarischen Avantgarde der zwanziger Jahre (München: Otto Segner, 1978).  While describing 
Constructivism as the “notwendige Ergänzung des poetistischen Lebenstils” (33), Müller quotes a 
passage from the Poetism Manifesto in which Teige in fact describes Poetism as the complement to 
Constructivism. 
 
63  See, e.g., Jaroslav Anděl’s claim that “unlike other, better-known movements and 
organizations, which advanced one dominant principle (either rational or irrational), Devětsil […] 
sought to achieve the improbable goal of wedding opposing artistic tendencies by capturing the 
polarities of the modern world and celebrating its beauty; this goal was expressed in the group’s slogan: 
‘Constructivism/Poetism’” (“The 1920’s: The Improbable Wedding of Constructivism and Poetism,” in 
The Art of the Avant-Garde in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1938 [S.l.: IVAM Centre Julio Gonzalez, 1993]: 
21). 
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understanding of the Constructivism/Poetism conjunction, and those are Teige’s own 
questions: how does this conjunction avoid repeating the historicist dualisms it 
rejected at the outset, and if it fails to avoid them, what antinomies lie behind this 
situation? 
The difficulty with the claim of dialectical unity emerges clearly from the 
image Teige chose to express such unity.  He wrote that: “Poetism is the crown of life, 
the basis of which is Constructivism.  It builds on Constructivism’s foundation.”64  
The image is clearly meant to express the interconnection of base and crown, and the 
incompleteness of either element taken independently.  But, like Marx’s metaphor of 
base and superstructure to which it alludes,65 the image seems equally effective in 
suggesting the division between or the independent existence of the two elements.  In 
fact, Teige’s image compulsively reproduces the fate of Marx’s: it slips from an 
expression of dialectical unity to one of static dualism.  Teige’s critique of historicism 
provides a vocabulary to describe this slippage: the conceptual model of base and 
superstructure all too easily degenerates into the model of structure and ornament.  
Through such slippage, the second element (Poetism, or for Marx, the superstructure) 
appears not as the dialectical counterpart and completion of the first but rather as 
something supplemental, unnecessary, or parasitic.   
Teige’s attempt to stipulate the unity of Constructivism and Poetism thus 
repeats the logical conundrum examined in Chapter 3 in relation to Marx’s theoretical 
formulation of a non-ideological, that is, materialist consciousness.  Constructivism 
provided Teige with the same firm logical ground that Marx held with the theory of 
historical materialism.  For both Marx and Teige, this firm ground seemed to offer a 
promised land: the rigor, the hardheaded sense for reality opened up a vision of 
harmony and integration of the mental and the material.  Poetism was Teige’s name 
for this promise of harmony.  But Poetism presented the same problem that the 
premise of a non-ideological consciousness did for Marx.  Either Poetism was “there,” 
in which case one could point to it but it degenerated into simply another program, an 
                                                 
64   Teige, “Poetismus,” in VzD/I: 123. 
 
65  The comparison to Marx’s base/superstructure image is discussed in Sus, Estetické 
problémy pod napětím, 40. 
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a priori aesthetic system, or an ornamental layer applied on top of the integral 
structure of Constructivism and thus reproducing the historicist dualism; or Poetism 
was “not there,” in which case it was Constructivism alone.  Precisely the rigorous 
internal consistency of Constructivism, however, was what had caused Poetism, as the 
experience of harmony, to appear in the first place, and thus the vicious circle began 
again.  The promised middle ground symbolized by the images of base and 
superstructure, foundation and crown, emerged as a true utopia: it was nowhere. 
Teige’s dualism thus should not be interpreted as consisting of two poles of 
equivalent status or as a straightforward combination of two programs.  
Constructivism contained a certain corpus of principles deriving from the central 
criterion of functionality, but Poetism was by its nature averse to programmatic 
formulation.  In response to the question “what is Poetism?” Teige had responded that 
it “is casual, jesting, fantastic, playful, unheroic and amorous.” Poetism was a “life 
atmosphere,”66 a modus vivendi, and no more precise definition was possible.  Teige’s 
second Poetist manifesto in fact took aim precisely against the formulation of Poetist 
principles, which Teige felt were leading away from the molten experience itself.  
From a series of metaphors or an inspiring vision, Teige feared Poetism was turning 
into a movement or school, that is, was ossifying into a formalism.67  Thus the relation 
between Poetism and Constructivism was not one between counterparts or equivalent 
items in a series.  Teige’s program was not strictly speaking a dual one because 
Poetism could have no program. 
The dilemma of this dualism therefore could not be avoided: no more moderate 
formulation or adjustment to the dual program could have saved Teige from the 
reemergence of the dualism he had sought to overcome.  Constructivism was to 
implement its radically totalizing vision by rooting out eclecticism and ornament 
through rigorous application of the criterion of functionality.  Poetism, on the other 
hand, had no corresponding criterion or program because it represented simply a 
                                                 
66  “Poetismus,” in VzD/I: 123. 
 
67  See “Manifest poetismu,” in VzD/I: 326. 
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manner of perception,68 a modus vivendi.  In Teige’s formulation, Poetism was nothing 
more nor less than the enthusiastic reception of the world created by Constructivism.  
Poetism was therefore the necessary result of Constructivism fulfilled: it was the 
experience of a world in which totality had been achieved.  Poetism would have been 
there in theory even if Teige had never named it in practice.  For Poetism – which 
destroyed the pristine purity of the totality claimed by Constructivism – emerged 
spontaneously from precisely those totalizing claims. 
Poetism’s spontaneous emergence from the claims of Constructivism was the 
awkward reminder of Constructivism’s origin.  The new instauration and rejection of 
all historical models upon which the emergence of Constructivism as the style of the 
present was predicated still bore the sign of their origin as the anticipation of a modern 
Gothic.  The original complaint against bourgeois historicism had been its lack of 
historical plenitude: the interregnum signaled by the failure to develop a true style.  
But Constructivism had taken this account of the failure of historicism and made of it 
the failure of history; or conversely, the hopes originally placed in a renewal had been 
displaced into a faith in the new.  Constructivism’s style of the present thus harbored 
within itself the paradox that, while calling for the rigorous rejection of the historical, 
the result was still understood as the re-inscription into history.  Poetism expressed 
this paradox.  Poetism was the celebration of the new instauration and the achievement 
of a totality, but a celebration that simultaneously marred that totality and revealed 
that the instauration had taken the form rejected at the outset as the mark of 
historicism.  The elision of historicism and history is characteristic not only of Teige’s 
Constructivism but is definitive of the avant-garde hostility to the past.   Poetism 
reveals the bad conscience of this hostility: its inseparability from historical nostalgia.  
The avant-garde critique of historicism, confusing historical plenitude with the 
rejection of history, thus took the form of a critique of a dualism it was condemned to 
repeat.  
 
                                                 
68 Vítězslav Nezval claimed that “Poetism is a method of viewing the world so that it becomes 
a poem” (quoted in Květoslav Chvatík, Bedřich Václavek a vývoj marxistické estetiky (Praha: 
Československý spisovatel, 1962): 79. 
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Chapter Five 
 
FORGETTABLE EXPERIENCES 
Benjamin and the Consciousness of Memory 
 
Hluboké ticho. – Z mokrých stěn 
Kapka za kapkou splyne, 
A jejich pádu dutý hlas 
Dalekou kobkou rozložen, 
Jakoby noční měřil čas, 
Zní – hyne – zní a hyne – 
Zní – hyne – zní a hyne zas. 
 
“Jak dlouhá noc – jak dlouhá noc –  
Však delší mně nastává. - - -  
Pryč myšlenko!” – a hrůzy moc 
Myšlenku překonává. – 
Hluboké ticho. – Kapky hlas 
Svým pádem opět měří čas.1 
 
 
I. Aura and Ornament 
 
Benjamin’s Passagen-Werk is populated by a gallery of social types: among the better 
known are, for example, the flaneur, the collector, and the prostitute. One of the less 
familiar is the idler, or Müßiggänger.  This idler has been fairly active, however, for 
he appears to have wandered in from Nietzsche’s text of sixty years earlier.  A number 
of attributes connect Benjamin’s idler with Nietzsche’s.  Benjamin explicitly linked 
the figure of the idler with the concept of so-called bad infinity: “Der Müßiggang hat 
die Anweisung auf unbegrenzte Dauer, die dem bloßen Sinnengenuß, von welcher Art 
er auch sei, grundsätzlich abgeht.  (Ist es richtig, daß die “schlechte Unendlichtkeit”, 
                                                 
1  From Karel Hynek Mácha, Máj (1836), in Dalekát’ cesta má (Praha: Evropsky literární klub, 
1943): 43.  (“Deep silence.— Down the dripping walls,/Drop after drop declines,/Their hollow voice as 
they strike the floor,/Resounding through the darkened cell,/As if measuring out the night/ Sounds – 
dies – sounds and dies –/Sounds – dies – sounds and dies once more//“How long the night – how long 
the night –/Yet a longer still awaits me.----/Out, thought!” – and the horror’s might/Numbs the thought 
completely./Deep silence.— The falling drops decline/And their voice measures out the time.) 
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die im Müßiggang vorwaltet, als Signatur der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft bei Hegel 
vorkommt?)”2  Nietzsche’s idler had also been insatiable, “begierig nach Zerstreuung 
oder Sensation,”3 wandering among the heaped treasures of the art collection or 
among the luscious foliage of the garden.  Further, Nietzsche’s Müßiggänger had a 
Doppelgänger in the “wissensgieriger” modern scientist, who, consuming facts 
without hunger, had infected the study of history with the demand that it draw no 
horizon to its knowledge.  For Nietzsche, the idler perceived the world as a collection 
of curiosities to be handled, briefly admired, and left behind, resulting in the bad 
infinity of a sensationalism never to be satisfied.  Benjamin’s idler was similarly 
addicted to the phantasmagoria of the commodity: “Die Erfahrung ist der Ertrag der 
Arbeit, das Erlebnis ist die Phantasmagorie des Müßiggängers.”4  The atmosphere in 
which Nietzsche’s idler moved and breathed was the humid air of historicism.  
Benjamin’s association of the idler with Erlebnis, the thinner, de-oxygenated form of 
experience characteristic of a commodified society, was similar: in both cases the idler 
drew a peculiar sustenance from the changed atmosphere, the “decadence” of modern 
society. 
 With Benjamin, however, the idler had left the garden and become a creature 
of the city.  The arcades in particular, with their wealth of commodities on display, 
provided the idler ideal hunting grounds.  This chain of associations would suggest 
that Benjamin’s focus on the arcades as the focal point for his dialectical image of the 
nineteenth-century should be interpreted in the context of the post-Nietzschean 
critique of historicism traced in the preceding chapters.  Much evidence can be found 
for such an interpretation.  The very architectural structure of the arcades represented 
one of the sharpest birth pangs of the architectural avant-garde.  Benjamin noted that 
the revolutionary structural principles introduced by iron and glass construction were 
                                                 
2  Walter Benjamin, Das Passagen-Werk, in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. V, (Frankfurt a/M: 
Suhrkamp, 1982): 969.  (This edition cited hereinafter as “GS” followed by a volume number. 
 
3  Friedrich Nietzsche, Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen II: “Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der 
Historie für das Leben,” in Kritische Studienausgabe, eds. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, vol. I 
(München and Berlin: DTV and De Gruyter, 1988): 258. 
 
4  GS/V: 962. 
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held in check by the ornately decorative historicism in which they were draped.  As 
Susan Buck-Morss has noted, “the architectural style of the Paris arcades was 
emblematic of the warring tendencies of engineering and ‘art.’”5  This tension between 
the progressive structural materials and techniques of the engineer and the regressive 
ornamental language imposed on them by the artist resulted in an overall falsity or 
deceptiveness of form.  Benjamin wrote: “Es gibt also Masken der Architektur und in 
solcher Maskierung steigt die Architektur um 1800, wie zu einem bal paré<,> 
geisterhaft an den Sonntagen überall um Berlin herum auf.”6  The arcades thus 
represented the architectural archetype of the split between inner content and outer 
form that Nietzsche had identified as the hallmark of the modern European, a split 
resulting in a deceptive culture of the mask.  
 Following the formulations of the architectural historian Siegfried Giedion, 
Benjamin translated these terms into Marxist vocabulary.7  He associated ornament 
with the boredom of the commodity and the courageous innovative drive of the 
engineer with that of the proletariat.  Discussing Giedion’s photo illustration of an iron 
bridge, Benjamin wrote: “Marxismus. Denn wer sonnst als Ingenieur und Proletarier 
ging damals die Stufen, die allein erst das Neue, Entscheidende – das Raumgefühl 
dieser Bauten – ganz zu erkennen gaben?”8  Here Benjamin echoed what had long 
been standard truisms of Constructivist and even pre-constructivist discourse on 
engineering as the source of modern architectural value: one recalls, for example, F. 
X. Salda’s pronouncement in 1904 on viewing a vast iron bridge that “the new beauty 
is above all the beauty of purpose, inner law, logic and structure,” which had such an 
influence of Teige.9  Teige’s identification of the new beauty with constructivism and 
                                                 
5  Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989): 126. 
 
6  GS/V: 213. 
 
7  On Giedion’s decisive influence on Benjamin’s understanding of modern architecture, see 
John McCole, Walter Benjamin and the Antinomies of Tradition (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1993): 
184-85 and 229-30. 
 
8  GS/V: 218.  In this and the preceding sentence, I have largely repeated Buck-Morss’ 
discussion of this quotation in The Dialectics of Seeing, 127. 
 
9  See the preceding chapter, page 91. 
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the liquidation of art clearly was founded upon the same understanding of a struggle 
between progressive engineering and regressive art that Benjamin identified in the 
arcades.  Finally, Benjamin’s fascination with the writings of Paul Scheerbart and 
glass architecture shows the significance for him of the ideal of modern architecture as 
an absolute transparency.10  In short, ample evidence would suggest that Benjamin’s 
understanding of the significance of the arcades moved within the terms of an 
architectural critique of historicism deeply indebted to Nietzsche’s formulation in the 
second of his Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen.11 
 Except that, of course, the situation is not that straightforward.  For the 
discourse of the architectural avant-garde, ornament was nothing other than the 
element destroying transparency; clinging to the functionalist structure like barnacles, 
the presence of ornament signaled the need for a stiff cleaning so as to scrap those 
layers of sediment off the surface of the structure.  Despite any number of passages 
where Benjamin referred to this discourse without a hint of critical distance, he at 
other times made statements that are absolutely incompatible with such discourse.  He 
commented, for example, on a statement by Giedion: 
 
“Abgesehen von einem gewissen Haut-goût-Reiz, sind die 
künstlerischen Drapierungen des vergangenen Jahrhunderts muffig 
geworden” sagt Giedion. […] Wir aber glauben, daß der Reiz mit dem 
sie auf uns wirken, verrät, daß auch sie lebenswichtige Stoffe für uns 
enthalten – nicht zwar für unser Bauen, wie die konstruktiven 
Antizipationen der Eisengerüste es tun, wohl aber für unser Erkennen 
wenn man will für die Durchleuchtung der bürgerlichen Klassenlage im 
Augenblick da die ersten Verfallszeichen in ihr erscheinen. […G]enau 
so, wie Giedion uns lehrt, aus den Bauten um 1850 die Grundzüge des 
heutigen Bauens abzulesen, wollen wir aus dem Leben <und> aus den 
                                                                                                                                            
 
10  On Benjamin’s relation to the writings of Scheerbart, see in particular Pierre Missac, Walter 
Benjamin’s Passages, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995): chapter 6, 
especially 158 ff. 
 
11  On Nietzsche’s influence on the emerging discourse of architectural modernism, see 
Tilmann Buddensieg, “Architecture as Empty Form: Nietzsche and the Art of Building,” and Fritz 
Neumeyer, “Nietzsche and Modern Architecture,” both in Alexandre Kostka and Irving Wohlfarth, eds. 
Nietzsche and “An Architecture of our Minds” (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute for the History of 
Art and the Humanities, 1999): 259-284 and 285-310, respectively. 
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scheinber sekundären, verlorenen Formen jener Zeit heutiges <Leb>en, 
heutige Formen ablesen.12 
 
Far from viewing the “artistic drapery” as a disguise to be shed and discarded, 
Benjamin claimed here that such ornamental drapery contained “vitally important 
material.”  While not going so far as to argue that this material could serve as any sort 
of model for a present architecture, as did the anticipatory constructive features of the 
“iron scaffolding” that had been hidden under the drapery, Benjamin did make a 
strong claim that the attraction or fascination exerted by these soon-to-be-discarded 
forms was something to be taken quite seriously – indeed, that it comprised cognitive 
value.  Benjamin’s fascination with the trappings of a culture marked by the fading 
traces of cultic and traditional practices, his sustained attention to the final shimmers 
of the auratic and of the weightier form of experience he termed Erfahrung as they 
disappeared under the changes wrought by industrial production, have often been 
deemed the sign of a fundamental nostalgia or ambivalence in his thought.13  From this 
angle the arcades would seem to have presented themselves to Benjamin so forcefully 
precisely because of the wealth of auratic traces that still clung to the cast-iron 
structure.  This process of sifting – which may be regarded as either self-indulgent or 
serious – is expressed in those moments when Benjamin interpreted the flaneur’s 
aimless wandering as a social critique of the utilitarian transformation of time and 
experience under capitalism, or in the image of the rag-picker, collecting discarded 
rags that represented, so to speak, precisely the tattered shreds of the “artistic drapery” 
that the engineers pulled off the face of modern architecture.   
 Indeed, there was a certain ambivalence: the cognitive data contained in this 
material was indeed “a tangle of both anticipatory and fettering elements.”14  The non-
                                                 
12 GS/V: 572. 
 
13  See, for example, Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form: Twentieth-Century Dialectical 
Theories of Literature (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press: 1974): 60; Jürgen Habermas, “Walter 
Benjamin: Consciousness-Raising or Redemptive Critique,” in On Walter Benjamin, ed. Gary Smith 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991): 106; Eugene Lunn, Marxism and Modernism: An Historical Study 
of Lukács, Brecht, Benjamin, and Adorno (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1982): 172; and 
McCole, Antinomies of Tradition, op. cit., Introduction. 
 
14  Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of Seeing, 143. 
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functional forms into which the new materials were twisted often represented a 
coefficient of historical drag, hampering the emergence of appropriate forms allowing 
the true capacities of these materials to be used.  In this way Benjamin pointed to 
industrial buildings in the form of classical temples,15 an early proposal to have 
railways run on granite roads,16 an early design for a locomotive that ran like a horse,17 
even the inefficient use of the “zu früh gekommenes” glass and iron in the arcades 
themselves, which gave them their characteristically drab lighting, as if in an 
aquarium.18  These absurdities and monstrosities were simply the result of a parallax 
between technological potential and formal creativity: “Welche Formen, die für unser 
Zeitalter bestimmend werden, in den Maschinen verborgen liegen, beginnen wir erst 
eben zu ahnen.”19   
On the other hand, these forms could also harbor a positive and creative 
energy.  Benjamin made the following “Versuch, von Giedions Thesen aus 
weiterzukommen.  Er sagt: ‘Die Konstruktion hat im 19. Jahrhundert die Rolle des 
Unterbewußtseins.’ Setzt man nicht besser ein: ‘die Rolle des körperlichen Vorgangs’, 
um den sich dann die ‘künstlerischen’ Architekturen wie Träume um das Gerüst des 
physiologischen Vorgangs legen?”20  These non-functional outer forms could thus also 
function as the site of dream images of the future.  As Buck-Morss describes it: 
 
By attaching themselves as surface ornamentation to the industrial and 
technological forms which have just come into existence, collective 
wish images imbue the merely new with radical political meaning, 
inscribing visibly on the products of the new means of production an 
ur-image of the desired social ends of their development.  In short, even 
as they mask the new, these archaic images provide a symbolic 
                                                 
15  GS/V: 213. 
 
16  Ibid., 218. 
 
17  Ibid., 217. 
 
18  Ibid., 211-12. 
 
19  Ibid., 217. 
 
20  Ibid., 1027. 
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representation of what the human, social meaning of technological 
change is all about.21 
 
If the surface ornamentation at some times served as the fetter that prevented the 
present reality from manifesting itself fully, it served at other times as the image that 
helped portray the image of the future.   
 But the real force of the arcades as a dialectical image does not lie in this 
balance between progressive and regressive functions of the images contained within 
their walls.  Rather it lies in a complication revealed in the post-Nietzschean critique 
of historicism and the understanding of history involved therein.  For that critique, 
history always appeared in the conceptual form of an ornamental or phantasmagoric 
outer layer that prevented the recognition of the true material content of the present.  
The tension between the outer layer of historical form and the inner content of the 
present appeared as a debilitating dualism: thus the attempt to sweep off the outer 
formalistic layer in order to arrive at the “Einheit des künstlerischen Stils” Nietzsche 
had posited as the mark of a strong cultural identity. 
 For Benjamin, however, the totality underlying this ideal was inherently 
problematic.  Always suspicious of totalities as the bearer of false mythologies, 
Benjamin’s consistent response was to apply a logic of montage that would shatter 
totalities into fragments that could be remounted into conceptual constellations.22  This 
logic of montage, which represented a reformulation of the theory of allegory 
contained in Benjamin’s earlier book on Der Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, 
thus functioned as an anti-organicizing strategy for reducing vital symbolic meanings 
to “dead” raw material.  For Peter Bürger, Benjamin’s logic of montage reflected a 
fundamental component of the logic of the avant-garde in general:  
 
Artists who produce an organic work […] treat their material as 
something living.  They respect its significance as something that has 
                                                 
21  The Dialectics of Seeing, 117.  Emphasis in original. 
 
22  On how the “privileging of the fragmentary over the total and integral has left its traces in 
every area of Benjamin’s thought,” see, e.g., Michael W. Jennings, Dialectical Images: Walter 
Benjamin’s Theory of Criticism (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987): 54 ff. 
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grown from concrete life situations.  For avant-gardistes, on the other 
hand, material is just that, material. […] Whereas the classicist 
recognizes and respects in the material the carrier of a meaning, the 
avant-gardistes see only the empty sign, to which only they can impart 
significance.  The classicist correspondingly treats the material as a 
whole, whereas the avant-gardiste tears it out of the life totality, isolates 
it, and turns it into a fragment.23 
 
Precisely this logic of montage and of smashing of totalities was what made Benjamin 
suspicious of the attempt simply to do away with the ornamental casings in which both 
ideological fetters and utopian dream images were contained, in order to leave only 
the shining purity of the structure.  The logic of a search for fragments that could be 
imbued with meaning, rearranged into constellations whose meaning would be 
contingent on the time and place of their construction, led Benjamin rather to turn his 
attention to precisely that which the post-Nietzschean critique of historicism regarded 
as utterly valueless: the historicizing and ornamental detritus swept off of the façade.  
“Methode dieser Arbeit: literarische Montage.  Ich habe nichts zu sagen.  Nur zu 
zeigen.  Ich werde nichts Wertvolles entwenden und mir keine geistvolle 
Formulierungen aneignen.  Aber die Lumpen, den Abfall: die will ich nicht 
inventarisieren sondern sie auf die einzig mögliche Weise zu ihrem Rechte kommen 
lassen: sie verwenden.”24  By using this detritus for the construction of dialectical 
images, therefore, Benjamin no longer regarded it as sheer waste or mere supplement. 
 Thus Benjamin pointed to a tension between two avenues of avant-garde logic: 
the critique of historicism and the critique of organic totalities.  By turning the screws 
of the logic of montage ever tighter, Benjamin’s focus turned not to the bare, holistic 
structure to be revealed, but rather to the fragments left behind.  Thus, ironically, 
precisely that aspect of Benjamin’s thought most often perceived as nostalgic – the 
fascination with the fragments of the auratic – could claim its justification in the 
avant-gardiste gesture of fragmentation.  Inversely, if one accepted Benjamin’s 
suspicions of totalities, then it was precisely the radical critique of historicism that 
                                                 
23  Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota 
Press, 1984): 70. 
 
24  GS/V: 574. 
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appeared nostalgic due to the holism informing its ideal of an utterly self-consistent 
style.   
 This tension had the result that in a number of cases, Benjamin’s use of 
terminology that appeared to be drawn from the post-Nietzschean critique of 
historicism turned around and functioned as a critique of that tradition of critique.  
This is revealed most clearly in the case of his use of the term historicism itself.  
Benjamin perceived one of the prime characteristics of historicism in the shallowness 
of its understanding of time.  This shallow understanding of time determined the basic 
conceptual procedure of historicism, which, Benjamin stated, “ist additiv: sie bietet die 
Masse der Fakten auf, um die homogene und leere Zeit auszufüllen.”25  Historicism 
thus understood historical phenomena – people, events, epochs – as mere indifferent 
material to be stuffed into a temporal structure conceived as a homogeneous container.  
The individual qualities of the historical phenomena were erased in such process and 
transformed into sheer historical volume.  The result was a “continuum” in which the 
entire historical timeline might be weighted with facts, but those facts themselves were 
reduced to mere placeholders or points on the continuum, and their position along the 
timeline resulted from contingency rather than from internal correspondence. 
Benjamin’s portrayal of this homogenous temporal continuum clearly echoed 
Lukács’ concept of reification.  Lukács, in his description of the deleterious effects of 
modern rationalism, had claimed: “Thus time sheds its qualitative, variable, flowing 
nature; it freezes into an exactly delimited, quantifiable continuum filled with 
quantifiable ‘things’ (the reified, mechanically objectified ‘performance’ of the 
worker, wholly separated from his total human personality): in short, it becomes 
space.”26  Benjamin in effect repeated this notion of a reified perception of time and 
attributed it to historicism.27  Here Benjamin’s formulation appears to parallel the 
                                                 
25 GS/I: 702. 
 
26  Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1971): 90. 
 
27 Michael Jennings points out that  “Benjamin found in Lukács’ emphasis on reification a 
model upon which to base the modification of his own historical analysis in light of Marx” (Dialectical 
Images, 72).  On Lukács’ influence on Benjamin, see also Ferenc Feher, “Lukács and Benjamin: 
Parallels and Contrasts,” in New German Critique 34 (1985): 125-138. 
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post-Nietzschean critique of historicism.  For Benjamin just as for Nietzsche, Lukács, 
and Teige, historicism resulted from the convergence of history and formalism.  
Formalist logic transformed individuality into abstraction and replaced closed organic 
structures with an open-ended, “bad” infinity.  Benjamin’s description of the 
historicist continuum, with its propensity to devour “masses” of facts and its 
“additive” structure, clearly echoes this notion of formalism. 
 Benjamin’s formulation, however, contains one major difference from the 
other versions of this critique of historicism examined so far.  Both Herder and 
Nietzsche, despite the differing valorizations they placed on the historical sense, had 
perceived the danger of formalist logic in its breakdown of totalizing vision and its 
antipathy to holistic models for knowledge.  Not only Lukács but also Teige, despite 
their opposed conclusions about how to represent the physiognomy of the present, 
took over this opposition of formalism to holism.  But Benjamin’s suspicion of 
totalities of any kind led him to view rather the homogenous continuum itself as a 
monstrous, devouring totality, ready to absorb all of history into its structure.28  It was 
for this reason that Benjamin claimed: “Der Historismus gipfelt von rechtswegen in 
der Universalgeschichte.”29  In order to liberate historical phenomena from this 
oppressively totalizing structure, Benjamin sought a historical method that would 
allow one “eine bestimmte Epoche aus dem homogenen Verlauf der Geschichte 
herauszusprengen.”30  Only once the historical matter lay scattered in fragments could 
the historical materialist select and arrange them in a meaningful manner.   
 Benjamin was thus rigorous in his application of the logic of montage to the 
critique of historicist time as a reified continuum.  Sensing the taint of nostalgia that 
clung to the opposition of formalism and totality – a taint that had caught Teige in his 
                                                 
28 Buck-Morss, quoting Adorno’s interpretation of Lukács’ influence on Benjamin in this 
respect, writes: “Both Benjamin and Lukács demonstrated that ‘the petrified life within nature is merely 
what history has developed into.’  But Lukács, relying on Hegel’s philosophical legacy, was led 
ultimately to a totalizing conception of metaphysical transcendence, whereas Benjamin, schooled in the 
very different tradition of the Baroque allegorical poets, remained focused on the fragmentary, 
transitory object” (Dialectics of Seeing, 160). 
 
29 GS/I: 702. 
 
30 GS/I: 703. 
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dilemma of a dualism that would not go away – Benjamin strictly ruled out the 
possibility of regaining totality even through the gesture of a radical rejection of the 
historical.  The way out of the continuum would obviously not be found by crawling 
backwards, but neither would it be found by movement forward if the telos of that 
movement appeared simply as the negative outline of what had been rejected.  The 
only alternative was to smash the entire structure and make what use one could of the 
pieces.   
 This destructive gesture was Benjamin’s avant-garde gesture: expressive of a 
conviction that the truth about the present was to be found only in its broken 
fragments.  But this radically fragmenting move was motivated also by this other side 
of Benjamin’s critique of historicism: “Die Vorstellung eines Fortschritts des 
Menschengeschlechts in der Geschichte ist von der Vorstellung ihres eine homogene 
und leere Zeit durchlaufenden Fortgangs nicht abzulösen.”31  Benjamin linked the 
concept of progress (Fortschritt) with linear forward movement (Fortgang).  The 
empty temporal corridor in which such movement necessarily took place thus became 
the site where historicism crossed paths with a faith in open-ended progress and future 
reconciliation.  Benjamin’s attempts to limit this critique of progress to a critique of 
Social Democracy were not terribly convincing.  For what was really implicated by his 
critique of progress was the model of a cutting edge, a most advanced stage, 
fundamental not only to all Marxism32 but expressing the very essence of an “avant-
garde,” whether political or artistic.  Benjamin’s avant-gardist gesture of smashing the 
reified conception of time into fragments thus turned around and bit its own tail.  The 
commitment of a political or artistic movement to the invigorating power of the future 
and of revolutionary change in fact represented an inability to break out of the reified 
notion of a temporal continuum.  The characteristic that the avant-garde movements 
felt most separated them from historicism – the devotion to the future and to 
                                                 
31 GS/I: 701. 
 
32 As Rolf Tiedemann has put it: “Selbst as Marxische Vertrauen in die Entfaltung der 
Produktivkräfte hypostasierte den Fortschrittsbegriff und mußte Benjamin angesichts der Erfahrungen 
des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts als unhaltber erscheinen” (“Einleitung des Herausgebers,” in GS/V: 31). 
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technological progress – became in Benjamin’s formulation precisely what the two 
had most in common. 
 A similar reversal is enacted by Benjamin’s theory of the dialectical image.  
Benjamin envisaged the dialectical image as a tool with which to dismantle the usual 
representational structures used to construct historical images.  He claimed that 
“[d]iese Bilder sind durchaus abzugrenzen von den ‘geisteswissenschaftlichen’ 
Kategorien, dem sogenannten Habitus, dem Stil, etc.”33  Again, Benjamin identified 
the implicit holism that lay in the strong notion of style so central for Nietzsche and 
for Teige, a holism harboring a nostalgia that effectively turned Teige’s notion of a 
“style of the present” into an oxymoron.  And again, Benjamin’s response was to bring 
to bear the logic of montage.  Hence the dialectical image functioned through 
“constellations” that suddenly illuminate a historical truth for a particular moment in 
the present.  The material for such images first had to be obtained by exploding 
historical totalities into fragments: the task of the historical materialist was thus “eine 
bestimmte Epoche aus dem homogenen Verlauf der Geschichte herauszusprengen; so 
sprengt er ein bestimmtes Leben aus der Epoche, so ein bestimmtes Werk aus dem 
Lebenswerk.”34  The resulting dialectical image was neither an image in miniature of a 
particular historical moment, nor the expression of a Zeitgeist, nor the revelation of a 
hidden, “true face” of a historical object.  The dialectical image did not capture a 
permanent historical truth but represented rather a freeze-frame image taken in the 
midst of complex movement, an image that possessed relevance only for a fleeting 
moment, after which the constituent fragments would be released back into their 
dialectical movement.  Such “Dialektik im Stillstand”35 thus expressed the logic of 
montage not only in its structure as an assemblage of fragments, but also in its 
intrinsic association with a transient moment of the present. 
 The raw material of such a dialectical image was provided by the detritus of 
history; the act of bringing these fragments together into a constellation a form of 
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citation.  Benjamin regarded such citation as redeeming or reactivating the energies 
latent in the historical material, but only for a fleeting moment.  For Benjamin, the 
archetype of such reactivation was the citation of Rome by the French Revolution: “So 
war für Robespierre das antike Rom eine mit Jetztzeit geladene Vergangenheit, die er 
aus dem Kontinuum der Geschichte heraussprengte.  Die französische Revolution 
verstand sich als ein wiedergekehrtes Rom.  Sie zitierte das alte Rom genau so wie die 
Mode eine vergangene Tracht zitiert.”36  This concept of citation, however, not only 
served as a conceptual link between montage and redemption, thereby permitting 
Benjamin to move between the discontinuous modes of thought of the political and the 
theological.  It also contained an implicit critique of the manner in which the avant-
garde temporal logic had defined itself in opposition to historicism. For in the standard 
critique of historicism that Nietzsche had formulated so forcefully, quotation was one 
of the prime negative features of historicism.  Quotation for Nietzsche was the cultural 
practice of decadence, and decadence was the dissolution of a strong identity into 
eclecticism, of style into fashion.  The formal quotation utilized, for example, by 
historicist architecture in the shape of neoclassical, neogothic, and neobaroque styles 
appeared from this angle as nothing other than a passive repetition of the great 
achievements of the past, the sign of an inability to create original forms and thus of 
historical exhaustion.  Benjamin’s notion of redemptive citation thus functioned as a 
critique of the manner in which avant-garde temporal logic distinguished itself from 
historicism.  Historicist quotations served for Benjamin as the material for literary 
montage.  Characteristic historicist and avant-garde gestures – quotation and montage 
– thus appeared to be not hostile but rather moments of a single process.   
 The result of this self-critique of avant-gardist logic was that the idea that 
modern culture or society was infected by some sort of dissatisfying condition that 
could be termed “historicism” no longer appeared as a claim that the present was 
caught in the grip of the past.  The linkage of historicism and history that constituted 
Nietzsche’s legacy to the avant-garde was weakened, but precisely through the 
intensification, not rejection, of the avant-garde logic of montage.  The consequence of 
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this disengagement of historicism from the historical meant that Benjamin needed to 
locate the ground of his critique of historicism in a different conceptual structure.  He 
found that structure in the theory of historical experience. 
 
II.  The Calendar and the Clock 
 
Benjamin’s theory of experience attempted to describe a shift in the form of 
experience in modernity: a shift he designated with the terms Erfahrung and Erlebnis.  
The broad terms of that shift were as follows: Erfahrung denoted experience 
accumulated over time and providing an ongoing sense of structure to one’s 
perception of the world.  For Benjamin, Erfahrung was closely linked to the 
experience of tradition as a shared body of knowledge: Erfahrung was experience that 
bound a community.  By contrast, Erlebnis designated experience passed through at a 
given moment without leaving any trace in the form of broadened knowledge.  
Erlebnis was a form of experience that remained confined to the individual and was 
extinguished as soon as it was lived through.  For Benjamin, Erfahrung used to be the 
primary form of experience; it was what was taken for granted when one spoke of a 
person being “experienced.”37  During the nineteenth century, however, Erfahrung had 
become an ever more rare and privileged form of experience as it gave way to the 
increasing preponderance of experience as Erlebnis.  Erlebnis represented one of the 
by-products of advancing capitalism: the extension of reification into the deepest 
structures of human experience.  Reification was of course always embodied in a 
manner of perception or experience. Erlebnis, however, represented the intrusion of 
reification into not only the perception of objective phenomena but into the very 
experience of time, which appeared as quantified and hardened into a continuum.  The 
concept of Erlebnis thus formed an integral part of Benjamin’s critique of historicism.  
                                                 
37  “Diesen Abstand und diesen Blinkwinkel schreibt uns eine Erfahrung vor, zu der wir fast 
täglich Gelegenheit haben.  Sie sagt uns, daß es mit der Kunst des Erzählens zu Ende geht.  Immer 
seltener wird die Begegnung mit Leuten, welche rechtschaffen etwas erzählen können. […] Es ist, als 
wenn ein Vermögen, das uns unveräußerlich schien, das Gesichertste unter dem Sicheren, von uns 
genommen würde.  Nämlich das Vermögen, Erfahrungen auszutauschen” (GS/II: 439). 
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Erfahrung, the form of experience rooted in tradition, represented layered historical 
experience; Erlebnis represented historicist experience. 
 The temporal dimension involved in these different forms of experience led 
Benjamin to define their mechanisms through a consideration of the function of 
memory.  The text “Über einige Motive bei Baudelaire” equated Erfahrung with the 
Proustian mémoire involuntaire on the one hand, and Erlebnis with mémoire 
voluntaire on the other.  The precious rarity of Erfahrung found its counterpart in the 
unexpectedness of mémoire involuntaire; neither could be forced.  Erlebnis and 
mémoire voluntaire, on the other hand, both functioned through an active, conscious 
drive.   
Benjamin defined this activity of the consciousness as the decisive mechanism 
transforming Erfahrung into Erlebnis.  The structure and endurance characterizing 
Erfahrung reflected its safe harbor within the memory: the retention and protection of 
experience by memory allowed experience to be gathered in the form of personal 
wisdom or communal tradition.  Benjamin claimed, however, that the intervention of 
consciousness prevented the lodging of experience within the memory.  Invoking the 
authority of Freud, Benjamin stated “‘daß Bewußtwerden und Hinterlassung einer 
Gedächtnisspur für dasselbe System miteinander unverträglich sind.’”38  
Consciousness in this model did not simply prevent the ingress of experience into 
memory: consciousness indeed consisted precisely in the annihilation or evaporation 
(“Verpuffung”) of memory: “‘das Bewußtsein entstehe an der Stelle der 
Erinnerungsspur.’”39  The memory of experience, in other words, provided the fuel for 
consciousness.  The fuel was of course consumed in this process, and thus 
consciousness of experience necessarily meant the annihilation of such experience, its 
obliteration from memory.   Benjamin concluded: 
 
Erinnerungsreste sind vielmehr “oft am stärksten und haltbarsten, wenn 
der sie zurücklassende Vorgang niemals zum Bewußtsein gekommen 
ist.”  Übertragen in Prousts Redeweise: Bestandteil der mémoire 
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involuntaire kann nur werden, was nicht ausdrücklich und mit 
Bewußtsein ist “erlebt” worden, was dem Subjekt nicht als “Erlebnis” 
widerfahren ist.40 
 
Erlebnis thus arose from the consciousness of experience.  Such consciousness was 
purchased at the cost of depth and permanence of experience, since the experiential 
material was consumed before its admittance to the harbor of memory. 
 This model provided Benjamin with an historical explanation for the 
increasing predominance of Erlebnis in modern experience.  Modern experience was 
ever more marked by such interventions of consciousness because of the increasing 
frequency with which modern productive forces confronted one with the experience of 
shock.  In the experience of shock, consciousness served a positive function as a 
protective mechanism or “Reizschutz.”  Consciousness drained the traumatic energy 
from such shock experiences, allowing the subject to master those threats, forget them 
and move on.  Benjamin described this defensive function of consciousness with an 
image from Les Fleurs du Mal: consciousness “parried” such shocks.  Although this 
parrying was a necessary survival tactic in a milieu where “Chockerlebnis zur Norm 
geworden ist,” the result was that an ever greater portion of modern experience was 
transformed into Erlebnis:  
 
Daß der Chock derart abgefangen, derart vom Bewußtsein pariert 
werde, gäbe dem Vorfall, der ihn auslöst, den Charakter des Erlebnisses 
im prägnanten Sinn. […] Je größer der Anteil des Chockmoments an 
den einzelnen Eindrücken ist, je unablässiger das Bewußtsein im 
Interesse des Reizschutzes auf dem Plan sein muß, je größer der Erfolg 
ist, mit dem es operiert, desto weniger gehen sie in die Erfahrung ein; 
desto eher erfüllen sie den Begriff des Erlebnisses.”41 
 
Modern experience thus took place through a protective screen of consciousness.  This 
screen of consciousness, however, not only protected but also isolated: the experiences 
with which the subject was regularly confronted were annihilated in self-defense 
before they could leave any lasting trace.   
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 Such hyperactivity of consciousness fundamentally altered the perception of 
time.  Benjamin wrote: “Vielleicht kann man die eigentümliche Leistung der 
Chockabwehr zuletzt darin sehen: dem Vorfall auf Kosten der Integrität seines Inhalts 
eine exacte Zeitstelle im Bewußtsein anzuweisen.”42  Erlebnis splintered the integrated 
experience characteristic of Erfahrung into pieces that could each be assigned a 
precise point in time.  Time as structured through Erlebnis thus functioned in a manner 
effectively identical to what Benjamin described elsewhere as the empty continuum of 
historicism.  Where historicism engulfed “die Masse der Fakten” in order to hang such 
facts upon a timeline and thereby to fill the empty and homogenous temporal 
continuum, the parrying by consciousness sliced events into units small enough that 
each could be pinned to a discrete moment.  Separated and isolated in this way, such 
events lost their “integrity of content” as well as their threatening potential.   
 Thus time in Erlebnis was experienced differently than in Erfahrung.  A 
quantitatively equivalent stretch of time was qualitatively incomparable.  Benjamin 
evoked this difference metaphorically: Erfahrung unfolded in the space of the days 
measured by the calendar, while Erlebnis marched to the rhythm of seconds measured 
by the clock.  There could be no translation between these units of measurement: a 
calendar day represented more than 86,400 consecutive seconds.  The days of the 
calendar provided, so to speak, a space generous enough to contain events in all the 
integrity of their content; the seconds of the clock, on the other hand, represented so 
many tiny pins upon which only the analyzed and dissected remnants of psychological 
events could hang.   
 Calendar days measuring Erfahrung were of course for the most part an 
antiquated phenomenon, rooted in cultic ritual and religious rites.  Benjamin did, 
however, find something similar in the modern experience of revolution:  
 
Die große Revolution führte einen neuen Kalender ein.  Der Tag, mit 
dem ein Kalender einsetzt, fungiert als ein historischer Zeitraffer.  Und 
es ist im Grunde genommen derselbe Tag, der in Gestalt der Feiertage, 
die Tage des Eingedenkens sind, immer wiederkehrt.  Die Kalender 
zählen die Zeit also nicht wie Uhren.  Sie sind Monumente eines 
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Geschichtsbewußtseins, von dem es in Europa seit hundert Jahren nicht 
mehr die leisesten Spuren zu geben scheint.43 
 
The French Revolution represented a final enactment of the Feiertag as day of 
commemoration in the sense Benjamin ascribed to older forms of experience, still 
echoing their origins in cultic ritual.  Since that moment, however, such a resonant 
historical consciousness had disappeared without trace.  The modern European, for 
whom the reified historicist consciousness corresponding to Erlebnis had become the 
norm, was thus “cast out” of the calendar: “Die Anerkennung einer Qualität mit der 
Messung der Quantität vereint zu haben, war das Werk der Kalender, die mit den 
Feiertagen die Stellen des Eingedenkens gleichsam aussparen.  Der Mann, dem die 
Erfahrung abhanden kommt, fühlt sich aus dem Kalender herausgesetzt.”44   
 Benjamin traced the consequences of this modern experience of temporality 
through several characteristically modern social types. The most important of these 
was the gambler.  The gambler’s occupation was the purest expression of the lack of 
depth or direction in the clock time of Erlebnis.  Benjamin, playing on an implied pun 
in Baudelaire, claimed that the gambler’s gaming partner (“la Seconde”) was always 
“der Sekundenzeiger.”45  For the gambler, each throw of the dice, each draw of the 
cards, represented a new start or “Immer-wieder-von-vorn-anfangen”46 that had no 
influence on the next draw, left no trace, and produced no lasting structure – it simply 
evaporated in the space of a moment.  This gesture was thus the very enactment of 
Erlebnis, a gesture echoing the rhythm of the ticking clock.  Benjamin felt that this 
compulsive repetition of a beginning that was simultaneously an end and that never 
led anywhere connected the gambler’s gesture – the short hand movements of the 
throw of the dice or draw of the cards – with a whole series of characteristically 
modern gestures: the clicking of a snapshot, the lifting of a telephone receiver, or the 
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strike of a match.  Most significantly, however, this gesture connected the activity of 
the idle gamer with that of the overworked wage laborer: 
 
Aber was ihr [the factory worker’s labor] nicht abgeht, das ist die 
Vergeblichkeit, die Leere, das Nicht-vollenden-dürfen, welches viel 
mehr der Tätigkeit des Lohnarbeiters in der Fabrik innewohnt.  Auch 
dessen vom automatischen Arbeitsgang ausgelöste Gebärde erscheint 
im Spiel, das nicht ohne den geschwinden Handgriff zustande kommt, 
welcher den Einsatz macht oder die Karte aufnimmt.  Was der Ruck in 
der Bewegung der Maschinerie, ist im Hasardspiel der sogenannte 
coup.  Der Handgriff des Arbeiters an der Maschine ist gerade dadurch 
mit dem vorhergehenden ohne Zusammenhang, daß er dessen strikte 
Wiederholung darstellt.47 
 
These repetitive gestures – short and rhythmic like the ticking of the secondhand – 
thus represented for Benjamin the physical movements through which Erlebnis was 
played out.  The gambler and the wage laborer were no different at the end of their day 
than at the beginning: that time had indeed elapsed could be discerned only from the 
position of the hands of the clock. 
 The “Immer-wieder-von-vorn-anfangen” of these gestures reflected the process 
by which consciousness evaporated (“verpufft”) the traces of memory.  Consciousness 
of experience was a continuous starting over again with nothing gained.  This 
overactive consciousness thus transformed into a consciousness of the sheer passage 
of time.  Benjamin identified this consciousness with Baudelaire’s motif of spleen in 
Les Fleurs du Mal: “Aber im spleen ist die Zeitwahrnehmung übernatürlich geschärft; 
jede Sekunde findet das Bewußtsein auf dem Plan, um ihren Chock abzufangen.”48  
Such hyperconsciousness of the empty passage of time was in effect nothing more 
than a counting of the seconds until one’s death.    Erlebnis had little to do with life 
after all, but rather resembled the interminable wait before the carrying out of a death 
sentence.  Thus the gambler – for whom the luxury was available, unlike for the 
laborer – was in fact attempting to flee this horrifying thought, the consciousness of 
approaching death.  The neurotic addiction to the game represented a desperate need 
                                                 
47  Ibid., 633 
 
48  Ibid., 642.   
 
  
134  
 
 
 
for a narcotic, or a “Rauschgift […], mit dem die Spielenden das Bewußtsein zu 
übertäuben suchen, das sie dem Gang des Sekundenzeigers ausgeliefert hat.”49  That 
this narcotic simply mimicked the rhythm of what it was supposed to anaesthetize 
against, however, revealed the hopelessness of the gesture.  The relentlessly ticking 
seconds fell like bars forming a cage from which the modern subject would find no 
easy escape. 
 Benjamin perceived a similarly futile gesture in philosophical efforts to heal 
the wounds of historicism.  Benjamin found the major, if problematic, representatives 
of such philosophical efforts in the Lebensphilosophen from Dilthey to Klages und 
Jung (“der sich dem Faschismus verschrieben hat”50).  The most exceptional figure in 
this tradition, according to Benjamin, was Bergson, who attempted to escape the 
dissatisfactions of Erlebnis by grounding experience in the durée.  In Benjamin’s eyes, 
Bergson had merely exacerbated the situation; far from moving beyond historicism, he 
merely reproduced it in another form:  
 
“Der Metaphysiker Bergson unterschlägt den Tod.” Daß in Bergsons 
durée der Tod ausfällt, dichtet sie gegen die geschichtliche (wie auch 
gegen eine vorgeschichtliche) Ordnung ab. […] Die durée, aus der der 
Tod getilgt ist, hat die schlechte Unendlichkeit eines Ornaments.  Sie 
schließt es aus, die Tradition in sie einzubringen.  Sie ist der Inbegriff 
eines Erlebnisses, das im erborgten Kleide der Erfahrung 
einherstolziert.51 
 
Just as did the gambler’s attempt, Bergson’s attempt to escape the consciousness of 
death reproduced precisely that from which it fled: the bad infinity of ornament, the 
mere outer garment or costume of Erfahrung.   
Benjamin thus described Bergson’s false sublation of Erlebnis as an express 
route straight back to the historicism it sought to escape.  What this demonstrates is 
that Benjamin’s critique of Erlebnis allowed him to disconnect his critique of 
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historicism from the category of history.  Bergson ended up in historicism even when 
formulating a theory expressing the resonant durée of the present moment.  
Historicism for Benjamin was a form of experiencing not history, but time – and thus 
historicism need not use the past tense.  Historicism in the present tense was 
Lebensphilosophie (or at other times Social Democracy); in the future tense it was the 
ideology of progress.   
This represents a fundamental break with the post-Nietzschean critique of 
historicism.  The temporal logic articulated so forcefully by Nietzsche and 
subsequently developed into hyperbolic dimensions by the interwar avant-garde 
responded to its dissatisfactions with modern experience by formulating the ideal of an 
incandescent presence.  The vision of de-alienated experience was thus thoroughly 
temporalized and invested in a static opposition of past versus present.  This led to 
contradictions that remained remarkably similar over the time-span separating 
Nietzsche from Teige.  Both the theses of “history in the service of life” and of a 
“style of the present” express the limitations of this static opposition of past and 
present.  Nietzsche effectively formulated his notion of “useful” history as a form of 
presence, while Teige effectively formulated his ideal of true presence as a form of 
history. 
Benjamin, however, instead of articulating the problem of historicism in terms 
of a need to liberate oneself from a suffocating historical inheritance and to start anew 
with a tabula rasa, articulated the problem as one of the consciousness of history.  The 
consciousness of history, the accumulation of historical knowledge, produced the 
neurotic, inescapable awareness of one’s own position in history: an awareness that 
inevitably turned into a nervous insecurity or questioning of that position.  Just as the 
consciousness of present experiences prevented their entrance into memory and led to 
their degradation into the thinner form of Erlebnis, the consciousness of historical 
experience – which was nothing other than the essence of tradition – precluded the 
inhabiting of a secure and resonant historical identity.  Instead, such a consciously 
experienced historical identity transformed into the awkwardly self-conscious 
movements of a play-actor.  The historicism of, say, Wagnerian theatrical culture, or 
of its political counterparts in the 18th Brumaires and Neuschwansteins of the later 
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nineteenth-century, lay not so much in the mimicry of past forms – tradition had 
always expressed itself through the use of inherited forms – as in the consciousness of 
the gesture.   
This formulation of the problem of historicism in terms of historical 
consciousness was already partially implicit in Nietzsche as well.  Nietzsche’s 
emphasis on the necessity of forgetting was clearly directed at breaking out of the 
ever-accelerating cycle of hyperconscious calculation that reduced action to mere 
pretence or deception. The problem, however, was that such consciousness, once 
attained, could not be reversed.  Forgetting cannot be an act of the will, for that would 
make it a conscious act.  Nietzsche’s insistence on the gesture of forgetting implicitly 
shifted the issue from that of the tyrannical grip of consciousness to the tyrannical grip 
of the past.  The escape route appeared to lead through the singularity of a present that 
had always just slipped out of reach.  Thus given Nietzsche’s terms, history that was 
“useful for life,” de-alienated history, history released from the debilitating grasp of 
historicism, could be nothing other than history that effectively constituted a present. 
This dilemma of consciousness had of course appeared explicitly in Marx’s 
theory of ideology as alienated consciousness.  Consciousness that was locked in the 
movement of its own inner transactions signified for Marx a consciousness that had 
lost touch with the essential reality of its present, with the present as it really is.  
Marx’s solution was to formulate the ideal of de-alienated consciousness as a clear 
window onto that essential reality.  But this transparency ideal solved the problem of 
independent consciousness literally by making it disappear: Marx effectively equated 
de-alienated consciousness with material reality.  The result was that the unshakable 
fellow traveler of this ideal of transparent consciousness was the vulgar reflection 
model, wherein consciousness provoked a guilty conscience since it represented a 
useless supplement or wasteful luxury.  Thus Marx faced the dilemma that the 
moment he tried to theorize de-alienated consciousness as an independent entity, he 
had already failed in his goal, for such an independent consciousness was by definition 
already ideology.  Nietzsche’s faced a similar paradox: to arrive at a history that would 
be useful for life, one had to forget the past.  To achieve what they sought – to avoid 
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reproducing consciousness and history in the form of a decoration or disguise – Marx 
and Nietzsche had both had to abandon what they sought. 
Benjamin offered no solution to this paradox.  The very terms through which 
he formulated his meta-critique of historicism were grounded in their own transience, 
their applicability to a particular moment only – itself the sign that the critical force of 
Benjamin’s theory of experience had been purchased dearly.  Nevertheless, his theory 
of experience and the consciousness of memory did produce terms allowing 
formulation of the paradoxes invoked by the consciousness of history.  Such a “weak” 
critical force is perhaps the only one possible. 
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Conclusion  
 
FROM POSTMODERNISM TO POST-HISTORICISM? 
 
 
The temporal presuppositions and prejudices associated with the term “avant-garde” 
can easily appear too obvious to require investigation.  The connotations of forward 
movement, of a cutting edge, and of the conquering of new territory, are immediate 
and undeniable.  Such connotations seem at first to leave no alternative to the temporal 
scheme whereby the avant-garde valorization of the future stands opposed to concern 
for the past, and whereby the avant-garde ideal of innovation and self-recreation 
stands in stark contrast to the alter ego by which it was haunted: “historicism,” the 
captivity to tradition and inherited form. 
Nevertheless, putting pressure on the avant-garde critique of historicism 
reveals that such a stark temporal contrast is indeed problematic.  While this critique 
ostensibly castigated historicism for its excessive investment in the category of the 
historical, what lay underneath this argument was in fact the complaint with the 
shallowness of the historicist consciousness.  Historicism was thus not so much the 
condition of a culture suffering from a “surfeit of history” (Nietzsche’s “Überfluß”) as 
of a culture existing in a historical vacuum or interregnum, dependant upon borrowed 
identities.  Paradoxically, precisely the avant-garde commitment to the future was, in 
the logic of this critique, the move that would endow the present with a deeper 
understanding of itself and thus with a true historical identity.  As Alan Colquhoun has 
described it in reference to the architects of the interwar avant-garde: “only by looking 
toward the future could they be faithful to the spirit of history and give expression in 
their works to the spirit of the age.”1 
The question then becomes what consequences should be drawn from an 
appreciation of this paradox.  The point is certainly not to add another item to a 
checklist of contradictions in the logic of the avant-garde and thereby imply that some 
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sort of “error” or “naiveté” inheres in that logic.  Rather, the problem may lie with our 
own sense – now, in a period when the severity of the avant-garde rejection of the 
historical has long since lost its compelling force – that the complications raised by 
this critique of historicism no longer apply to us.   
One of the more significant of the various phenomena claiming the label of 
postmodernism is the assertion that the last quarter-century or so has witnessed the 
return to a historical sense (which may be understood in a variety of ways) after the 
excesses of the avant-garde temporal paradigm.  As Matei Calinescu formulates it: 
“abandoning the strictures of the avant-garde and opting for a logic of renovation 
rather than radical innovation, postmodernism has entered into a lively reconstructive 
dialogue with the old and the past.”2  Andreas Huyssen has traced this development 
closely, describing how in the 1960’s postmodernism first “revitalized the impetus of 
the historical avant-garde and subsequently [in the 1970’s] delivered that ethos up to a 
withering critique.”3  This shift has generally been regarded as having two causes.  
The first is simply the success and subsequent exhaustion of the avant-garde temporal 
model: the sense that, as Irving Howe commented, the “search for the ‘new’ […] has 
become the predictable old.”4  It would appear that the avant-garde logic of incessant 
innovation and reinvention inevitably had to reach a stage where the most radical 
reinvention possible was the complete inversion of the very logic of innovation itself.  
Huyssen refers to this as “the novelty of no longer fetishizing the new,”5 and Gianni 
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Vattimo terms it the “dissolution of the category of the new.”6  Some commentators 
take this observation one step further and portray this shift as having been catalyzed 
by an increasing sense of the “naiveté of modernism’s ideologically and aesthetically 
motivated rejection of the past.”7  The exhaustion of the avant-garde temporal 
paradigm could then be viewed as at least partly due to the revelation of the sheer 
destructiveness of the logic of innovation, the feeling that it had led not to the 
promised cleansing fire of aesthetic renewal but rather to an impoverishment of 
contemporary experience: to the aesthetic “emptiness” of a pure white canvas or glass-
and-steel curtain wall and to the silence of a literature without narrative.8   
The second cause often pointed to is the enormous development of modern 
media and communications technology.  The ever-increasing ease with which 
temporal and spatial boundaries are actually or apparently overcome in the era of 
CNN, the World Wide Web, and mobile telecommunications networks has resulted in 
a shrinkage of the temporal register within which many people’s everyday lives are 
lived.  This implementation of an “omnipresence” in practice was inconceivable in the 
period of the historical avant-garde, for which the rejection of history remained a 
revolutionary slogan, an aesthetic ideal, or a theoretical postulate.  The result is that 
contemporary history appears to many as “the history of that era in which, thanks to 
the use of new means of communication (especially television), everything tends to 
flatten out at the level of contemporaneity and simultaneity, thus producing a de-
historization of experience.”9  For Huyssen, the “synchronicity” brought about by new 
communications technology constitutes a major impulse for the return of a concern 
                                                 
6  The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture, trans. Jon R. 
Snyder (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1988): 4. 
 
7  Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction (London: Routledge, 
1988): 30. 
 
8  See, e.g., Umberto Eco, Postscript to The Name of the Rose, trans. William Weaver (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovitch, 1984): 67. 
 
9  Vattimo, The End of Modernity, 10.  Fredric Jameson also speaks of “the emergence of a 
new kind of flatness or depthlessness” in the postmodern, although he does not necessarily connect this 
to the issue of technology (Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism [Durham: Duke 
Univ. Press, 1991]: 9).   
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with memory and “extended structures of temporality,”10 which he identifies in the 
contemporary popularity of the museum as a mass medium: 
 
The museal gaze thus may be said to revoke the Weberian 
disenchantment of the world in modernity and to reclaim a sense of 
non-synchronicity and of the past.  In the experience of a transitory 
reenchantment, which like ritual can be repeated, this gaze at museal 
things also resists the progressive dematerialization of the world which 
is driven by television and the virtual realities of computer networking.  
The gaze at the museal object may provide a sense of its opaque and 
impenetrable materiality as well as an anamnestic space within which 
the transitoriness and differentiality of human cultures can be grasped.  
Via the activity of memory, set in motion and nurtured by the 
contemporary museum in its broadest and most amorphous sense, the 
museal gaze expands the ever shrinking space of the (real) present in a 
culture of amnesia, planned obsolescence and ever more synchronic 
and timeless information flows, the hyperspace of the coming age of 
information highways.11 
 
For Huyssen then, the contemporary museum – transformed from earlier incarnations 
as a shrine of high culture into a mass medium with the potential for critical 
destabilization of widely accepted truths – provides a temporary but healthy refuge 
from the flattening of experience through technology.  For this reason, the ideological 
opposition of progressive modernity v. reactionary museum, so central for the 
historical avant-garde, can no longer hold.12 
 These two causal factors – the first a development in the dialectic of 
modernism, the second in the technology of modernity – would thus at first sight 
appear to portray the situation confronted by postmodernism as the more or less direct 
inverse of that addressed by the critique of historicism inherited by the avant-garde 
from Nietzsche.  Huyssen phrases it thus: “Nietzsche’s polemic addressed the 
hypertrophy of historical consciousness in public culture, while our symptom would 
seem to be its atrophy. […] Thus our fever is not a consuming historical fever in 
                                                 
10  Twilight Memories, 9. 
 
11  Ibid., 34.  
 
12  See ibid., 21. 
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Nietzsche’s sense, which could be cured by productive forgetting.  It is rather a 
mnemonic fever that is caused by the virus of amnesia that at times threatens to 
consume memory itself.”13  In other words, where the avant-garde critique of 
historicism had reacted against an overly magnified historical consciousness, 
postmodernism confronts the historical vacuum created by a triumphant modernism 
and the advance of technology.   
Here is where closer investigation of the critique of historicism reveals its 
consequences for our contemporary situation.  For the historical vacuum addressed 
explicitly by much of postmodernism was addressed implicitly by the avant-garde 
critique of historicism as well.  Yet we continue to view these aspects of 
postmodernism as a reaction against, or a pendulum swinging away from, the excesses 
of that critique.  The point is certainly not to deny that much of postmodernism 
construes itself precisely as such a reaction and formulates its terminology directly in 
opposition to avant-gardism or high modernism.  The point is rather to acknowledge 
that the temporal dilemma at work here may be complicated enough that no such 
“reversal” or “return” is possible without ignoring central tensions in the avant-garde 
temporal paradigm.14 
An example may illustrate how this oppositional scheme tends to break down.  
James Clifford has forcefully described how the standard representational practices of 
anthropology often serve to locate tribal cultures in a de-historicized, mythic time.  
Analyzing the exhibition of the Hall of Pacific Peoples at the American Museum of 
Natural History in New York, Clifford notes how photographs taken recently of 
aboriginal cultures often bore captions in the past tense, while photographs or artifacts 
                                                 
13  Ibid., 6-7. 
 
14  I am clearly oversimplifying somewhat here.  Certainly no one has argued (as if they could) 
for a straightforward return to nineteenth-century historicism.  The reversals and returns of 
postmodernism are always enacted with the simultaneous introduction of new terms – memory, irony, 
multiplicity, and so on – that essentially change the dynamic of this postmodern historical 
consciousness.  Be that as it may, the scheme that “avant-garde = rejection of history” and 
“postmodernism = renewed concern with history” is commonly presupposed, and this is the issue I am 
trying to complicate here. 
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from the turn of the century would be described in the present tense.15  By thus 
relegating these cultures to a mythic time – either “a vanishing past or an ahistorical, 
conceptual present”16 – such anthropology preserves the image of a “pure” culture that 
cannot be touched by Western modernity without vanishing or losing its essential 
identity.  Thus the task of this anthropology appears as the task of collecting, 
assembling, and re-creating the characteristic expressions of such cultures before they 
disappear.  As Clifford puts it: “in this temporal ordering the real or genuine life of 
tribal works always precedes their collection, an act of salvage that repeats an all-too-
familiar story of death and redemption. […] At the Hall of Pacific Peoples or the 
Rockefeller Wing the actual ongoing life and ‘impure’ inventions of tribal peoples are 
erased in the name of cultural or artistic ‘authenticity.’”17  An alternate model of 
ethnography, Clifford suggests, would return such cultures to a truly historical 
temporal register in which change, adaptation, and advance would not be perceived as 
“impurities” but rather as evidence of the continuing vitality of such cultures.  As he 
describes it: “[…] one can at least imagine shows that feature the impure, ‘inauthentic’ 
productions of past and present tribal life; exhibitions radically heterogenous in their 
global mix of styles; exhibitions that locate themselves in specific multicultural 
junctures; exhibitions in which nature remains ‘unnatural’ […]”.18  Clifford finds an 
example of something akin to this in a particular exhibition on Asante art and culture 
which displayed not only “pure” cultural products but also “evidence of the twentieth-
century colonial suppression and recent renewal of Asante culture […], along with 
color photos of modern ceremonies and newly made ‘traditional’ objects brought to 
New York as gifts for the museum.”  The result of such representational strategy was 
that  “[t]he tribal is fully historical.”19   
                                                 
15  See The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1988): 202. 
 
16  Ibid., 201. 
 
17  Ibid., 202. 
 
18  Ibid., 213. 
 
19  Ibid., 210-11. 
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This impure ethnography clearly seems to share in the general return to the 
historical that constitutes such a significant part of the postmodern critique of the 
avant-garde.  In particular, the emphasis on impurities and a vital eclecticism that 
Clifford associates with this historicizing ethnography is deeply at odds with the 
holistic vision of a true style so central for both Nietzsche and Teige.  From this angle 
the postulate of a true style appears as an essentializing fiction that whitewashes out 
the true traces of history: the accidental, the makeshift, the disruptive or the local.  
From another angle, however, Clifford’s vision of an impure ethnography appears 
strikingly Nietzschean in its celebration of vitality, creative appropriation of foreign 
elements (for example, the traces of colonial rule or even of contact with 
ethnographers), the ability to digest outside stimulae and turn them into impulses for 
original self-expression.  Representing these cultures in an historical mode thus 
involves perceiving the expressions of their ongoing life: “The historical contacts and 
impurities that are part of ethnographic work […] may signal the life, not the death, of 
societies.”20  Most striking, however, is that Clifford figures this return to the 
historical largely as a process of recognizing traces of the present.  Clifford comments 
that “[…] in most of the Hall of Pacific Peoples history has been airbrushed out. (No 
Samoan men at the kava ceremony are wearing wristwatches; Trobriand face painting 
is shown without noting that it is worn at cricket matches.)”21  The impurities that 
return these tribal cultures to an historical register thus consist in the signs of their 
ongoing development in the present.   
Here is where the line that would separate an anti-historical avant-garde from 
an historicizing postmodernism begins to blur.  Clifford’s ethnography, just as had 
Teige’s Constructivism, associates historical identity with the recognition of the true 
face of the present.  The photograph of a New Guinea girl wearing necklaces 
ornamented by photographers’ flash bulbs22 functions similarly to Teige’s call to find 
Poetism in the factory: both function to recuperate what had hitherto been excluded 
                                                 
20  Ibid., 201. 
 
21  Ibid., 202. 
 
22  See ibid., 211. 
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(from the purity of  “culture” on the one hand and of the “aesthetic” on the other) in 
the name of a positive acknowledgement of contemporary reality.  In the former case 
this recuperation is presented as the return to the historical and a celebration of the 
eclectic; in the latter case as the escape from the historical and the overcoming of 
eclecticism.  But these opposed terms meet in the identification of a vital and creative 
present identity. 
If the line between the avant-garde rejection of history and postmodern 
historicism can blur so radically, perhaps that line is not the most appropriate to use in 
drawing our cultural categories.  A different angle on these categories can perhaps be 
found by arranging them into a chart: 
 
Anti-Historicizing     Historicizing 
Monolithic Modernism (-) 
- Flattening of experience 
- Global uniformity 
Polymorphous postmodernism (+) 
- Memory and local diversity 
- Multicultural eclecticism 
Critique of historicism (+) 
- Overcoming weak eclecticism 
- Finding pattern, style of present 
 Traditionalism (-) 
- Sees loss of tradition, communal ties  
- Weak relativism 
Table 1: Avant-Garde vs. Postmodern Temporal Biases 
 
This chart represents in slogan-like fashion four general positions possible towards the 
issues discussed above.  The two fields on the left represent, respectively, negative and 
positive perceptions of the avant-garde (or, many would claim, generally modernist) 
hostility to history, while the two fields on the right represent positive and negative 
perceptions of the postmodern return to an eclectic historicizing mode.  The upper left-
hand box, labeled “monolithic modernism,” represents the negative perception of a 
triumphant modernism that has erased all diversity: what Marshall Berman has 
described as the “expressway world”23 of faceless skyscrapers rising on the ruins of 
neighborhoods that had possessed unique characters, and the banal uniformity of the 
                                                 
23  See All That Is Solid Melts Into Air, 164-171 and chapter V. 
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modern metropolis even in countries enormously distant from each other.  The upper 
right-hand box represents a particular postmodern response to monolithic modernism: 
the emphasis on local traditions and on their mixing and adaptation, on “the diversity 
of history and geography”24 as an antidote to the “absolutism”25 of the modern.  Here 
is where the general trends of a postmodernist historicism discussed above would fall.  
The lower fields represent, respectively, the avant-garde critique of historicism that 
has been examined in the foregoing chapters, with its critique of weak, eclectic 
borrowing through the positing of forceful stylistic expression; and a neo-conservative 
critique of the postmodernism, which shares the focus on the return to greater 
temporal anchoring but identifies the postmodern strategy of eclecticism as 
contributing to rather than ameliorating the loss of secure historical identity (this 
position has remained outside the above discussion).  These categories are very 
general, of course, and one could certainly refine and add to them.  The point here, 
however, is simply to point out how the decisive dividing line is generally regarded as 
that separating the left-hand column from that on the right: separating the anti-
historicizing positions from the historicizing ones.  What the present discussion of the 
avant-garde critique of historicism aims to suggest is that a more productive line of 
thought may be one that runs along a rising diagonal: one that tries to negotiate the 
points of contact between the avant-garde critique of historicism and a “polymorphous 
postmodernism.”  That such points of contact exist has been demonstrated by the 
example of Clifford’s ethnography; finding the terminology to express such contact, 
however, is a task the present dissertation has not undertaken.  Were it undertaken, 
such an investigation might find that attempts to articulate a break with avant-garde 
temporal paradigms through various historicisms and returns to the past in fact remain 
caught within the temporal presuppositions they criticize. 
                                                 
24 Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (Chicago: Univ. of 
Chicago Press, 1990): 156. 
 
25  See, e.g., Wolfgang Welsch’s claim that “the more radically one rejects everything pre-
existing, the more exclusive and binding the ground gained through radical innovation must be.  To the 
degree that one destroys all bridges with tradition and negates all alternatives to modernism, modernism 
itself becomes tendentially absolute” (Unsere postmoderne Moderne, 3rd ed., [Weinheim: VCH. Acta 
Humaniora, 1991): 156. (My translation.) 
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